Turkish President Recep Erdoğan is notable for his acumen and his particular pragmatism. Like Kemal Atatürk in his time, he has achieved a fairly advanced partnership with Russia in the field of economy, politics, and security.
The fact that Turkey, being a NATO member, still tries to maintain an independent course towards Russia, to develop mutually beneficial economic relations with it (especially in the field of energy, transit communications and tourism), not to participate fully in the anti-Russian sanctions of the collective West, not to rule out the possibility of new agreements with Russia on military-technical cooperation, certainly speaks of Erdoğan’s pragmatic approach.
The Turkish leader’s policy allows Ankara to achieve considerable success in military diplomacy in partnership with Moscow (in particular in Libya, Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh). The latter helps to strengthen Turkey’s regional positions in North Africa, the Middle East and the South Caucasus, as well as stimulates the process of planning a new breakthrough in post-Soviet Central Asia, taking into account local resources and ethnocultural ties.
In the situation of the protracted Russian-Ukrainian crisis, Turkey has not officially taken an unambiguous position in favor of the conflicting parties, but has acted as an effective mediator, given Erdoğan’s trusting relationship with Putin and Zelensky. However, it should be noted that the personal preferences of President Recep Erdoğan are still more inclined towards President Vladimir Putin, given their long period of acquaintance and joint cooperation (in some ways even the similarity of their characters and age correspondence), and most importantly, the high role of Russia in the economic development of modern Turkey. Erdoğan’s relations with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky are more bound up with geopolitical considerations and partly with Turkey’s obligations within the NATO framework than with personal affinities (Erdoğan and Zelensky not only represent different generations of politicians by age but they also differ significantly in character).
Historically and methodologically, any military conflict always needs mediation to reconcile the parties. However, as a rule, mediation in a conflict, in addition to common moral values, also pursues very pragmatic economic and political interests. Traditionally, Turkish diplomacy is famous for its pragmatism and is focused on Turkey’s national interests. How does Turkey’s pragmatism manifest itself in the current crisis between Russia and Ukraine?
Admittedly, Ankara’s mediation efforts have had real and tangible achievements, although not breakthrough ones. During the 15 months of the ongoing Russian Armed Forces special military operation (SMO) in Ukraine, thanks to Turkey’s mediation mission, Moscow and Kiev:
a) began to hold multi-level talks in Istanbul involving different agencies (Foreign and Defense Ministries, foreign intelligence agencies);
b) made several successful prisoner exchanges;
c) have concluded a grain export deal (the “grain deal”);
d) have been discussing other possible deals (e.g., for the export of Russian agro-industrial products).
Finally, the Black Sea area is not becoming a theater of military operations with the involvement of additional NATO forces, because Turkey, following the provisions of the Montreux Convention, does not open the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits for the entry of military vessels of third countries (for example, the US and British Navy) into the Black Sea.
Ankara has repeatedly stated at a high level that it would not allow provocations against Russia, considers it irresponsible to take sides in this conflict, does not want to participate in the conflict against Russia, understands the rationale of the Kremlin’s position, which, at a minimum, should be respected instead of bringing the situation to a global disaster and the third world war. However, politicians’ words often serve to conceal real actions.
Firstly, Turkey, with its mediation mission, increases the authority and image of its own state in world politics. It helps Erdoğan to strengthen Turkey’s independent status and its new role in international affairs.
Secondly, Turkey compensates for its mediation efforts between Russia and Ukraine quite effectively with economic and financial dividends (in the form of the “grain deal”, receiving new megaprojects from Russia for the “gas hub”, planning the construction of a second nuclear power plant in Sinop according to a profitable scheme similar to the Akkuyu nuclear power plant in Mersin, obtaining discounts on Russian gas or deferred payments for gas in the amount of $ 20 billion).
Thirdly, Turkey refrains from full participation in Western sanctions against Russia (in which Turkey however participates in part), and actually suggests that Moscow consider its territory as the main “transit artery” to the outside world (primarily to Europe). The latter scheme promises Ankara considerable financial and other economic benefits (including impressive discounts on oil and gas), and over time (that is, after the start of their operation) a certain dependence of the Russian market on the position of Turkey.
Fourthly, Turkey, by providing intermediary and economic assistance to Russia (for example, in the parallel transit of sanctioned goods), is trying to promote its interests in the regions of the historical presence and influence of the Russian state (for example, in the South Caucasus and Central Asia) from a tougher position. Ankara no longer minds Moscow’s opinion on the Turkic cooperation, has created the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) and is increasingly taking advantage of the crisis to reorient the transit of energy resources of the Turkic CIS countries to the European market bypassing Russia through Turkey. In this case, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan are particularly active. Turkmenistan’s stance is also changing from strict neutrality to that of an interested observer in the OTS.
The Turks are closely paying attention to the opinions of the Russian experts as well as the political science community for options to resolve the Ukrainian crisis. As you know, Ankara, for all its respectful relations with Moscow, initially did not recognize the incorporation of Crimea into Russia, as well as its reunification with other regions (the DPR and the LPR, the Kherson and Zaporozhe regions). Turkey, therefore, considers all of these territories to be part of Ukraine. However, this position of the Turkish side is still based on the current realities of its vision of territorial contradictions. What will happen tomorrow remains a matter of conjecture.
This being said, when some well-known figures in Russia (for example, Igor Girkin / Strelkov) hypothetically admit some kind of partition of the Ukrainian territory between Russia, Poland, Hungary, and Romania (that is, the eastern and south-eastern regions in favor of Russia taking into account the current realities, Galicia goes to Poland, the Carpathian region to Hungary, and Bender to Romania allegedly in exchange for mutual recognition of territorial changes), then what could prevent Turkey from joining the process with claims to the “Tatar Crimea”? The Turks promise neither Girkin nor anyone else that it won’t happen.
Meanwhile, Turkey carries out very differentiated mediation between Russia and Ukraine and explains its position to the West with the need to maintain bridges with Moscow, and to Russia with the expediency of maintaining influential relations with Kyiv. Turkey not only refuses to recognize the territorial reality of the 15-month-long Special Military Operation in Ukraine, but is also known to provide the Kyiv regime with considerable military-technical and humanitarian aid (including deliveries of Bayraktar-TB2 drones and Kirpi armored personnel carriers, UAV operators and Gray Wolf fighters, etc.).
Turkish Bayraktar drones had proven themselves in other theaters of military operations before the Ukrainian events (e.g., in Nagorno-Karabakh on the side of Azerbaijan). In the initial period of the SMO, when the Turks began to supply Kyiv with Bayraktars to be used against the RF Armed Forces, and the head of the Turkish UAV production company Baykar Makina, Selçuk Bayraktar (a son-in-law of President Recep Erdoğan) announced his intention to establish a joint venture in Ukraine to produce drones, the Russian side suggested that the Turkish colleagues should make a similar deal with the Russian Federation as well.
However, Turkey has officially claimed it was business and nothing more. In turn, Erdoğan’s son-in-law and simultaneously head of Baykar Makina, Selçuk Bayraktar unequivocally ruled out any possibility of military-technical cooperation with Russia in the situation of the Ukrainian crisis. How should one then understand Turkey’s motivation whose president says it is “business and nothing more,” while his son-in-law rules out any possibility of cooperation with Russia for political reasons? Then Russia can reciprocate Turkey’s decision and suspend military-technical cooperation because arms trade is not about tomatoes, but always and at all times it is about politics.
It is known that Turkey is cooperating with Ukraine on the supply of engines for the development of unmanned aerial vehicles. Within the framework of Erdoğan’s election program, for objective reasons, the ruling regime regularly presents new achievements of the current government in the field of economy, modern technologies, defense industry, politics and diplomacy to the Turkish society. In the context of this propaganda campaign, the deal with the Ukrainian side to sign three new contracts with the Turkish UAV manufacturer Baykar Makina at the international exhibition of aviation and aerospace equipment Teknofest in Istanbul was announced on April 30, 2023, which allows Kiev to get new generation weapons. Moreover, in the summer of 2022, the Ukrainian ambassador to Turkey, Vasyl Bodnar, announced the construction of the Bayraktar drone manufacturing plant in Ukraine, which was scheduled be built within two years.
So far, Russian troops have been quite successful in using Tor-M2 air defense systems to destroy Turkish drones during the SMO in Ukraine. In turn, Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov called the alleged Bayraktar plant in Ukraine another facility to be demilitarized. It turns out that Turkey, on the one hand, maintains good and mutually beneficial partnership relations with Russia, and on the other hand, its mediation is differentiated and brings some tension to the format of relations with our country.
In our view, in a situation of military conflict, a mediator must remain faithful to its declarations of trust with the opposing sides and exclude military and technical assistance to one of them. Otherwise, the degree of trust on the part of the other partner is inversely proportional to the degree of complicity of the “mediator” in the conflict. In addition, Russia is able to demonstrate a similar “business and nothing more” motivation in other conflicts, where Turkey supports one of the parties (including, for example, in Syria or Nagorno-Karabakh).
Aleksandr SVARANTS, PhD in political science, professor, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”
