With the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the United States and its NATO allies, firstly, regarded themselves victorious in the post-World War II conflict, and secondly, set a course for the formation of a unipolar world order under United States hegemony.
Russia, as the successor of the Soviet Union, during the difficult 1990s-2000s of the transition period, was in fact unable to oppose the American course with its own autonomous strategy. The situation was aggravated by the “parade of sovereignty” in the former Soviet Union, the virus of separatism within the Federation (North Caucasus, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, etc.), the lack of a collective ideology in society, and the systemic crisis of the economy and state institutions.
With the change of power in 2000 and positive changes in the economy (primarily in world energy markets) the new Russian president Vladimir Putin managed to reverse the trend of the deepening crisis, gain financial stability, and start reforms in the economy and defense complex in particular.
As some Russian politicians and businessmen have noted, even before 2014 (that is, when Russia was in the G-8) in his numerous meetings and negotiations with Western partners, Vladimir Putin repeatedly noted the importance for Russia to maintain its historical and geopolitical presence and influence in post-Soviet countries. The latter was determined not only by the history of living together as part of a single state for centuries (the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union), but also by the intertwining of human destinies, mentality, economic justifications, natural communications links, military security considerations and Russia’s status as a nuclear triad possessor like the United States.
Their Western counterparts, however, pretended to understand the Russian leader’s concerns, but, as time has shown, they continued with their anti-Russian policies and did exactly the opposite. The US and Britain were spinning the course of NATO’s eastward movement (in Russia it reminded of Adolf Hitler’s slogan “Drang nach Osten”), dragging the same Baltic States, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan into new programs of cooperation with NATO. As for the Turkic-Islamic republics of the CIS (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) the USA and Britain actively used the capabilities of Turkey with its modernized version of the doctrine of Pan-Turkism and Panturanism.
As a result, new hotbeds of tension with an anti-Russian bias appeared in the former Soviet Union. In spring 2004, the Baltic states joined NATO; GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova; from 1999 to 2005 it included Uzbekistan), a regional organization created in 1997 at the initiative of the West, was planning to join it. The “color revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine, supervised by the US and British intelligence services, led not only to the replacement of weak local regimes by pro-Western leaders, but also to the initiation of an active policy of distancing Georgia and Ukraine from their alliance with Russia.
Unresolved conflicts as a legacy of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the costs of the national and administrative policies of the Communist Party occupied a special place in the former Soviet Union. These problems, in the resolution of which the same United States and EU countries (for example, France and Germany) became officially involved under the Aegis of the OSCE, have not yet received an objective resolution. The same situation persists in the situation with Nagorno-Karabakh, Donbass, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria.
Meanwhile, in 1994 Washington and London began to realize a new anti-Russian strategy in the post-Soviet area using geo-economic projects to form pipeline communications bypassing Russian routes to export strategically important oil and gas from the Caspian basin to the European market. At the suggestion of Great Britain, the USA began to actively use NATO’s Turkey with its doctrine of Neo Pan-Turkism and Neo-Panturanism in these projects. The latter was explained by the fact that the Turkic countries of the CIS (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), considering Turkey as their closest ally, are the main owners of oil and gas in the Caspian and Central Asian energy regions.
Moscow was looking for options that ruled out a radical path of confrontation with the West and the former Soviet republics. However, the more Russia tried to intensify diplomacy and provide economic and political bonuses to its CIS partners, the more the West saw in Russia’s actions a weakness and the possibility of another onslaught on the formation of centrifugal tendencies from Moscow. The results of this same US policy were:
– The involvement of more and more external players from among its allies (partners) in anti-Russian practices in the former Soviet Union (including Turkey, Israel, Italy, Bulgaria, Poland, etc.);
– implementation of new transport and energy communications bypassing Russia: Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan oil pipeline; Baku – Tbilisi – Erzurum gas pipeline, “Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline – TANAP”; Baku – Tbilisi – Kars railroad;
– “color revolutions” to change regimes in a number of CIS countries (Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Armenia);
– military conflicts in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine.
As is well-known, on February 10, 2007 the President of Russia declared at the international forum on security in Germany the inadmissibility of forming the unipolar world with the hegemony of the USA, which objectively doesn’t meet the interests of global and regional security under the condition of reality of the multipolar world with the variety of centers of gravity of the world order. This position of Russia caused shock among the Americans and the British, as well as understanding on the part of a number of world actors in Europe, Asia, South America and Africa. Subsequently, the world observed the escalation of the situation against Russia, the new conflicts provoked by Anglo-Saxons in the former Soviet Union, Middle East and Africa.
In Kosovo, the USA created a precedent on revision of the Helsinki conclusion of 1975 about inviolability of the European borders after the Second World War. When Russia recognized the sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in response to military provocation of international swindler Saakashvili’s regime, the West accused Moscow of “aggression”, “occupation” and other sins. The same practice of the Western diplomacy continued after the annexation of the Crimea by the Russian Federation on the basis of the principle of self-determination of nations and the will of the Crimean people according to the results of the referendum.
All this gave rise to Russia’s forced appeal to the US and NATO in December 2021 about the need to stop the destructive policy of the West to promote the North Atlantic Alliance to the East (in the same Ukraine), to respect the rights and freedoms of the people of Donbass. The critical perception of Russia’s position by the collective West became a catalyst for the start of the Russian Military Defense Forces in Ukraine and the largest conflict in Europe since the Second World War, which has been ongoing since February 24, 2022, the victims of which are the peoples of Russia and Ukraine.
In a situation when Russia is busy with security issues in Ukraine, the US and its NATO and EU partners purposefully combine a policy of anti-Russian sanctions with attempts to alienate an increasing number of post-Soviet countries (including those officially allied to Russia in the CSTO and EAEU) from Moscow. To this end, they exploit both economic issues (e.g., in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan) and issues of unresolved conflicts (in particular, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations).
As we all know, January 2022 began with the escalation of the internal political situation in Kazakhstan, which forced the then acting President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to turn to Moscow and the CSTO for military assistance. With the prompt participation of the Russian president, the CSTO reacted very quickly to the request of the Kazakh leader and sent forces to maintain order and stabilize the situation in the friendly country. However, after the start of the USO in Ukraine, the very same Kassym-Jomart Tokayev publicly and categorically refused to support Russia’s policy of forced recognition of the independence of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR), considering it unacceptable and contrary to the principle of territorial integrity.
After Azerbaijan’s success in the second Karabakh war in autumn 2020, which became possible due to the external assistance of the Azerbaijani army from a group of countries (including Turkey, Israel, Pakistan and others) and the complete neutrality of Russia, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in November 2021 transformed the international organization Turkic Commonwealth into the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). This organization, coordinated by Ankara, began to pursue an offensive policy of economic, military and political integration of the Turkic countries of the CIS with NATO member Turkey. Meanwhile, Turkey, as a result of the second Karabakh war of 2020 entered Transcaucasia (as a participant of the Monitoring Center in Aghdam).
One of the strategic goals of the OTS is the idea of the Turan project with Turkey’s long-term access to the expanses of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Erdogan, as part of the policy of strengthening Turkey’s independence and reanimation of imperial ambitions to return to the “club of world powers,” is trying to get the shortest route to mainland Azerbaijan and historic Turkestan through the Meghri corridor in Armenian Zangezur. A number of new aggressive forays by Azerbaijani forces on the border with Armenia between 2021 and 2022 were dedicated to this goal, indirectly provoking Russia to form a “second front” in Transcaucasia.
Turkey, by conducting flexible mediation diplomacy between Russia and Ukraine, received new bonuses from Moscow in the form of a “gas hub” project, which significantly strengthens its energy security and independence from external factors. Meanwhile, the Turkish leadership, developing an inter-Turkic alliance, began to pursue an offensive policy in the Central Asian theater, hoping to change the flow of Kazakh and Turkmen oil and gas exports through Azerbaijan to Turkey and on to the EU world markets. At the same time, Azerbaijan’s regional role in international energy and logistics transit is increasing. Azerbaijan’s leading oil corporation SOCAR concludes new agreements with EU countries (Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Serbia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Albania) to increase gas and “green energy” supplies in exchange for Russian gas because of the sanctions policy.
For its part, Kazakhstan began building up its tanker fleet (in particular, Kazmortransflot increased its fleet to five vessels) to supply oil for export bypassing Russia via Azerbaijan and Turkey. According to Reuters, by the end of the first quarter of 2023, Kazakhstan exported 163,400 tons of oil by sea route Aktau – Baku, which is six times more than in 2022. Supplies via Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan pipeline amounted to 104,000 tons over the same period, where the oil comes by the Caspian Sea by tankers again.
Such policy of Astana is carried out in order to reduce Kazakhstan’s dependence on Russia, as well as within the framework of Erdoğan’s policy of integration of the OTS countries and formation of the common Turkic market. In addition to the economic part, Astana under the leadership of Kassym-Jomart Tokayev began to demonstrate a policy more distant from the union with Russia. For example, by joining the policy of anti-Russian sanctions of the West in the hope of another bonuses, as noted by German political analyst Alexander Rahr, in the field of obtaining advanced technologies, profitable investments and relocation of the same German business from Russia to Kazakhstan. On the eve of May 9, the Deputy Minister of Defense of Kazakhstan noted that the country will not hold the Victory Parade this year because of the economy of funds. Kazakh authorities have introduced a stricter regime for the entry of Russians into the territory of the republic. At the same time, Kazakhstan (as well as Kyrgyzstan), being a member of the CSTO, is increasing military-technical cooperation with NATO member Turkey on the purchase of Bayraktar drones and other means.
In the situation of the unresolved Karabakh conflict, the USA has intensified its diplomacy to draw Azerbaijan and Armenia to the Western option of peace between Baku and Yerevan, using the EU platform in Brussels rather intensively in the negotiation process. Simultaneously, the US and France limit themselves to declarations on the observance of the rights of Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, but do not take effective steps towards the same in Azerbaijan. The West is counting on Caspian oil and gas for the European market and sees Azerbaijan as a springboard to enter Central Asia and put pressure on Iran.
In a similar dynamic of confrontation with Russia, the US and EU countries are trying to lower the bar of their old requirements for the strict observance of democracy, human rights and freedoms to their new partners in the same post-Soviet space. In particular, as Alexander Rahr has noted, the West is changing its diplomacy tactics from “sticks” to “carrots” for it is situationally hoping to discredit Russia and push it out of its regions of traditional presence.
The current reality compels Moscow to mobilize all its resources to contain such an openly hostile strategy of the West and to warn its traditional and new partners about the inadmissibility of rash steps, which may create for them problems of their own security.
Aleksandr SVARANTS, PhD in political science, professor, exclusively for the online journal “New Eastern Outlook.”
