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Is there a division in the ranks of Turkey’s opposition?

Alexandr Svaranc, March 10

It is rather obvious that uniting the opposition in the elections of the head of state usually ends in failure. This fact is due to the contradictions in the programs of the opposition candidates and, of course, the maximalist approach of each of them in their desire to get into the office.

This may explain the split in the opposition bloc of six parties in the pre-election period in Turkey. Turkish media recently reported that the leader of the center-right Good Party Meral Akşener refused to support 74-year-old leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu as a single opposition candidate at the forthcoming May 14 presidential elections. However, Meral Akşener has not yet withdrawn from the six-party bloc, but has only stated her negative attitude towards the main opposition CHP candidate, because her withdrawal will not guarantee the Good Party’s success in the parliamentary elections either.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan took the news very calmly, since this is what the opposition would inevitably have come to, given their focus on their own ambitions rather than on the interests of the people. As the reader may be aware, Erdoğan has resolutely rejected the initiatives of political forces (including the Justice and Development Party – AKP, which he heads) to postpone the date of the general presidential and parliamentary elections to a later date due to the tragic consequences of the earthquake in the southeast of the country.

Naturally, the charismatic Erdoğan understands that postponing the elections would be detrimental to the ruling party as well, since in the situation of a devastating earthquake and increased mass discontent with the authorities due to poor construction, the opposition would be able to exploit public opinion to their advantage.

At the same time, President Erdoğan had an opportunity to evaluate the approaches of key countries (primarily, the US) to the topic of the presidential elections in Turkey, as well as to demonstrate his political flexibility to maintain relations of strategic alliance with the NATO bloc. Turkey, in a situation of acute financial crisis and, moreover, the consequences of the devastating earthquake, is naturally in need of serious external investment aid and favorable loans. Hence, it follows that Erdoğan may go for the restoration of full-fledged relations with the same US in the hope of success in the next elections and the subsequent assistance of the West in solving the acute internal problems of the Turkish economy.

In case such a shadowy agreement between Turkey and the US authorities took place through diplomacy or intelligence, the split of the Turkish opposition would hardly surprise the expert community. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, running for the Turkish presidency, dooms the opposition to failure in advance because of a number of his personal qualities: firstly, the CHP leader is quite old, even though his party has much more successful and energetic young figures (including the mayors of Istanbul – Ekrem İmamoğlu and Ankara – Mansur Yavaş); secondly, he does not have a sufficient approval rating among the voters (just over 29%).

Meanwhile, the opposition alliance is known to include six parties: the center-right Good Party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the Islamist Happiness Party (SP), the pro-Kurdish Democratic Party (DP), the Future Party (GP) of former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and the Democracy and Progress Party (DEVA) of former Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan.

This list shows that in addition to the well-known opposition favorites in the presidential race represented by the mayors of Istanbul and Ankara, the bloc retains no less strong candidates from among former associates of Erdoğan himself, Ahmet Davutoğlu and Ali Babacan.

Nevertheless, internal party discipline in the CHP prompted Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu to withdraw from the presidential election and support the candidacy of party leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. İmamoğlu criticized Akşener’s stance, which could lead to a split in the opposition, and reminded her that it was the alliance of the two parties that enabled him to win the Istanbul mayoral election against the ruling AKP candidate Binali Yildirim in a tough fight. This decision by Ekrem İmamoğlu is evidently motivated not only by internal party discipline, but also by the fact that a court decision was issued against him due to insults directed at CEC (obviously not without the intervention of the ruling AKP).

For his part, Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavaş also decided to support the candidacy of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the leader of the CHP. To this end, he convened a convention of opposition municipal heads. The latter indicates a certain unity of approach of the HDP and localization of the opponents, uncomfortable for Erdoğan in the May 14 elections.

If one were to bear in mind the political biography, education and connections of the former foreign minister and ex-prime minister of Turkey Ahmet Davutoğlu, the developer of the neo-Ottomanism strategy, this candidate should be taken very seriously by both external observers and participants in the process. In fact, Ahmet Davutoğlu was the author of the idea of nominating a single candidate from the opposition.

The fact that Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu sees no other alternatives but himself testifies to the obvious failure of the united opposition in the upcoming presidential elections. Meral Akşener in this case is rather a supporter of the five-party alliance against the leader of the CHP, which can change the tactics of the opposition candidate’s nomination for the presidential election. In other words, Ahmet Davutoğlu, Ali Babacan, Temel Karamollaoğlu and Meral Akşener are able to negotiate a “third alliance” and a single candidate with Süleyman Demirtaş, the leader of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Party. In this case, the three candidates (Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and a representative of the five parties) will determine the fate of the elections according to the results of the first round of voting. If the candidates do not receive more than 50% of votes in the first round, the two remaining candidates with the largest numbers of votes will fight in the second round.

Why does much depend on the position of DP leader Süleyman Demirtaş? The fact is that of the 15 million citizens affected by the tragedy of the earthquake in the southeastern provinces, a large part of the population is Kurdish. It is clear that Erdoğan, who has an alliance with Devlet Bahçeli’s radical right-wing Pan-Turkist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), is hardly a favorite of the Kurdish voters, whose number exceeds 20 million according to various estimates. That is why there are still the tactics of reshuffle in the opposition bloc. Even before the six-party bloc was formed there were discussions in the Turkish opposition (e.g. Temel Karamollaoğlu) about the possibility of forming a “third force.”

Otherwise, the impression is that the Turkish opposition got harsh signals from outside (most likely from its main ally, the US) not to create problems in the elections to the AKP leader, who demonstrated unique flexibility in the pre-election period. In either case, the presidential election in May 2023 will be difficult for Erdoğan, even in the absence of a serious challenge from a single opposition candidate. The parliamentary elections may change the balance of political forces in the country not in favor of the AKP-MHP alliance. The latter will create tension between the parliament (Grand National Assembly of Turkey, or TBMM) and President Erdoğan (of course, if he prevails).

That is why this author cannot claim or deny that instead of a “split” in the ranks of the Turkish opposition, there could be a forced “reshuffle.”

Aleksandr SVARANTS, PhD in political science, professor, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.

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