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Trump’s Political Troubles Are Becoming the Gulf Monarchies’ Problem

Salman Rafi Sheikh, November 21, 2026

Donald Trump’s political defeat at home is exposing the dangerous gamble that America’s Gulf allies have made by tying their strategic fortunes to his presidency.

Trump's Political Troubles Are Becoming the Gulf Monarchies' Problem

The political costs of presidential patronage

The November 3 midterm elections, which handed Democrats control of both chambers of Congress, have dramatically altered the political environment in which Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar conduct their relations with Washington. Having cultivated exceptionally close relationships with Trump through investment commitments, defence agreements and personal diplomacy, the three monarchies now face the prospect of congressional investigations into arrangements that previously appeared politically advantageous.

According to Al-Monitor, Democratic lawmakers intend to scrutinize the Trump family’s financial relationships with Gulf sovereign wealth funds, investigate the administration’s handling of the Iran war and reconsider aspects of Washington’s regional security commitments. Their new congressional majorities will give them subpoena powers, control over key committees and greater influence over federal spending when the new Congress convenes in January.

Gulf governments therefore face the possibility of prolonged military confrontation alongside growing political conflict in Washington

For Gulf rulers, the problem is not simply that a friendly American president has suffered an electoral setback. It is that their efforts to secure privileged access to the White House have drawn them into America’s increasingly polarized domestic politics. Commercial arrangements intended to strengthen bilateral relations may now become evidence in politically charged investigations.

The financial relationship between Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, and Gulf sovereign wealth funds illustrates this vulnerability. Kushner’s investment firm, Affinity Partners, has attracted billions of dollars from Saudi, Emirate and Qatari investors, even as he has remained involved in Middle Eastern diplomacy. These investments do not, by themselves, establish improper conduct. Nevertheless, the intersection of private financial interests and diplomatic influence has created precisely the kind of political exposure that congressional investigators are likely to examine.

Qatar faces a similar problem over its controversial offer of a luxury aircraft for presidential use. What Doha may have regarded as an extraordinary gesture of goodwill has become a source of controversy over potential conflicts of interest. Meanwhile, the UAE’s commercial relationships involving advanced technology and digital assets could attract greater scrutiny over whether private business arrangements have influenced American policy.

The underlying problem is structural. Gulf monarchies have increasingly relied on personalized diplomacy to secure access, influence and strategic advantages in Washington. Trump’s transactional approach encouraged this tendency by presenting foreign relations as an exchange of investments, commercial opportunities and political favors. But the same personal relationships that facilitated agreements with the White House have also made those agreements vulnerable to changes in America’s domestic political balance.

When strategic agreements become political liabilities

The consequences extend beyond reputational embarrassment. Congressional scrutiny could complicate major agreements on which Gulf governments have based their economic and security calculations.

Saudi Arabia provides the clearest example. In September, the Trump administration approved a proposed $24.3 billion sale of 48 F-35 fighter aircraft and associated equipment to Riyadh. The proposed transfer represents a significant shift in American defence policy, given Washington’s longstanding commitment to preserving Israel’s qualitative military advantage in the Middle East. It also reflects Saudi Arabia’s determination to strengthen its military capabilities amid growing regional insecurity.

Yet, the agreement remains subject to congressional oversight. Lawmakers have previously questioned arms transfers to Saudi Arabia over human rights concerns and regional security implications. Democratic control of Congress could make the political environment for such transactions considerably more difficult, even if opposition does not ultimately prevent their implementation.

The proposed US-Saudi civilian nuclear agreement faces a more immediate challenge. Reuters reported in October that senators had secured an expected vote before December 13 on the agreement, citing concerns that it does not explicitly prohibit uranium enrichment or the reprocessing of nuclear material. Unlike the UAE’s 2009 nuclear cooperation agreement with Washington, the Saudi proposal has raised questions about whether it provides sufficiently strong safeguards against proliferation.

These disputes reveal the limits of presidential assurances. Trump can promise sophisticated weapons, nuclear cooperation and preferential economic arrangements, but he cannot entirely insulate such commitments from congressional oversight. Nor does his party’s electoral defeat automatically invalidate them. The president retains extensive foreign-policy authority, and American strategic interests in the Gulf continue to enjoy substantial bipartisan support.

The more consequential change is that Gulf governments can no longer assume that agreements negotiated through the White House will escape sustained political scrutiny. Congress can demand documents, investigate conflicts of interest, challenge arms transfers and use budgetary authority to constrain presidential decisions. Even where these efforts fail to reverse policy, they can delay implementation, increase uncertainty and impose political costs.

This matters because the Gulf monarchies’ economic strategies increasingly depend on predictable access to American technology, capital markets and defence capabilities. Saudi Arabia’s economic diversification programme, the UAE’s ambitions in artificial intelligence and advanced technology, and Qatar’s international investment strategy all require stable institutional relationships. Personal proximity to Trump may facilitate negotiations, but it cannot provide the long-term predictability these projects require.

The Iran war exposes a deeper dependence

The political consequences of the midterm elections are unfolding alongside a more fundamental challenge to Gulf security: the war against Iran.

The conflict has exposed the contradiction at the centre of the Gulf monarchies’ relationship with Washington. They depend heavily on American military capabilities to deter external threats, yet that dependence also leaves them vulnerable to the consequences of American decisions over which they exercise limited control.

The war has disrupted regional commerce, heightened risks to energy infrastructure and threatened shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Its economic consequences have also reverberated through American domestic politics. In fact, public anger over rising living costs, partly driven by the Iran war, contributed to the Republican defeat.

This creates an uncomfortable dilemma for Gulf rulers. Their close relationships with Trump were intended to strengthen American security commitments, but the administration’s confrontation with Iran has intensified the very instability against which those commitments were supposed to protect them. Meanwhile, Trump’s domestic political weakening makes the future direction of American policy more uncertain.

Democrats have indicated that they will seek to constrain the war through congressional oversight and spending powers. Yet, their ability to force a change in policy remains limited by Trump’s veto and executive authority. Gulf governments therefore face the possibility of prolonged military confrontation alongside growing political conflict in Washington.

Nor can China offer an immediate alternative. Beijing has become an increasingly important economic partner for the Gulf states, but it lacks both the military infrastructure and the willingness to replace Washington as their principal security guarantor. Economic diversification away from excessive dependence on the United States is possible; a comparable diversification of security relationships is considerably more difficult.

The answer, therefore, cannot simply be to cultivate another American president or find another external patron. Gulf governments need to institutionalise their relationships with Washington across party lines, make major commercial agreements more transparent and reduce their exposure to regional military confrontation through sustained diplomacy with Iran. These steps would not eliminate their dependence on American power, but they could make that dependence less politically hazardous.

Trump’s electoral setback has exposed a fundamental weakness in the Gulf monarchies’ strategy: they have invested heavily in securing the favour of the American presidency without adequately accounting for the political institutions that constrain it. Their larger challenge is no longer merely to preserve access to Washington, but to ensure that their security does not depend on the political survival of whoever occupies the White House.

 

Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs

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