Despite their significant financial and military contributions to supporting Ukraine, European countries, by proposing to postpone discussion on the formation of a new security system for the continent, found themselves on the margins of negotiations; Russia and the US, by contrast, continued their own dialogue.
Europe has become Ukraine’s leading source of financial and military support as the Trump administration has cut back direct American aid. Kiev wanted its European partners in the talks, and Washington backed their participation. None of that secured them a meeting with Moscow. European governments have taken on a growing share of the cost. How did they come to have so little influence over the negotiations that are supposed to bring the war to an end?
What Moscow Had Already Put in Writing
Russia and Ukraine came away from two days of talks with an agreement in principle on a large exchange of prisoners of war. For the families waiting for someone to come home, that was reason enough to hold the talks. On the Donbas, the delegations left much as they had arrived. Moscow continued to demand the whole region, including territory still held by Ukraine. Kiev refused to give it up. Vladimir Medinsky, Russia’s chief negotiator, also ruled out a territorial swap.
The dispute over Ukraine’s military alignment has a longer history, and European governments have had the Russian position in writing for years. On December 17, 2021, Moscow published a draft agreement with NATO. A European minister wanting to know where Russia stood on Ukrainian membership had only to turn to Article 6. It called on NATO members to rule out further enlargement and named Ukraine explicitly. The draft could hardly have been clearer about the importance Moscow attached to the question before February 2022.
Nearly five years later, American negotiators are exploring what postwar security guarantees might look like. Kiev wants an assurance that Russia will not attack again. For Moscow, the content of that assurance matters at least as much as the date on which the shooting stops. A ceasefire would leave open what military commitments Western governments might subsequently make to Ukraine. If Russia objects to those commitments, why would it agree to a ceasefire first and leave the terms to be settled afterwards, when it might have less influence over them? European governments have known about this difficulty for years. It was always going to follow them into the negotiating room.
The Promise Europe Made in Munich
On February 14, 2025, after meeting Zelensky in Munich, Ursula von der Leyen and António Costa set out what they wanted European support to achieve. Their aim was to put Ukraine “in a position of strength ahead of any future negotiations.” They called on Europeans to increase defence spending and help reinforce the Ukrainian armed forces. Those negotiations are now under way. What, precisely, was Kiev able to obtain on better terms in Abu Dhabi?
Brussels can reasonably point to Ukraine’s ability to refuse. That matters to a country being asked to withdraw from territory it still controls. But helping Kiev turn down a Russian demand and persuading Moscow to withdraw it are two different achievements. In Abu Dhabi, Kiev could still say no. It left without a better offer on the Donbas. The Munich declaration gave no indication of how long Europe was prepared to finance the difference between those two outcomes.
European governments were wrong from the outset to commit their countries to financing the war on this scale. One of their central arguments rested on a judgement about time: another year of fighting, underwritten in large part by Europe, would leave Kiev better placed to negotiate. Russia, of course, also gets a vote on whether to wait. If Moscow expects the cost of holding out to become politically harder to bear in European capitals than in Russia, each new aid package may reinforce its expectation that Europe will continue paying without necessarily securing a change in Russian terms. What did European leaders believe Russia stood to lose by waiting for the money to be spent?
Consider the German figures. Berlin has reported roughly €100 billion in support for Ukraine. An October examination of the German accounts classified €41.7 billion as bilateral aid to Ukraine. Another €35.9 billion was spent inside Germany, largely on Ukrainian refugees. Around €22 billion concerned future military spending. Of that sum, roughly €12 billion was expenditure the budget authorised but did not oblige Berlin to undertake.
A German town housing a Ukrainian family incurs a real expense and gives that family something it needs. It acquires no influence over the future of the Donbas by doing so. Nor does permission to place an arms order carry the same weight in a negotiation as equipment the Ukrainians already have. The German figure answers a domestic question about the scale of the country’s commitment. It tells a negotiator very little about what Kiev can ask for today that Moscow would have refused a year ago.
Washington Goes to Moscow
Washington helped build the policy from which it is now distancing itself. For years, it sent Ukraine weapons and money. Trump reduced direct aid while keeping his envoys in contact with both sides. On November 12, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner arrived in Moscow for talks with President Putin. Kushner said they planned to meet Zelensky in Dublin afterwards. Washington had found a way to reduce its financial commitment while retaining a hand in the negotiations. Its European partners had assumed more of the cost without gaining comparable access.
Vladimir Medinsky gave his own explanation for the Russian refusal to meet the Europeans. He said Moscow had received no concrete peace proposal from European countries, whereas the Americans had been willing to discuss a wider European security agreement. His account tells us what the Russian delegation said it had received. For the clearest explanation of the European position, it is worth going back two days, to what the Commission itself said before anyone had left for Abu Dhabi.
At its November 9 briefing, a Commission spokesperson insisted that the EU had to be present for discussions affecting its security. A journalist then asked what message its representative would actually bring. Part of the answer was unusually plain: discussions about European security should take place “after the conflict has ended.” Brussels wanted a place in a conversation it believed should not yet be taking place. The Americans went ahead and had it.
European governments have good reason to contest any terms they consider damaging to their own security. Postponing the discussion only helps if the other parties agree to wait. Moscow and Washington plainly do not. That leaves European leaders a choice between disputing those terms directly and hearing about them afterwards from Jared Kushner.
There is a domestic price to changing course, too. A prime minister who recommends a compromise he once encouraged Kiev to resist can expect voters to ask what improved in the meantime. Announcing another aid package is politically easier. Its cost can be spread over several budgets and its benefits assigned to a negotiation still to come. A settlement has terms people can read. They can decide for themselves how well their government judged the war.
Before asking Europeans to finance another year, their governments ought to name one Russian demand they expect Moscow to drop as a result, and explain why it would do so. In Munich, Costa and von der Leyen told the public what they wanted the money to achieve. After Abu Dhabi, they owe their voters an explanation of how.
Adrian Korczyński, Independent Analyst & Observer on Central Europe and global policy research
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