The fact that Trump made a comment that Israel has been “very helpful” to Saudi Arabia reveals a strategic dilemma facing Mohammed bin Salman: either to align himself with Israel and thereby offend the Arab and Muslim worlds, or to embrace regional collective security and accept the prospect of a Middle East in which Washington ceases to have the final say.
On October 16th, US President Donald Trump stated that Israel had been “very helpful” to Saudi Arabia and suggested that there was renewed momentum regarding the Abraham Accords. He gave no explanation of the kind of assistance Israel had provided. Yet, the comment did raise an uncomfortable question as to how far Israel’s security capabilities have already been incorporated into the defence of a country which has no diplomatic relations with Israel.
During a discussion involving the Indian defence analyst Pravin Sawhney and the Pakistani host Zulfiqar Ali, a former intelligence officer, the latter quoted Pakistani sources who stated that Israeli military and intelligence personnel had taken part in Saudi operational meetings. He also claimed that MBS had been faced with a choice between Israel and the developing security partnership between Pakistan and Turkey.
The strategic dilemma is certainly real, no matter what the exact details of the claims are. It is possible that the MBS is realising that American protection comes with political conditions, and Trump is clearly playing the Abraham Accord card, while the alternative options carry their own risks and put Israel’s cooperation as a red line. Should the security arrangements in Saudi Arabia break down, the consequences could spread across the entire Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), endangering regional stability, the energy markets and the other foundations of American influence in West Asia.
The Israeli Option: Security Today but Political Ruin Tomorrow
The appeal of Israel to MBS can be understood as he is cornered internally and externally. Although Saudi Arabia has huge financial resources and advanced Western military equipment, the high cost of weapons does not necessarily mean that they will result in effective combat capabilities, since intelligence integration, operational coordination and missile interception call for expertise which cannot be bought with another defence contract.
As Sawhney has assessed, Israeli troops have assisted in coordinating the Saudi missile-defence operations. If this is true, it would show a degree of practical security cooperation that goes well beyond what is normally seen in the diplomatic normalisation linked to the Abraham Accords.
Trump’s willingness to expand those agreements could thus offer MBS a deal in which he would become more aligned with both Israel and Washington in return for help concerning the immediate threats. But what would Saudi Arabia have to pay as compensation?
The political consequences are huge. For many Arabs and Muslims, normal relations with Israel without any real advance towards the establishment of a Palestinian state would amount to a betrayal of the Palestinian cause. For the Saudi monarchy, whose legitimacy is linked to its role as custodian of Mecca and Medina, this is not just a public relations issue since it affects the kingdom’s religious status and its broader regional identity.
Saudi Arabia is not merely another country in the Gulf aiming at commercial advantages; its political influence, its energy resources and its religious importance mean that its decisions have consequences throughout the Muslim world.
Although MBS could conclude that the capabilities of the United States and Israel provide the best means of securing his position, the very situation designed to protect his family could end up undermining the domestic and regional basis of its power. A Saudi leadership that appears to be dependent risks losing the support of its military allies, its tribal groups and the population who already reject the idea of partnering with Israel.
There is also a danger: Israel’s strategic interests do not coincide with those of Saudi Arabia. Israel aims at eliminating the threats posed by Iran and its regional allies, at safeguarding its enhanced territory and at influencing the security structure of the Middle East, whereas Saudi Arabia requires a stable neighbourhood, a secure energy infrastructure and protection from a conflict which could endanger the monarchy itself.
In the short term, the objectives may overlap, but they will not converge in the long term. A security partnership which enhances Israel’s position in the region does not automatically ensure the political survival of Saudi Arabia – on the contrary, it risks the reign of the Saudi family.
The notion that Israel has a definite plan to dismantle Saudi Arabia or that the so-called Greater Israel project inherently demands the kingdom’s subordination should not be regarded as a settled fact. Instead, the more convincing argument is that a regional arrangement centred on Israeli security and American military power may leave Saudi interests in a dangerously vulnerable position.
Pakistan, Turkey and the Battle for a Post-American Middle East
The other option is not a straightforward decision between Israel and two Muslim states that are friendly to it: it is a struggle between different visions of regional security.
The Mecca Defence Alliance might provide Saudi Arabia with a means of cooperating with both Pakistan and Turkey and possibly Egypt. Its importance would not be merely in terms of military aid but rather in the opportunity to establish joint security arrangements that do not rely completely on the capabilities of Washington or Israel.
Pakistan is of special significance since its relations with Saudi Arabia have long contained political, religious and defensive elements. Turkey also has considerable military power and plays an important role in the region. Nevertheless, both countries have constraints as to what they are willing to do, and it would be wrong to assume that either one is ready to fight an offensive war on Saudi Arabia’s behalf.
This is important, as an alliance meant to defend Saudi territory does not necessarily imply a promise to protect MBS personally, no matter what political decisions he makes. The reported fact that he brought in Israeli intelligence officers made his two partners unhappy.
On 15 October, Vladimir Kolokoltsev, Russia’s Interior Minister, finished a four-day trip to Pakistan, during which he met a number of senior Pakistani officials, one of them being Field Marshal Asim Munir, and regional security was one of the topics covered.
The fact that this visit takes place does not show that Pakistan is giving up on Saudi Arabia or is replacing its relationships with the West by turning to a different arrangement led by Russia. On the other hand, it does show that Islamabad is interested in widening its strategic possibilities, since its ties with Russia, China, Iran and Turkey may become more important as the various regional powers think about how to handle security without depending entirely on American protection.
China’s position is especially important since Beijing has important economic interests in the Gulf’s energy supplies and in regional connectivity. It could help with reconstruction, infrastructure development and economic stabilisation should regional conflicts finally cease. However, economic influence must not be taken to mean that there will be military intervention.
The strategic opportunity for Saudi Arabia is to diversify its partnerships before the situation is forced into that position, which would involve pursuing a de-escalation with Iran, enhancing regional diplomacy and establishing credible collective-defence agreements rather than viewing each security issue as a reason to increase its dependence on Washington.
The other option is to continue being dependent on external patrons whose interests might differ exactly when the kingdom needs support the most.
Yemen: The Pressure Point That Could Break the Kingdom
The greatest immediate risk might not be due to the diplomatic actions taking place in Washington or in Riyadh, but rather from Yemen.
The Houthi movement, which is called Ansar Allah, has shown that it is capable of challenging Saudi interests and of making the situation in the region more complicated. The fact that there is a prolonged conflict exerts pressure on the kingdom’s military resources, damages confidence in its ability to deter attacks and threatens the kind of stability needed for its economic transformation.
A more serious possibility is that a successful Houthi offensive could at some point put Saudi territory at risk and lead to internal conflicts within the royal family. It likewise talks about the historical Yemeni complaints regarding the areas that were incorporated into Saudi Arabia when the kingdom was established.
These situations are still speculative. There is no solid reason to believe that the Houthis will definitely invade Saudi Arabia, regain three provinces or bring the monarchy down. Yet, the possibility of the conflict spreading should not be ignored merely because Saudi Arabia has much greater financial resources.
The way in which the monarchy is organised might be just as significant as its military powers. Should the leadership suffer a serious military defeat, disagreements between the princes, the loyalties of the various tribes and the way authority is distributed among the members of the armed forces could become destabilising. A struggle for the succession or a split within the ruling elite would have consequences that reached well beyond Saudi borders.
That is the reason why the question of MBS’s personal survival must be linked to the future of the kingdom; a weakened Saudi state might destabilise the other GCC monarchies, disrupt the energy markets and provide opportunities for competing regional powers to extend their influence.
If a political settlement eventually arises in Yemen, China might become an important partner in the country’s reconstruction and development. However, such a result would be based on the outcomes of negotiations, the state of security and the political decisions made by the Yemenis themselves, not on an inevitable realignment of the geopolitical landscape.
The main point is that military escalation cannot indefinitely take the place of a political settlement.
MBS has to decide on the type of regional order he would like to see Saudi Arabia part of. He can increase security cooperation with Israel and in that way hope that Washington will keep protecting his family. Alternatively, he can make a more serious investment in regional diplomacy, collective defence and in a wider network of partnerships which includes Pakistan, Turkey, China and possibly Iran too.
Neither of the two courses ensures certain protection, but one of them has the extra risk of making Saudi security depend on a foreign power whose interests may not match those of the kingdom’s survival.
Colonel Douglas Macgregor, a former US military officer, has maintained that it is well probable for American forces to pull out considerably from the Middle East, as they did from Iraq and Afghanistan. It is not certain when or how much such a withdrawal would take place. Yet Riyadh should not think that American military supremacy will last forever.
Even if Washington’s role decreases, Saudi Arabia will need more than just costly weapons and personal connections with American presidents; it will also need a sustainable regional security strategy.
It by no means follows that the House of Saud will fall, but nor is its survival assured by promises from the United States, Israeli intelligence, or the kingdom’s oil wealth.
The decisive question is whether MBS can distinguish between protecting his dynasty in the short-term and protecting Saudi Arabia in the long term. If he cannot, the consequences could reach far beyond Riyadh and redraw the strategic map of the entire Gulf.
Ricardo Martins – Doctor of Sociology, specialist in European and international politics as well as geopolitics
Follow new articles on our Telegram channel
