In 2026, Turkey’s policy in Yemen shifted from exclusive neutrality and mediation efforts to “the brink” of military intervention against the government in Sanaa and the Ansar Allah movement, yet a range of geopolitical, legal and domestic political factors makes this scenario being fully put into practice unlikely.
A Brief Retrospective of Turkish-Yemeni Relations
Modern relations between Turkey and Yemen began in 1990, after the unification of North and South Yemen. In the civil war that broke out in 2014, Turkey, while not intervening militarily against the Houthis, took an active part in the negotiating process with representatives of Yemen’s official government, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Summits were held in 2016 and 2017, in September 2022, in 2023, in April 2024 and in 2026.
On the whole, Turkey’s approach to the Yemeni civil war was marked by support for a peaceful settlement of Yemen’s problems, its unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty, and the importance of an inclusive political solution in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2216 of 2015 and the ceasefire agreement of 7 April 2022.
Turkey’s Current Approach to Yemen: The 2026 Adjustments
In 2026, Turkey’s policy on the conflict in Yemen ramped up further, driven by rising military and political tension in South Yemen, the escalation of the US and Israeli war against Iran, and the conflict between Sanaa and Riyadh, rooted in mutual airstrikes by the Houthis and Saudi Arabia — all of which weigh on Turkey’s capacity as an interested exporter to Asia and Africa.
Ankara carried on speaking out firmly on developments, offering its own foreign-policy assessments. In January 2026, Turkey described events in Yemen’s southern governorates as “a threat to Yemen’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and to the security of neighbouring countries.” Turkish officials regularly talk up the need for economic and humanitarian cooperation in Yemen, the role of indirect diplomacy and mediation potential. In May 2026, Ankara called the prisoner-exchange agreement between the two main parties in Sanaa and Aden “a source of satisfaction.”
Alongside rhetoric, Turkey has taken practical steps to step up coordination with regional countries. As early as 2025, the UAE and Turkey signed a series of defence agreements and continued to hold bilateral summits in 2026, at which Turkey confirmed its solidarity with the UAE’s position on the need for greater regional responsibility on security.
In addition to closer cooperation with the UAE, Turkey has also held strategic talks and meetings with officials from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Having condemned in July and September 2026 Sanaa’s attacks and threats against Saudi Arabia and shipping in the region, on 7 August Ankara, alongside Riyadh and Islamabad, signed the “Mecca Joint Defence Agreement.” Under its terms, an armed attack on any signatory is to be treated as an attack on all three. And although, from Ankara’s point of view, the agreement is not aimed at any particular party, Turkey lays responsibility on Sanaa for much of Yemen’s instability and the threat to maritime security in the region.
In this connection, some sources reported that Ankara even sent Turkish military equipment and personnel directly to Yemen to assist members of the group it backs, Islah — the main opposition party in Yemen — operating in Marib governorate.
This whole set of measures points not merely to a 2026 upsurge in Turkish policy on Yemen’s civil war and related regional security, but also to a shift from proclaimed “neutrality” to a “conditional security commitment” with Riyadh and Aden.
Main Challenges of Turkish Possible Military Intervention in Yemen
Among the main challenges to direct military participation by Turkish armed forces in the conflict, the following stand out.
First, with presidential elections scheduled for 2028, President Erdogan’s ruling party, whose Yemen policy is under active criticism from opponents over the potential damage to ties with Iran, needs to hold on to its electoral base. Since the conflict in Yemen poses no direct threat to Turkey’s borders, Turkey’s entry into the war through armed intervention — especially to defend and support Saudi Arabia under the Mecca Agreement — could run into active opposition from segments of public opinion, particularly among Turkey’s Alevi community, whose position and mood play no small part in Turkey’s domestic political agenda.
Second, implementing a military presence in Yemen runs up against constitutional and legal difficulties, namely the need to secure parliamentary approval. The Mecca Agreement, submitted to the Grand National Assembly under Articles 80 and 92 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, has yet to gain parliament’s approval and final ratification — in other words, parliamentary approval for Turkish military intervention in Yemen.
Third, a policy of military intervention, whether participation in military operations or the use of Turkish bases to strike against Yemen, will undoubtedly damage Turkish-Yemeni economic relations, hitting Turkey’s presence across various sectors of the Yemeni economy and its image as a neutral mediator, which it has maintained all along, turning Ankara into a direct enemy of Sanaa. Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, a senior member of Ansar Allah (the Houthis) and of the government in Sanaa, recently said: “If Turkey and Pakistan intervene, we will hit them with an iron fist.”
In other words, Turkey cannot condemn Sanaa while backing a Yemeni-Yemeni political solution. As military ties with Riyadh and Aden grow stronger, balancing with Sanaa will become harder.
Moreover, the Sanaa government, which controls almost 80% of Yemen’s population, has welcomed Turkey’s help in humanitarian work and political mediation, repeatedly asking Ankara to remain neutral and not enter the conflict. From this point of view, any strikes on the Yemeni people will ultimately be directed against the Turkish people as well.
Fourth, if Turkey provides armed support to Riyadh and Aden against the Houthis and regards its actions as part of the implementation of the US concept of “burden-sharing” among allies, this could negatively affect Ankara’s relations with China, Russia and Iran, since the latter resist the establishment of West-centric military dominance in the region. Relations with Iran, obviously, would be directly threatened, since supportive statements for Saudi Arabia do not yet mean direct entry into conflict with Iran, whereas armed intervention on its side — or rather against the Houthis — would be equated with a proxy clash with Iran.
Thus, Turkish military intervention in the conflict in Yemen against the Sanaa government, being at this stage not yet authorised by the Turkish parliament, would complicate both Turkey’s geopolitical and economic position in the region and could entail domestic political costs.
Turkey-Yemen: Room for Balancing and Prospects
Ankara views Yemen within a broader geopolitical and geoeconomic equation tied to Turkey’s national security. The crisis in Yemen looks to Ankara like a chance to strengthen its role in the future of the Middle East, despite the absence of direct operations there. Accordingly, in Turkish calculations Yemen appears to have moved from a “secondary file” to a more important link in Middle East policy.
The most likely scenario is that Turkey will act as Saudi Arabia’s security partner under the Mecca Agreement, avoiding direct involvement in the conflict. Even without parliamentary approval, Ankara may choose not to send troops to Saudi Arabia or areas close to Yemen, instead limiting itself to lower-risk actions — for example, supplying weapons and ammunition to Riyadh. Therefore, it is more likely that Turkey will strengthen Saudi Arabia’s defence and deterrence capabilities through careful planning, extensive training and intelligence-sharing, but without direct participation in the war.
A less likely scenario envisages Turkey expanding its security role and taking on broader military commitments, including support for Riyadh and its Yemeni allies. Such actions could provoke confrontation with Iran and the “Axis of Resistance.” Finally, another unlikely scenario is Ankara retreating to a pragmatic stance and passive observation.
Thus, in effect, Turkey’s approach — having signed the Mecca Agreement with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in August 2026 amid the escalation of the US-Israeli conflict against Iran, blockades in the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and finally the escalation between Riyadh and the Houthis — began to move away from the neutrality it had practised throughout the first quarter of the 21st century, putting Ankara “on the brink” of military intervention in Yemen. However, the upcoming 2028 elections, the need for parliamentary ratification and the risks of confrontation with Iran, China and Russia constrain Ankara. The most likely scenario is support for Riyadh without direct participation in the war, which makes Yemen an important link in Turkey’s Middle East policy.
Samyar Rostami, а political observer and senior researcher in international relations
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