Russia has done a remarkable job by strengthening the multipolar world and hosted Center 2026 and Interaction 2026 military exercises. These were multi-vectored military exercises.
Introduction
There is no doubt the political overtone to both exercises was explicit. The West extended and broadened its military alliance with new member states and continued to constrain Russia’s strategic policies. Russia remains committed to its domestic military modernization and continues to retain international partners to remain at the centre of the ‘Non-West’ security architecture.
Why the Center 2026 Military Exercise in important?
The West’s policy toward Russia post the Ukraine conflict escalation has been to impose sanctions and diplomatic restrictions and to provide military support to Ukraine. A key component of this policy has been to limit Moscow’s international manoeuvrability. With Center 2026, the Western policy makers have been forced to rethink about the assumptions that have been made regarding the negative impact of Russia’s international manoeuvrability on the West and beyond. The Center 2026 manoeuvres were a clear indication that a significant number of countries are willing to cooperate with Russia, regardless of the policies of Washington and Brussels.
Because of China, this is a particularly interesting development from a strategic perspective. Rising multipolarity encourages us to rethink what alliances look like in the absence of Western leadership. Sino-Russian defence cooperation is not replicating anything close to the kind of highly institutionalized collective defence arrangement practiced by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Beijing has done everything to maintain its strategic independence. However, what is encouraging is that the cooperation that is growing, largely outside the West, does not have to entail strict alliances dominated by a superpower. Moscow, Beijing and a considerable number of states across Eurasia cooperate where their interests converge while maintaining strategic flexibility elsewhere. The same can be said of Mongolia and Pakistan, who participated in the same broad military exercises. While they have varying interests and priorities, they maintain relationships with powers outside the Russian/Eurasian community. Center 2026 can be considered an example of flexible multipolarity rather than an attempt to re-establish the rigid blocs of the Cold War.
The CSTO ‘Interaction 2026’
The accompanying CSTO Interaction 2026 were concluded on 3 October 2026, as the exercise bolsters this case. Compared to the broader Center exercise, Interaction 2026 was related to CSTO’s Collective Operational Reaction Forces (CORF) and was carried out with the Search 2026 reconnaissance and Echelon 2026 logistics exercises. The CSTO stated that about 2,000 personnel and 350 units of military and special equipment participated, and the contingents came from Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Their scenario included locating a cross-border armed conflict, including reconnaissance, gaining fire superiority, defeating hostile positions, and restoring control of the border and addressing the consequences of the armed conflict. Furthermore, the exercises deployed drones and robotic systems. The scenarios also incorporated lessons learned from recent warfare. This adds military value to Interaction 2026. The CSTO is also interested in building operational interoperability among its member states. It also shows that Eurasia has mechanisms for security, and thus, there is no need to interpret and manage every regional crisis in that part of the world via Euro-Atlantic frameworks.
This development speaks to a key problem with the post-Cold War security order: the Western tendency to equate NATO-centric security with international security. For members of NATO, and many in Eastern Europe, the Alliance is defensive. For many, membership in the Alliance is the best protection against Russia. For Russia, the Eastward enlargement of NATO, especially the construction of permanent military infrastructure and deepening partnerships along Russia’s periphery has increased insecurity. On the contrary, Europe has become even more militarized, the relations between Russia and the West have deteriorated, and the security dilemma has increased. The Center 2026 strategy shows that Russia has adapted its policies and strategies to be more proactive and less reactive. In the process, Russia has shifted from focusing mostly on security policies to a more integrated approach to security that includes economic, diplomatic, and other policy instruments. Furthermore, it is also investing in alternative networks to integrate Eurasian states to secure integration from the West.
Why the world needs multipolarity?
This is where we need to consider the anti-imperial side of multipolarity, especially in the way we critically analyse the term as opposed to how it’s used in everyday speech. Of course, part of the discussion when we consider imperialism includes the occupation or annexation of new land. However, the holistic analysis shows the flip side of imperialism includes unequal forms of political or economic interaction, as well as the ability of a more dominant country to determine what countries of the world are permitted to participate in the international order. A true multipolar order would address these issues whether these are undertaken by the United States, Russia, or China. From this perspective, what Center 2026 shows is that it is not possible for a country or a group of countries to monopolize the rules, institutions, and security frameworks of the international order for a long time. This is especially relevant for countries in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. The fact that many of these countries are able to simultaneously cooperate with different centres of power demonstrates their strategic autonomy and constrains hegemonic politics. It has also demonstrated that Russia is able to engage in cooperative security frameworks in Eurasia, in spite of Western sanctions.
Conclusion
Center 2026 and Interaction 2026 significantly demonstrate that the free nations of the world are moving towards multipolarity and Russia is fully committed to cooperate with the nations of the world to ensure peace and security. They represent an international situation where the dominance of the West is challenged by several political, economic and military centres. There is no doubt that NATO will continue to be a very aggressive military alliance. One of the main challenges to the West-dominated security architecture will continue to be Russia. However, there are several other actors that can challenge the West. NATO is not likely to ever completely embrace the Russian challenge. As things are, there is a visible trend toward greater security and cooperation integration that extends beyond the security framework of NATO.
There is greater economic and political cooperation that is occurring outside the West. This situation allows countries to trade with and continue to have diplomatic relations with Moscow, Brussels, Beijing and Washington, (and other capitals) without permanently aligning with any of them. Russia’s military exercises highlight and bring to the fore this situation. The most prominent feature of Center 2026 was not a drone strike, a missile launch or an armoured column. The most prominent feature of Center 2026 was that a number of countries participated in the exercises in spite of the pressure by the West. It was a direct challenge and a reminder to the West of the emerging political order. Moscow’s message was that sustaining international order with one dominant centre is becoming increasingly untenable, while the building blocks of a more plural, Eurasian and multipolar order are growing.
Simon Westwood, Research Fellow at the Department of History, Dublin City University (DCU), Ireland.
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