Behind the cacophony of the diplomatic rift between South Korea and Ukraine hides a fundamental question: what is the price Seoul has had to pay for access to North Korean prisoners of war and how will this affect regional security?
Essence of the Conflict
The only South Korean representative who gained access to the prisoners was lawmaker Yoo Yong-won. Independent observers were not allowed to communicate with them. The published photos invite skepticism, as the face of the soldier talking to the lawmaker is concealed, and the setting of the room looks so sterile and empty that it involuntarily suggests the footage was staged.
Legal and Propaganda Aspects
According to international conventions, prisoners of war are subject to return to the country for which they fought. However, South Korea’s domestic legislation, which regards the DPRK as an “anti-state organization”, considers all citizens of the North to be its own subjects. This is the basis on which Seoul demanded the transfer of the prisoners. The motives are obvious: regardless of whether their choice was voluntary, these people represent enormous value as a source of intelligence on the modern Korean People’s Army (KPA) and as an instrument of propaganda.
In my view, the strict information isolation of the prisoners is indirect evidence that their “relocation” to the South was not voluntary. If Seoul and Kiev really had people eager to “choose freedom” at their disposal, would it not make more sense to organize an open press conference? A demonstration of these “victims of tyranny” who joyfully swapped the regime for the paradise of globalization would have been a powerful propaganda move. Instead, we see only secrecy, anonymity, and references to dubious sources.
Diplomatic Background
The question of the fate of the prisoners became a subject of discussion at a meeting of the two countries’ foreign ministers in March 2026. Later, in July, the topic was personally raised by Lee Jae Myung and Vladimir Zelensky on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Ankara. Following the talks, Seoul stated that the sides had agreed to seek a solution that would take into account “the wishes of the prisoners themselves” and international humanitarian norms.
Zelensky Irritating Lee and What Followed
A scandal erupted on September 23, 2026, when Vladimir Zelensky, at the UN General Assembly, publicly announced the transfer of two North Korean prisoners of war to South Korea as if it were a self-evident fact.
Already on September 24, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung accused Zelensky of violating a non-disclosure agreement, writing “Ukraine disclosed the transfer in a breach of a non-disclosure agreement. I don’t know the reasons, but I regret it”. Lee stressed that the issue of returning North Korean prisoners is an extremely sensitive topic with a serious impact on diplomacy, security, and the situation on the Korean Peninsula.
The conservatives were especially harsh in their criticism, asking why South Korean citizens learned of the North Koreans’ arrival from a foreign president, while their own authorities, in their view, did not want to “anger Kim Jong Un”. Former intelligence chief and ruling Democratic Party lawmaker Park Ji-won demanded an explanation as to why the public had not been informed about the transfer of the prisoners.
On September 25, a representative of the South Korean presidential office, who wished to remain anonymous, reported that the prisoner transfer was accompanied by dozens of closed consultations with Kiev, and both sides had proceeded on the assumption that the operation would remain confidential. Ukraine had warned in advance that Zelensky would touch on the topic of the prisoners in his speech; however, according to Seoul, it did not make clear that he would announce the transfer as already having taken place.
South Korea’s ruling Democratic Party was even tougher than the president. Party spokesperson Shin Hyun-young called Zelensky’s actions “an act that undermined trust between the two countries” and “dangerous from a national security standpoint”. Kiev was called upon to explain the disclosure and to prevent the publication of information that could endanger the lives of the servicemen themselves and their relatives in the DPRK.
The Ukrainian side did not smooth over the conflict with diplomatic wording, stating that Ukraine is an open country. “It would be strange to secretly send people captured by Ukrainian military personnel to another country”, Kiev emphasized.
Advisor to Ukraine’s Ambassador to the UK Oksana Torop claimed that a non-disclosure agreement did exist, and she called Zelensky’s decision to publicly speak about the prisoners a “show”.
On September 26, the White House once again emphasized the need to observe international law and humanitarian principles in the treatment of North Korean prisoners of war.
On September 27, the South Korean presidential administration expressed “strong regret” over Ukraine’s refusal to observe the non-disclosure agreement. Senior Presidential Secretary for Public Relations Song Gihong stated: “The presidential office expresses strong regret over Ukraine’s unilateral disclosure and its subsequent false announcement that there had not been a non-disclosure agreement”. Moreover, Song Gihong stated that it was specifically the Ukrainian side that had insisted on confidentiality of the deal, explaining this by the fear that public disclosure of the information could provoke domestic criticism of Kiev for refusing to exchange soldiers for Ukrainian prisoners. On September 30, this information was confirmed by the National Intelligence Service (NIS).
On September 28, a representative of the ruling Democratic Party, retired general Kim Byung-joo demanded that the South Korean government reconsider its aid to Ukraine. “Until now we have provided humanitarian and economic support amounting to 100 million dollars. In response, we received a violation of agreements between the leaders and the publication of false information”, he said. He added: “There is neither reason nor need to support a state that does not observe trust between governments and ignores agreements reached”.
On the same day, Ukraine’s chargé d’affaires, Andrei Veshkin, was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea. First Vice Minister Park Yoon-joo conveyed to him the official protest of the South Korean government, emphasizing that the publication of false information seriously undermines trust between the countries and damages bilateral relations. He demanded that the Ukrainian side provide official explanations and apologies, and also urged that such incidents not be allowed in the future.
And now one wants to ask…
At present, the conflict remains one of the loudest topics on the local political agenda. However, the author does not intend to criticize Zelensky’s irresponsibility or to assert that South Korea can no longer trust Ukraine. Instead, a different question arises: what exactly provoked this scandal?
According to RIA Novosti, Zelensky disclosed the fact of the transfer of the North Koreans as a kind of revenge for Seoul’s refusal to provide Ukraine with air defense systems. Indeed, Ukraine repeatedly asked South Korea in August to supply the Cheongung-II (KM SAM) air defense system, but each time received a refusal. In this context, one could speak of a more subtle game where the public disclosure of the transfer of the prisoners unequivocally worsens South Korea’s relations both with Russia and with the DPRK, and may provoke retaliatory measures after which it will be easier for Seoul to “cross Moscow’s red line”. The worse, the better. However, the effectiveness of such tactics remains debatable.
Any state would react to a violation of the confidentiality of negotiations and the disclosure of “sensitive information damaging foreign policy interests”. Nevertheless, Seoul’s usually restrained reaction in this case was very sharp. If the deal really was “clean”, i.e. humanitarian, based on the voluntary consent of the soldiers and international law, then what caused such a harsh response?
The author believes that the reason lies in the fear of revealing with what exactly the transfer of the prisoners was paid for. Did it become the beginning of military-technical cooperation between the two countries?
It should be noted that direct supplies of weapons and ammunition are unlikely, as that would be too conspicuous. Moreover, the South Korean defense industry is loaded with orders for years ahead, and there is a shortage of specialists and production capacity.
Seoul needs not only modern models of South Korean military equipment, but also high technology, as well as specialists capable of training others to work with it.
In this context, the recent incident with a “group of civilians” who systematically launched reconnaissance drones toward the DPRK is telling. After Pyongyang raised an outcry, the participants had to be arrested. It soon turned out that the operators were acting on the orders of South Korean special services. Despite illegally crossing the border and actions bordering on provoking a large-scale conflict, all those involved received only suspended sentences — and even then, under a formal charge of violating flight safety rules.
This precedent creates a dangerous leeway; nothing prevents a group of enthusiasts driven by ideas of democracy and support for Ukraine from heading to the combat zone. Having officially violated the ban on travel to the region, they could engage in training Ukrainian soldiers and introducing new technologies. Their real task is clear, namely collecting intelligence on the participation of North Korean forces in the Special Military Operation and studying the specifics of modern warfare, experience of which South Korea, which has not fought since Vietnam, desperately needs.
If such activity comes to light, relations between Moscow and Seoul could degrade to the level of our relations with Warsaw or Tallinn. It is not excluded that the restrained rhetoric of the South Korean president is merely the tip of the iceberg, and a journalistic investigation could unravel the entire tangle.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that in August 2026 Seoul confirmed its interest in NATO’s PURL program (Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List), which involves financing the purchase of American weapons for Kiev. No final decision has been made yet, but the official position remains unchanged. Foreign Minister Cho Hyun stressed that humanitarian aid (including the promised $100 million) and Ukraine reconstruction projects will be implemented regardless of the current diplomatic scandal.
What does this mean for Russia? We hope for the best, but prepare for the worst. Too many things indicate that by the end of 2026, relations between Moscow and Seoul may pass the point of no return. With this text, the author hopes to draw attention to the problem and, possibly, to slow down this dangerous trend.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of China and Modern Asia at the Russian Academy of Sciences
Follow new articles on our Telegram channel
