On the margins of the 2026 SCO Summit in Bishkek, Armenia’s government once again demonstrated its foreign-policy indecisiveness and propensity to evade responsibility for making up its mind in favour of either the EU or the EAEU, whilst forgoing a nationwide referendum on the matter.
“Did Russian Slip Their Mind All of a Sudden?”
The most widely discussed episode was Nikol Vovaevich’s decision to deliver his address in Armenian rather than in Russian—the only leader present at the “SCO+” session to have done so. The media were prompt to label this move a “provocation,” starkly illustrating the accelerating distancing of Armenia’s foreign-policy trajectory from Russia. Some even juxtaposed the Armenian premier’s “stunt” and the political style characteristic of Ukrainian President V. Zelensky, who regularly “draws a blank on Russian” in his public speeches (as well as English, on a related note—a phenomenon quite often observed at high-level meetings with Western leaders; suffice it to recall the episode at the Munich Security Conference in February 2025). Moreover, in May 2026, at the 8th European Political Community Summit in Yerevan, N. Pashinyan and V. Zelensky “synced up in forgetting Russian,” having conducted their own bilateral negotiations in English.
Nevertheless, however significant the political symbolism may be—and its semantic weight is often acquired precisely through the interpretation of the underlying actions by other actors (for instance, Presidential Aide Yury Ushakov commented on Pashinyan’s choice of Armenian language as follows: “He might have got to know that interpretation was available <…> into other languages, <…> hence delivering his speech in Armenian”; “Peculiar, but nothing more than that”)—it is more important to focus on what the Russian and Armenian leaders actually discussed during their bilateral meeting and what was new about the agenda.
Foreign-Policy (In)decisiveness
The key issue that the negotiations centred on was, predictably, Armenia’s making up its mind between alignment with the EU and fully-fledged membership in the EAEU and its affiliated structures.
In this regard, Russia’s stance has remained unaltered. In response to N. Pashinyan’s arguments that the EAEU Treaty stipulates a clear procedure for withdrawal from the organization, involving the official dispatch of a notice of withdrawal to the depositary state through diplomatic channels (which Armenia, according to Pashinyan, has still not done), V. Putin unequivocally stated that the adoption of a law on commencing accession to another organization (in this case, the EU—ed.) “effectively signifies withdrawal from the current one.”
And since Russia unequivocally regards Armenia as a sovereign and legitimate subject of international relations, V. Putin emphasized: “Whichever way Armenia opts for, that will be the way forward. We respect any choice of the Armenian people.” Yet, throughout the summer season, the government of N. Pashinyan has reiterated the same narrative: “There is as yet no legal collision between our EAEU obligations and our EU policy”; “Armenia will remain in the EAEU until the choice becomes inevitable.”
And just a week prior to the SCO Summit, on August 24, 2026, N. Pashinyan, while presenting his government’s program in parliament, went even further, stating that he would be quite content if the CSTO (another organization within the CIS space, which Yerevan has in effect already abandoned by having put its participation on a halt back in February 2024) were to expel Yerevan from the alliance on CSTO’s own accord. “In any case, that would relieve us of the dilemma of whether to withdraw or not <…>.”
Thus, Armenia is demonstrating a clear unwillingness to assume responsibility for its own political decisions, literally shifting that burden onto its partners. Hence, one should not expect a decisive resolution in the near future, despite the Russian government’s insistent and courteous request — “We would ask you to determine your position as soon as possible.”
In reality, such irresolute foreign-policy behavior tallies rather perfectly with the overarching conceptual positioning of Armenia under the government of N. Pashinyan. Clearly fitting the characteristics of a “small power,” Armenia has become one of the few states to have codified at the conceptual level the status of “small-powerness,” which, among other things, presupposes the absence of political passionarity as such. In the “Real Armenia” program presented by N. Pashinyan as early as February 2025, the rejection of foreign-policy “maximalism” is explicitly stipulated, along with minimizing the diaspora’s role in Armenian foreign policy and a rupture with the previous historical tradition, which is sought to be associated, inter alia, with the excessive influence of Russia.
This choice is far from consensual within Armenian society; therefore, and particularly in light of the fact that in the June parliamentary elections—with a turnout of only 59%—the positions of N. Pashinyan’s party in parliament proved far less secure than it would have wished, the management of public opinion (or efforts to circumvent it) has acquired particular significance for N. Pashinyan.
Referendum: To Be or Not to Be?
In this context, the only matter on which N. Pashinyan’s government has truly reached a decision, and which was unequivocally articulated in the negotiations with V. Putin, is the refusal to hold a nationwide referendum on the accession to the EU.
Whereas previously Pashinyan had postponed the moment of clarity by all possible means, asserting that Armenia would grant its people the right to speak after receiving a positive response from Brussels (“after preparatory work and the submission of an official application for membership,” it is important “to create alternatives for Armenian citizens so that the people may choose for themselves,” “perhaps neither the EU nor the EAEU,” etc.), on September 1, 2026, on the margins of the SCO, the prime minister declared that the 2025 law on launching the path to European integration had been adopted by the Armenian parliament precisely in order to avoid holding such a referendum, among other things.
Commenting upon this decision, Sergey Markedonov, a specialist on the post-Soviet space at the Institute of International Studies of MGIMO University, notes that such “obfuscation of popular will” by the government of N. Pashinyan is by no means a precedent, becoming “Nikol Vovaevich’s signature style.” Back in 2020, the Armenian authorities canceled a scheduled nationwide vote on the Constitutional Court and adopted amendments through parliament, “using the difficult epidemiological situation due to COVID-19 as a cover.”
Thus, one may infer that since it is currently impossible to talk of the Armenian society as “homogenous,” the government of N. Pashinyan fears the actual standpoint of the Armenian people regarding further integration with European Union structures. A position that might well substantively coincide, for example, with the outcome of the referendum recently held in Iceland on the resumption of EU accession negotiations, in which 52.83% of citizens voted against. As Russian Presidential Spokesman Dmitry Peskov aptly remarked: “The Icelanders did not wish to. We shall see what sets Armenians apart from Icelanders.”
Stepanida Safonova, Master’s Student at the Diplomatic Academy of MGIMO University, Political Observer
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