The account of what took place in Beijing would be incomplete without covering the role played there by representatives of the Republic of Korea.
South Korea’s participation in the celebrations and the “brief encounter” with the North
However, the record of Lee’s visits to Japan and the United States revealed Seoul’s true foreign policy priorities. On August 25, 2025, Lee Jae-myung declared that Seoul could no longer adhere to the traditional formula: “security with the United States, economy with China.”
Then, on August 28, Foreign Minister Cho Hyun stated that South Korea would closely cooperate with relevant countries, including China, to bring Pyongyang back to the negotiating table with the ultimate goal of denuclearization.
In the end, it was the Speaker of the National Assembly, Woo Won-shik, who traveled to China. He is the third-ranking figure in the South’s formal hierarchy, but not a decision-maker. Commenting on this, Guangcha noted that China’s leadership is fully aware of South Korea’s complex domestic situation and of President Lee Jae-myung’s difficult position: he must give top priority to relations with the United States and Japan as well as to domestic tensions, but at the same time he cannot ignore China. As long as his administration’s dealings with the United States and Japan do not undermine Chinese interests, and as long as relations with Beijing can be improved, the Chinese leadership can accept this.
In Seoul, some even considered Woo Won-shik a better choice for talks than Lee Jae-myung himself. As Woo Sang-ho, senior political adviser to the president, told journalists: “Woo Won-shik and Chairman Kim even drank together during the inter-Korean summit in 2018, so they are well acquainted.” Moreover, Woo’s mother and older sisters live in North Korea. Even so, adviser Woo admitted that an official meeting was out of the question, and at best a brief exchange of greetings could take place.
Так, в общем-то и случилось, хотя первые южнокорейские новости говорили о «короткой беседе», подавая ее как дипломатический успех, почти сразу стало известно ее точное содержание: That is essentially what happened. Although South Korean news outlets initially spoke of a “short conversation,” presenting it as a diplomatic success, the actual content quickly became known:
Woo Won-shik: We met seven years ago, and now we meet again!
Kim Jong-un: Ah, hello …
That’s it!
What’s more, despite desperate attempts by the second member of the delegation, Park Jie-won (former head of South Korea’s intelligence agency and earlier one of the organizers of the 2007 inter-Korean summit), to draw Kim’s attention — twice addressing him with the words, “Chairman of State Affairs, my name is Park Jie-won” — the North Korean leader did not even turn his head.
Nonetheless, upon returning home and speaking to the press, Woo described his handshake with Kim Jong-un as “significant in itself.” Moreover, he claimed that his trip “not only achieved its set goal of advancing cooperation between South Korea and China, but also produced an unexpected outcome concerning the Korean Peninsula.” The level of embellishment and self-congratulation readers can judge for themselves.
Other diplomatic activity by the South Korean delegation
On other fronts, Woo Won-shik fared better. First, the Speaker met with Xi Jinping and invited him to attend the APEC summit in Gyeongju in October 2025.
Second, Woo held an informal conversation with President Vladimir Putin, asking him to take care of 130 South Korean companies operating in Russia. The Russian leader inquired about prospects for inter-Korean relations and asked what message Woo would like conveyed to Kim Jong-un.
Woo’s reply was as follows: “I hope for the beginning of an era of peace and prosperity in North–South relations. Although there are many obstacles and difficulties, it is crucial now to do everything possible to strengthen peace on the Korean Peninsula, and we will work toward that goal.”
Third, Woo Won-shik met with Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang, urging Beijing to expand economic cooperation with Seoul. He emphasized that Xi Jinping’s participation in the upcoming APEC summit would serve as a “decisive” turning point in the development of bilateral relations. He also called for efforts to achieve “meaningful results” in ongoing negotiations on a free trade agreement (FTA) between South Korea and China, and to step up joint responses to supply chain disruptions, including stable access to key raw materials. Finally, Woo stressed the need to expand mutual investment and to intensify cooperation in crisis management, while exploring new areas of partnership such as biotechnology, robotics, artificial intelligence, and renewable energy. For his part, Ding Xuexiang proposed accelerating FTA negotiations and moving toward their swift conclusion.
Discussion of the event’s outcome in South Korea
There was a flood of articles of varying authorship, and it is easier to single out the main lines of discussion, apart from attempts to disguise the failure on the inter-Korean front. Beforehand, South Korean media wrote that “Kim Jong-un will not be able to ignore Woo Won-shik.” Afterwards, the focus shifted to what Woo had discussed with the Chinese side (although, in fact, no agreements or declarations were signed there either).
The first theme was the conclusion that Kim Jong-un had bolstered his international standing and, with backing from Beijing and Moscow, strengthened his bargaining position, making his denuclearization highly unlikely.
Hong Min, senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, argued that Kim’s presence alongside Xi Jinping at the parade reflected “recognition of North Korea’s strategic status as a neighboring power in Northeast Asia,” signaled solidarity, and served as a deterrent message to the United States. Hong suggested that although China formally continues to declare support for denuclearization of the peninsula, such rhetoric may soon be dropped.
Sidney Seiler, senior adviser at the Korea office of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, noted: “Kim clearly relishes the impression that the U.S.-led world order is weakening, that a group of authoritarian revisionist states challenging that order is growing, and that Russia and China view him as a valuable and powerful — if not leading — member of this club.”
It was also pointed out that the parade in Beijing took place just a week after President Lee Jae-myung, during his visits to Japan and the United States, reaffirmed trilateral security cooperation with Washington and Tokyo, effectively discarding multi-vector foreign policy. Against this backdrop, North Korea, emboldened by support from Russia and China, is unlikely to join denuclearization talks. Instead, Kim Jong-un may pursue arms control negotiations, seeking recognition as a permanent nuclear state.
However, former U.S. chargé d’affaires in Seoul Rob Rapson cautioned that the media were overstating the significance of the Kim–Xi–Putin meeting: “Despite the sensational photos, this is not yet a unified bloc.”
The second theme was the “restoration” of China–North Korea ties and its implications for Seoul in terms of prospects for China–South Korea relations. The prevailing view: Kim is trying to rebuild ties with Beijing as a way of strengthening his hand ahead of possible renewed talks with the United States. Yang Moo-jin, president of the University of North Korean Studies, remarked that the North Korean leader’s trip was part of efforts to restore frayed ties with Beijing ahead of the end of the war in Ukraine, which may shift Moscow’s focus westward: “Kim’s presence could serve as a starting point for multilateral dialogue in the region and as a catalyst for a North Korea–U.S. summit”, which China might seek to arrange.
Sidney Seiler likewise suggested that “the display of closeness between Xi Jinping, Putin, and Kim before and during the parade may have been intended to show that rumors of Chinese displeasure over Russia–North Korea relations are exaggerated.”
In this context, South Korean media highlighted growing rumors about Xi Jinping’s possible trip to Pyongyang for the founding anniversary of the Workers’ Party on October 10, 2025. They also speculated that “China–North Korea relations may see a rapid increase in economic cooperation and high-level exchanges, restoring ties strained by Pyongyang’s military alignment with Russia to a state of normalcy.”
The third theme concerned criticism of Lee Jae-myung. Ironically, the same conservative outlets that once condemned him for a “pro-China course” now wrote that “strengthening the alliance with Washington and Tokyo is the right response, but insufficient. Deterrence must be coupled with flexibility.” Such is the logic of factional politics.
Their opponents countered that the world is changing and the clustering of political space no longer allows one to sit between two chairs. The author recalls his own 2021 text, where he argued that “Seoul’s alignment with American projects is inevitable. South Korea will demonstrate its independence in foreign policy to the very end, but ultimately it will choose Washington.”
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Centre for Korean Studies of the Institute of China and Modern Asia at the Russian Academy of Sciences
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