In late January and early February, there was a local diplomatic escalation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Korea, which, in the view of some experts, had the effect of cooling relations between the two countries by a couple of degrees.
On January 19, 2024, Georgy Zinoviev, Russian Ambassador to the Republic of Korea told Russian journalists that as long as South Korea did not cross a “red line” and directly supply lethal weapons to Ukraine, Russia was ready to consider the Republic of Korea as a promising partner.
Using one of the present author’s favorite phrases, “the Republic of Korea is one of the friendliest states among those unfriendly to Russia,” the ambassador emphasized that “unlike Western countries, the Republic of Korea is not seeking to defeat, punish or divide Russia. That is not the goal of South Korean diplomacy.” The ambassador reiterated that “direct deliveries of lethal weapons to the Kiev regime would critically damage bilateral ties. We will not allow South Korean shells to kill Russian soldiers.” However, Moscow is taking the Republic of Korea’s assurances that it has no intention to supply weapons to Kiev quite seriously, and expects this stance to remain unchanged. This is important not only for the current situation, but also for subsequent relations following the end of the conflict in Ukraine.
With regard to the DPRK, the ambassador noted that North Korea is a friendly state with which Russia is developing full cooperation taking into account its international obligations, and any doubts about this should be discussed, not through statements to the media, but through the mechanisms established for this purpose, primarily the 1718 Committee (UN Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1718).
The ambassador also noted that South Korea’s expansion of the list of products subject to export control measures, which this year included heavy construction machinery and equipment, batteries, machine tools, aircraft parts and components, etc., will make it difficult to normalize relations between Russia and South Korea.
The ambassador also expressed hope that South Korea would not join the ranks of Russia’s entrenched adversaries and would eventually become the first on the list of “unfriendly” countries to return to the category of “friendly” ones.
On January 22, 2024, the Republic of Korea’s Minister of National Defense, Shin Won-sik, said that he believes it is necessary to provide Ukraine with military assistance and support, but nevertheless supports the current position of the government, which is that Seoul is, so far, limiting itself to supplying only non-lethal types of products.
On January 23, 2024, South Korea’s Ambassador to the United Nations Hwang Joon-kook, along with representatives of 50 other nations, signed a statement expressing dissatisfaction concerning Russia’s protests over Western arms shipments to Ukraine. The statement said that arms deliveries to Ukraine at the request of the Ukrainian government were perfectly legal.
For his part, Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, who was also present at the meeting, put the responsibility for the continuation of the military conflict in Ukraine on the West, which continues to supply Kiev “legally” with arms and military equipment. He also accused Ukraine’s “Western patrons” of pushing the country to continue a “senseless military confrontation” under the cover of lies. He also stated that the United States, South Korea and Japan were preparing for a war against the DPRK by constantly conducting military maneuvers involving large amounts of military personnel and hardware.
On January 26, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, commenting on Shin Won-sik’s remarks, warned that Seoul’s “reckless conduct” could undermine its formerly friendly relations with Moscow. “It is Washington that is behind Seoul’s statements, and the purpose of these news releases is to involve an Asian ally — the Republic of Korea — in the Ukrainian conflict.”
South Korean media was quick to sound the alarm: “Moscow interpreted this as a potential indication of Seoul providing military aid to Kyiv and warned of a ‘complete breakdown’ of bilateral ties.”
On January 28, commenting on the Russian government’s reaction to Shin Won-sik’s statement about full support for Ukraine, a representative of the Republic of Korea’s Foreign Ministry said that the development of South Korean-Russian relations would depend on Moscow’s actions. The Republic of Korea’s Foreign Ministry also reiterated its position of not providing military aid to Ukraine: Seoul is only providing non-lethal support to Ukraine while keeping an eye on military-technical cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang in light of its possible impact on the Republic of Korea’s national security.
On January 31, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement on the situation on the Korean Peninsula, which “presents a threat to the security and stability of the whole of Northeast Asia. This escalation stems from the provocative steps by the United States and its allies, aimed at ramping up their military activity in the region, including by deploying NATO infrastructure, making military preparations and holding more maneuvers and exercises, some involving nuclear components, close to the DPRK’s border.” Attempts to portray the DPRK as the culprit — “are nothing more than a reflection of their long-standing habit of shifting the burden of responsibility.” In fact, it is the unrelenting aggressive provocations by Washington, Seoul and Tokyo that are forcing Pyongyang to take adequate measures to ensure its defense capabilities and security.”
On February 1, Maria Zakharova said that “statements of the President of the Republic of Korea, Yoon Suk-yeol, who called the DPRK allegedly “the only country in the world” that legislated the possibility of a “preventive nuclear strike,” are frankly tendentious. They are designed to obscure aggressive plans against the DPRK and look especially odious against the background of what is happening on and around the Korean peninsula, where the degree of tension and conflict is steadily increasing, primarily as a result of the impudent policies of the United States and its allies, including the Republic of Korea and Japan.”
According to Maria Zakharova, “The authors of such strategic revelations should know that the doctrines of Seoul’s American curators assert for themselves the possibility of a nuclear first strike. They also justify “preventive” disarming and decapitating strikes on countries that Washington has listed as its enemies. Unfortunately, Seoul doesn’t seem to realize that the United States’ leading position is irrevocably becoming a thing of the past… This shortsighted approach is reflected in provocative rhetoric. A vivid example of this is the recent statement by the South Korean leaders to the effect that the Republic of Korea and the US have already reached the “nuclear alliance level.” But does Seoul understand that if it comes to testing these statements in practice, South Korea may turn out to be no more than a small bargaining chip in Washington’s geopolitical games?”
On February 3 Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs Chung Byung-won summoned Russian Ambassador to Korea Georgy Zinoviev to protest those statements: “It is very unfortunate that the Russian side ignored the truth and unconditionally defended North Korea and criticized our leader’s remarks in an extremely rude manner… This will cause our relations to deteriorate further.”
In response, the Republic of Korea’s Foreign Ministry states, Ambassador Zinoviev said he had listened carefully to the position of the South Korean government and would immediately report it to his government. According to another report on the subject of the Russian Embassy in the Republic of Korea, Ambassador Zinoviev “outlined Russia’s views on the increasingly tense situation on the Korean Peninsula. He objected to the ‘unacceptable’ nature of comments published by South Korean media, citing the Foreign Ministry, on February 2 this year in connection with the statements of the official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, including statements concerning the special military operation of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine.” After that, experts started talking about how “bilateral relations between Russia and South Korea are going through the worst period in diplomatic history since 1990.”
But that was not all…
Part two
On February 2, 2024 Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko held consultations in Seoul with the Republic of Korea’s Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs Chung Byung-won, Foreign Ministry Special Representative for Peace and Security on the Korean Peninsula Kim Gong, and also met with First Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Hong-kyung.
According to a statement published on the website of the Republic of Korea’s Foreign Ministry, “We expressed our serious stance in relation to military cooperation between the Russian Federation and North Korea, called on Russia to act responsibly, and asked for it to cooperate in order to ensure that the legitimate rights and interests of our citizens and companies in Russia are not violated.” Kim Gong also called on Moscow to comply in full of its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions, including bringing an immediate halt to its military ties with Pyongyang that threaten the security of the Korean Peninsula and Europe.
The Russian Foreign Ministry also reported on Andrey Rudenko’s consultations in the Republic of Korea: “there was an exchange of views on the situation on the Korean Peninsula and in North-East Asia as a whole, and also on issues affecting bilateral relations. The Russian representative expressed serious concerns about the sharp escalation of tensions in the region and pointed out that its main source is Washington’s provocative policy, which for its own geopolitical purposes is trying to encourage its regional allies to implement its aggressive plans, which are fraught with unpredictable consequences. He emphasized that the normalization of the situation would be facilitated by an immediate cessation by the United States and its allies of their dangerous military activity and a return to a joint search for a political and diplomatic solution to the current problems.
The Russian representative expressed Russia’s firm intention to continue, in accordance with the requirements of international law, to develop mutually beneficial cooperation with the DPRK in the interests of both countries and their peoples, and in order to strengthen peace and stability in the region.”
On February 6, media in the Republic of Korea, citing an anonymous insider, reported that the head of South Korea’s National Security Office Chang Ho-jin had met with Andrey Rudenko on February 3. Chang Ho-jin is senior to Andrey Rudenko, but nevertheless agreed to meet informally with him, indicating the willingness of the two sides to work together to resolve outstanding issues and thus ease tensions.
On February 7, Georgy Zinoviev said in an interview with Yonhap that relations between Russia and the ROK “are not as good as we might hope, but nevertheless they have not hit rock bottom.”
Referring to Seoul’s decision in December 2023 to tighten controls on the export from Russia of dual-use goods that could be used for military purposes, the ambassador emphasized that “such decisions do not help maintain a substantial level of bilateral cooperation… The minimum requirement for removing the Republic of Korea from the list of unfriendly countries is the lifting of sanctions against Russia,” he added. As for Russia’s relations with North Korea, the ambassador denied any military cooperation between the two countries, describing the allegations of such cooperation “groundless and unverified.” Calling Korea “a country with which Russia has a long and rich history,” Georgy Zinoviev said he would work hard to make progress in relations with the Republic of Korea during his posting in Seoul.
Also, on February 7, 2024, an interview with TASS was given by DPRK Ambassador to Russia Aleksandr Matsegora. He emphasized that “we have now reached what we could reasonably describe as an unprecedented level of mutual understanding in our relations with the DPRK” and that “cooperation continues to strengthen thanks to the great personal efforts made by the leaders of the two countries.” It is therefore possible that “the current year will mark a breakthrough in relations between Russia and the DPRK in many areas.”
On the other hand, he continued, “Moscow is primarily concerned about the incessant provocations that the United States and its South Korean allies are carrying almost continually in areas directly adjacent to the DPRK’s borders.” Thus “whether 2024 will be a year of peace in Korea or whether it will see the beginning of an armed conflict depends entirely on the Americans,” as does the DPRK’s nuclear testing. The DPRK leadership may conduct new nuclear tests “to further strengthen its defense capabilities” in the event of “provocative steps” by the US, he emphasized.
To complete this outline of developments, we will quote from an interview given by Ivan Alekseevich Zhelokhovtsev, Director of the First Department of Asia of the Russian Foreign Ministry, published by RIA Novosti on February 11, 2024. Mr. Zhelokhovtsev, as the specialist primarily responsible for Korean issues, pointed out that “despite serious differences in approaches, we believe it is important to maintain open channels of communication with our South Korean partners, and they assured us that they share this view in a meeting of deputy foreign ministers held in Seoul in early February. We welcome this attitude, but we will judge Seoul’s intentions by its actions, particularly in matters concerning economic sanctions against our country.”
To summarize: the communications from the two countries’ Foreign Ministries make it clear how firmly each side communicated its position. But the present author would like to draw attention to one more interesting detail. In the present case, the ups and downs in relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Korea are not due to the traditional set of obstacles, but to the fact that Russia, roughly speaking, firmly stood up for North Korea. For the present author, this is an important point:
in a number of articles, he noted that the security architecture in Northeast Asia is formed around two triangles, Moscow-Beijing-Pyongyang and Washington-Tokyo-Seoul. The escalation between these two blocs is growing, and the author hopes it will follow the Cold War model, in which NATO and the Warsaw Pact held each other at gunpoint, but neither ever pulled the trigger.
In such a situation, South Korea is trying to get out of the difficulty it finds itself in. In Seoul, in all likelihood, support for the US policy is not so much seen as a question of loyalty to the imperial protector, but as a rational use of its resources to ensure its own security. However, Seoul is also aiming for a free hand in relations with China and Russia, and is indeed doing less than Washington has asked it to do. If that was not the case, it is clear that South Korean weapons would have been used in the Ukraine conflict long ago. However, Seoul is very sensitive to any statements that suggest that it lacks autonomy and subjectivity and portray it as a compliant vassal of the US.
From Seoul’s point of view (and this is a position the present author is quite familiar with) it had little choice but to join in the sanctions and condemnation of Russia, but tried (from its own perspective, at least) to minimize the damage to relations. But from Moscow’s point of view, joining in the sanctions itself is an unfriendly step, irrespective of how much damage it actually causes. This is particularly true given the current confrontation between the two triangular blocs, in which Seoul’s actions are beginning to be seen not only as actions detrimental to Russia, but directed against the triangle as a whole.
Seoul is angry that the DPRK’s actions in its relations with the Republic of Korea have not met with condemnation in Moscow. The fact that ties between the two Koreas have been severed and Pyongyang is moving toward Moscow clearly saddens Seoul, although this is an understandable process.
In the confrontation between the two blocs, each of the two Koreas is trying to choose its side, and although this does not necessarily mean breaking off links with the countries in the “foreign” triangle, it priority is to strengthen links with the countries in its own bloc.
This year is therefore likely to see turbulence in relations between Moscow and Seoul, and the speed and scope of the problems will depend on the changing situation. At present, Moscow and Seoul are seeking to explain their positions, combining open diplomatic rhetoric, although naturally couched in strong language, with attempts to establish contact and seek common ground, but external pressure is high. In addition, the Republic of Korea has parliamentary elections coming up in April 2024, and Seoul is doing its best to appear as proud, tough and independent as possible in the campaign season. The current political structure requires a more perceptive and demonstrative response to the challenges.
Konstantin Asmolov, Candidate of Historical Sciences and Leading Research Fellow at the Center for Korean Studies at the Institute of China and Modern Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”
