Iraqi Kurdistan is on the verge of a political split due to long-standing disagreements between its two main parties—a situation that could lead to the creation of parallel power structures and undermine regional stability.
Introduction
The Kurdistan Region’s Parliament elected Vala Farid, a representative of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP or PDK), as its Speaker. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the New Generation Movement boycotted the session.
On November 5, Bafel Talabani, President of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, announced that his party would withdraw from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and would not recognize the parliamentary decisions or appointments resulting from the recent political process. He further declared that the party would refuse to recognize any decisions or positions arising from that process.
The most consequential aspect of his statement was the threat to establish parallel governing institutions. In other words, if Erbil appoints a regional president and prime minister, Sulaymaniyah will also appoint its own president and prime minister.
Causes and Background Factors
Since the end of the civil war, the Kurdistan Region’s governing structure has never achieved genuine political and institutional unity.
Three decades of structural disagreements between the two major parties, a dual governing structure, mutual distrust, concerns, military capabilities, and party-affiliated armed forces have constituted the principal obstacles to unification.
In practice, the Kurdistan Democratic Party exercises power in the Erbil and Duhok regions, while the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan retains control over Sulaymaniyah and parts of the surrounding areas.
The two parties agreed in 2006 to integrate their governing structures; however, this unification was never fully implemented. Furthermore, the withdrawal from the political scene of the founding generation, divergent political orientations, differences in foreign relations, and the parties’ respective political tactics and strategic approaches have all contributed to the intensification of the current situation.
The persistence of the two major parties’ patronage networks across the economy, media, and security institutions, together with the geographical division of spheres of influence between their respective territories, constitutes one of the principal causes of the current duality of governance.
The Kurdistan Parliament has effectively remained inactive since its first session on December 2, 2024. From the perspective of KDP supporters, two years have been spent waiting for a political agreement, and prioritizing Kurdish interests amid ongoing political developments and the formation of a new government is essential.
Accordingly, supporters consider the parliament both lawful and necessary to overcome the political deadlock, whereas opponents characterize it as a unilateral action lacking political legitimacy.
Opponents also regard the KDP’s unilateral move to hastily reactivate parliament as an expression of political monopolization, strategic miscalculation, and the unilateral imposition of its political will.
The PUK has also demonstrated that it is no longer willing to accept the role of a “small actor” or tolerate the unequal distribution of interests and resources and the disregard for its geopolitical and security significance in the eastern and southern parts of the Kurdistan Region.
The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan has historically maintained better relations with Baghdad than the Kurdistan Democratic Party. By invoking federal laws and exercising its economic, legal, and resource-related leverage, Baghdad has progressively narrowed Erbil’s room for maneuver. Erbil’s determination to preserve its political position and protect itself against regional threats has motivated its efforts to convene parliament and establish a “government with fully constituted institutions.”
Consequences of the Crisis
The current circumstances have brought the crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan into a new phase. Over the past two years, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan had sought to create the conditions necessary for the formation of an inclusive government. The PUK does not appear to have closed the door to negotiations. However, Talabani’s threat that “whatever Erbil does, we will do here as well” indicates a stronger insistence on, and a broader concentration of political attention on, the PUK’s demands and its areas of influence. If these threats evolve into formal political and legal recognition of separate governing arrangements, the prospect of political, security, and economic integration within the Kurdistan Region would effectively be undermined.
The KDP’s action should not be interpreted as a declaration of war against the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.
The possibility of complete separation between Erbil and Duhok, on the one hand, and Sulaymaniyah and Halabja, on the other, does not necessarily lead to civil war. Nevertheless, it could further weaken the political and economic unity of Iraqi Kurdistan.
Such a development would make it more difficult for the Kurdistan Regional Government to address challenges relating to economic reform, revenue diversification, institutional strengthening, and the resolution of disputes with Baghdad.
From another perspective, de facto separation would also have direct and indirect implications for the budget, oil revenues, border management, and administrative relations between Erbil and Baghdad.
Despite its substantial dependence on oil revenues, the central government of Iraq has currently set the Kurdistan Region’s budgetary allocation at 12.67 percent, whereas the Kurdistan Region is demanding a 14 percent share of Iraq’s general budget.
Meanwhile, the disputes between Erbil and Baghdad encompass the Region’s budgetary allocation and the volume of its oil production. The Iraqi central government could exercise control over Kurdistan’s share of federal power and reduce the autonomy of Erbil and the Kurdish regions to a minimum.
Furthermore, should Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court rule that the parliamentary session was illegitimate, Baghdad could declare any resulting legislation, budgetary decisions, or appointments null and void, potentially paralyzing Erbil’s financial and executive institutions in practice.
Moreover, the inefficiency of political and economic institutions in Erbil could trigger public protests and popular uprisings across the Kurdistan Region. Nevertheless, the possibility of transforming the existing de facto duality into formal and legally recognized separation remains particularly significant.
Despite the security-unification measures undertaken in September 2026, the two principal parties continue to exercise considerable influence over the security structures operating in their respective areas of control.
If the two parties fail to reach an agreement on security responsibilities, this could have adverse consequences for coordination with Baghdad, territorial administration, and efforts to counter the activities of remaining ISIS* elements.
Meanwhile, the mediation efforts of Tom Barrack, Donald Trump’s envoy, to establish a bridge between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have failed.
Although some actors in Erbil claim that the PUK, with the support of its allies in Baghdad, has gained greater confidence. The silence, lack of positive reception, and reluctance among regional actors to congratulate or confer legitimacy upon the recent parliamentary session remain particularly noteworthy.
For its own security and strategic reasons, Ankara would not welcome increasing instability in the Kurdistan Region, external interference, or the securitization of its borders. Accordingly, Turkey may seek to expand its spheres of influence, while certain Western actors may also exert pressure on Erbil or Sulaymaniyah.
Iran’s dissatisfaction with the conduct of the Kurdistan Region’s authorities in their response to the Iran–US war is particularly noteworthy, especially given that Talabani traveled to Tehran on September 15 to meet with Iranian officials. For Iran, maintaining stability along its western borders and preventing political disagreements within Iraqi Kurdistan from escalating into a security crisis are of considerable importance. Any civil war between Iraqi Kurdish parties could further complicate the management of border and security issues. Accordingly, if the crisis moves toward civil war, Tehran, Ankara, Moscow, Beijing, Washington, and Brussels may adopt serious and new approaches to de-escalation or mediation.
Although the United States supports a “strong and resilient Kurdistan Region of Iraq,” its withdrawal from northern Iraq and the wider region could, to some extent, alter the regional security landscape to the detriment of the Kurds. In this context, internal fragmentation could turn the Kurdistan Region into a fragile arena of geopolitical competition in which external actors would be able to exercise greater influence.
Outlook
From a theoretical perspective, the territories under the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan’s sphere of influence could be administered within the framework of a separate federal region maintaining direct relations with the federal government of Iraq.
Under Article 119 of the Constitution of Iraq, such an administrative structure is possible through a referendum, initiated by one-third of the members of the relevant provincial council or by at least 10 percent of the province’s registered voters. Nevertheless, announcing withdrawal from the regional cabinet does not, in itself, signify the creation of another independent Kurdish region.
Accordingly, several factors would influence the realization of any potential scenario, including the role of and degree of support from other Kurdish parties, control over administrative institutions, financial resources, the position of the Iraqi central government, and the reactions of regional actors.
Looking ahead, the scenario of an armed conflict between the two parties appears unlikely. A return to negotiations and the achievement of a new agreement through the mediation of domestic political forces or external actors constitutes a plausible scenario. Nevertheless, the continuation of the political deadlock and the emergence of two parallel centers of power, without the formal establishment of two separate and independent governments, appears to be the more likely scenario.
* It has been recognized as a terrorist organization and is prohibited on the territory of the Russian Federation
Samyar Rostami, а political observer and senior researcher in international relations
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