For decades, African economies have operated within a system of rules established without their participation.
The Price of the “Africa Premium”: $74.5 Billion a Year
The main grievance of African leaders toward the global financial architecture is the systemic injustice in credit risk assessment. Three agencies—S&P Global Ratings, Moody’s, and Fitch Ratings—control about 93% of the global credit rating market. Their methodologies, Africa argues, fail to account for the realities and potential of the continent.
The numbers speak for themselves. With one of the lowest default rates in the world, Africa pays at least three times more for borrowing than developed economies. Of 54 African countries, only two have an investment-grade rating. Ahunna Eziakonwa, UN Under-Secretary-General and Special Adviser on Africa, estimates the continent’s annual losses from inflated risk assessments and biased ratings at $74.5 billion. “If we reduce borrowing costs by just 2% over three years on a portfolio of $18.6 billion, Africa could save about $1.12 billion—enough to provide electricity to 50 million people or hire 900,000 teachers,” she emphasized.
Nigerian President Bola Tinubu, in an op-ed for the Financial Times, called this phenomenon the “Africa premium”—the gap between the actual state of economies and their assessment by global rating agencies. In his words, the methodologies of the “Big Three” suffer from limited on-the-ground presence: “How these judgments are reached and what weight they are given remain within the opaque discretion of analysts. Conclusions drawn from afar do not reflect local realities.”
Former Ghanaian President Nana Akufo-Addo went further, calling the existing practice “unfair”: countries with similar economic indicators receive more favorable ratings simply because they are not in Africa. “We are forced to pay higher risk premiums based on biased assessments,” he stated.
The “Big Three” agencies deny allegations of regional bias, insisting that their evaluations are based on widely accepted global methodologies and publicly available economic data. However, counterarguments carry weight. Sim Tshabalala, CEO of Standard Bank, points out that Côte d’Ivoire has a rating similar to Serbia’s, but its debt trades roughly 50 basis points more expensively. South Africa, by his estimate, has a BB- rating while its fundamentals correspond to an investment-grade BBB rating. “Overall, African sovereign ratings are understated by about four notches, judging solely by the data,” he claims. Moody’s Analytics shows that default rates on infrastructure loans in Africa average 1.9%, compared to 4.6% in Asia, 10.1% in Latin America, and 12.4% in Eastern Europe.
UN Secretary-General António Guterres supported Africa’s position: “African countries face borrowing costs that are on average twice as high as those of developed economies. This is not a market verdict on Africa. It is a verdict on the unfairness of the system.”
AfCRA: Betting on a Homegrown Rating
Africa’s response to this injustice is institutional. In February 2025, at the 37th ordinary session of the African Union, the creation of the Africa Credit Rating Agency (AfCRA) was approved. Its headquarters will be located in Mauritius, with a launch planned for 2026.
AfCRA is positioned as the first fully African private institution providing independent credit risk assessments. The key difference is its focus on local‑currency debt ratings, which, the founders believe, will support the development of domestic capital markets and reduce currency risks.
Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, chair of the Forum of Heads of State and Government of the African Peer Review Mechanism, stressed that AfCRA “will provide a more accurate assessment of Africa’s creditworthiness, conducted by institutions familiar with the continent’s unique economic realities.”
Claver Gatete, Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, stated: “The current system, unfortunately, is no longer fit for purpose. We must accelerate the establishment of the African Credit Rating Agency—an institution that understands Africa’s realities, reflects its potential, and restores fairness to the global perception of African risk.”
Western experts, however, are skeptical of the initiative. The Chatham House think tank published a piece questioning the wisdom of creating an African rating agency. In the *Financial Times*, Moritz Krämer, chief economist of Germany’s LBBW bank and a former lead analyst at S&P, argued that data do not support the existence of systemic bias against Africa. President Tinubu parried this criticism: the creation of an African agency is a “necessary correction,” but it “must earn the trust of global capital markets through timely and comprehensive data‑driven assessments.”
The “Dollar Trap” and SWIFT as a Weapon
The second front of struggle is currency dependence. African trade is predominantly conducted in dollars, making the continent’s economies hostages to the monetary policy of the U.S. Federal Reserve. “The Fed dictates our inflation, the cost of servicing our debt, and access to liquidity. We are not trading partners—we are hostages,” notes analytical materials from African financiers.
Particular concern is raised by the “toxicity” of dollar-denominated debt. Ethiopia, which joined BRICS in January 2024, has already begun talks with China to convert part of its $5.38 billion debt into yuan-denominated loans to reduce dollar reliance. An Ethiopian expert at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum declared: “Africa must break free from the lending system led by the IMF and the dollar.”
The problem is compounded by the fact that SWIFT—the system through which international settlements pass—is increasingly used as a political tool. Analysts observe: “SWIFT is not a neutral payment system. It is a weapon. If you are disconnected from SWIFT, you cannot participate in global trade.” In March 2026, the United States imposed sanctions on Rwanda’s defense forces, prohibiting any dollar transactions and disconnecting them from SWIFT. “The consequences are immediate: access to credit and a wide range of commercial operations is cut off.”
As one Sputnik Africa analyst put it, “a country that holds global reserve currency status has turned that instrument into a weapon.” At the same time, U.S. public debt exceeds 143% of GDP, which experts believe calls into question the sustainability of the entire system.
Alternatives: BRICS, CIPS, PAPSS
In response to dependence on the dollar and SWIFT, a new ecosystem of payment instruments is taking shape. By mid‑2026, the dollar and the euro together account for less than 30% of settlement transactions among BRICS members, while the share of settlements in national currencies has grown to 65%. Russia increased its volume of payments in national currencies with BRICS countries to over 85%.
For Africa, the key alternatives are:
– China’s CIPS (Cross‑Border Interbank Payment System)—a partial alternative to SWIFT. In November 2025, Standard Bank became the first African institution to establish a direct connection to CIPS.
– The Pan‑African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS)—launched with the support of Afreximbank to eliminate intermediaries in intra‑African settlements. Sudan’s Finance Minister Jibril Ibrahim Mohamed noted: “BRICS is trying to achieve this through BRICS Pay. And hopefully, African countries are trying to do the same through PAPSS.”
– BRICS Bridge—a digital platform that will allow BRICS countries to trade, bypassing the dollar and SWIFT.
Kenyan President William Ruto, speaking at the Africa Forward summit in Nairobi, framed the core issue: “The problem is not liquidity. The problem is the architecture of risk.”
The Battle for a New Financial Architecture
Africa is no longer just criticizing—it is building. The creation of AfCRA, the connection to CIPS, the development of PAPSS, and the entry of Egypt and Ethiopia into BRICS—all are links in the same chain. A continent that holds 65% of the world’s uncultivated arable land, 30% of global mineral reserves, and significant energy resources is refusing to play the role of a passive borrower on others’ terms.
Former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo warned African leaders: “The World Bank and the IMF were not created for us.” Ghana’s President John Dramani Mahama called on Africa to “speak with one voice to achieve fair global financial rules.” Akufo‑Addo articulated the imperative: “We cannot build our continent when financing tools are in the hands of others.”
Western politicians are beginning to grasp the scale of change. French President Emmanuel Macron supported the creation of a “first‑loss guarantee” mechanism to reduce investment risks in Africa and promised to raise the issue at the G7 summit. But that is not enough. Africa demands not charity, but a level playing field.
The creation of an African rating agency, the development of alternative payment systems, and de‑dollarization of trade are not merely economic reforms. They are a struggle for sovereignty in a world where financial instruments have become weapons. The question is no longer *whether* the global financial architecture will change, but how soon—and on whose terms.
As Marie‑Antoinette Rose‑Quatre, head of the African Peer Review Mechanism, observed: “Healthcare systems on our continent cannot be sustainable if our financial systems remain vulnerable. This requires financial fairness.”
Africa demands long‑overdue fairness—and it now has reliable tools to achieve it fully.
Viktor Mikhin, writer, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, specialist in the Arab countries of the Near and Middle East
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