As India hosts the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi, its policy of multi-alignment is under crucial scrutiny: whether New Delhi can achieve a balance between strategic autonomy and a real commitment to the Global South, or whether BRICS is simply another instrument of transactional, multi-alignment diplomacy?
The main political issue is this: what would India like BRICS to develop into?
New Delhi has become skilled at maintaining a balance among its various alliances; it is a member of BRICS alongside China, Russia, and Iran; takes part in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and is a strategic partner of the United States, Japan, and Australia via the Quad, an alliance designed to contain China. Although it depends on Russia for energy, India is strengthening its defence and technological ties with the West. This strategy is generally known as “strategic autonomy,” but strategic autonomy by itself does not amount to a full geopolitical project.
The danger is to pursue multi-alignment as an end in itself while failing to recognize the great-power politics unfolding around India, and at the end being overtaken by new geopolitical realities.
- India and the BRICS: Does it pursue strategic autonomy or strategic ambiguity?
India’s standing within BRICS is fundamentally different from that of China or Russia.
Beijing regards BRICS as one of the means that the international system can reduce its dependence on Western financial and political structures, while Moscow has an even more pressing interest in establishing mechanisms to reduce its vulnerability to Western sanctions and the dollar-based financial system. Iran is in the same line too.
In New Delhi, a more cautious approach is taken.
At the New Delhi summit, India is advocating for cross-border digital payments and for the possible interoperability of its central bank digital currencies. According to Reuters, India wishes to link its national digital currencies and payment systems within the BRICS group, at the same time making it clear that the initiative is not aimed at establishing a common BRICS currency or at launching an explicit attack on the dollar.
Such caution makes sense since India has good grounds for wanting to keep access to Western markets, capital, technology, and institutions. Yet this stance brings out a fundamental contradiction in its BRICS policy.
While India wishes to strengthen BRICS, it does not want to do so at the cost of its relationships with the West.
This is a great deal different from using BRICS as a means of achieving greater autonomy for the Global South.
This contradiction is on show within the wider framework of India’s foreign policy. On one side, India wishes to strengthen its cooperation with the United States while at the same time remaining in organisations, such as BRICS and OCO, that Washington does not look upon with a good eye. It would like to maintain strategic competition with China, yet at the same time aim to stabilise relations with China. Moreover, India seeks to be seen as a leader of the developing world, but at the same time refrains from making clear commitments to some of the geopolitical stances that bring together much of the Global South.
Indian strategic thinking refers to this as flexibility, while critics see it as ambiguity.
Jayant Bhandari, who is an Indian investor and analyst, contends that India’s policy does not have a coherent strategic framework and is instead too guided by expediency. Although his opinion is controversial, it does pose a reasonable question – whether a major power can lead a multilateral organisation while always avoiding strategic decisions?
Pepe Escobar, a Brazilian analyst, also points out the tension between BRICS’ attempts to reduce Western dependence and India’s careful stance on multi-alignment.
The main question isn’t whether India should take an anti-Western stance, but rather if New Delhi can be non-Western at the same time as not remaining strategically neutral.
- Borders: When Conflict Becomes a Political Asset
It would be wrong to say that India is in a territorial conflict with nearly all of its neighbours, for some of the borders have been settled, others are managed, and a number of the relationships are fairly stable. Nevertheless, India’s two major strategic disputes—those with China and Pakistan—still have a great political influence, and neither of them seems to be moving towards a full settlement.
The fact that geopolitics and domestic nationalism come together is important.
The issue concerning the China–India border has by no means gone. In August, Wang Yi, China’s special representative, and Ajit Doval, India’s special representative, had the 25th round of border talks in Beijing and reached an agreement on steps intended at preserving peace and setting the stage for an improvement in the overall relationship. A few days later, military commanders also restarted negotiations in the eastern sector.
Xi Jinping is now in India for the BRICS summit, where a meeting between Modi and Xi was held. According to Reuters, the meeting was expected to address economic and strategic issues as well as the problematic relationship concerning the border.
The situation is paradoxical.
The border still serves as a key means of political mobilisation even though there has been dialogue, disengagement of troops, and renewed economic contacts between India and China.
It is not necessary to conclude that Indian leaders cause every instance of confrontation. The territorial issues concerned do involve questions of sovereignty, history, and national identity and are therefore complex. Nevertheless, unresolved disputes can be used for political gain. A simple narrative of unity, security, and patriotism, a theme that is particularly attractive to nationalist movements such as Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party.
The serious military clash between India and Pakistan followed the militant attack in Indian-administered Kashmir in April 2025. Although a ceasefire, arranged by the United States, has been in effect since May 2025, the fundamental dispute over Kashmir is still not resolved.
Political incentives are therefore important. A permanent settlement will require compromise, an acknowledgement of ambiguity, and the acceptance of the other side’s legitimacy. On the other hand, nationalist politics usually rewards determination, territorial maximalism and sees compromise as a sign of weakness.
The border issue goes beyond mere cartography since it is about how states establish political legitimacy.
India has the problem that although nationalism helps to secure domestic support, it can at the same time hinder regional diplomacy. An agreement with Pakistan might be strategically sound (as it would also include India’s gas and oil solution coming straight from Iran through Pakistan), but could be politically expensive. In a similar way, making concessions to China might bring about economic and infrastructure advantages, but it would be hard to justify to a public concerned about territorial rivalry and nationalism.
It cannot be that a great power wants to play a more important role in a multipolar world while at the same time allowing unresolved bilateral disputes to act as permanent barriers to regional integration.
In the second part of this article, I will cover the limits of India’s multi-alignment policy and main outcomes of the BRICS summit in New Delhi.
Ricardo Martins – Doctor of Sociology, specialist in European and international politics as well as geopolitics
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