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Outlook For the 2026 BRICS Leaders’ Meeting: Summing Up India’s Presidency & Overcoming India–China Controversy

Ksenia Muratshina, September 09, 2026

On September 12, New Delhi will host one of the year’s most long-awaited events, namely, the 18th BRICS Summit. How has India’s presidency unfolded, what can we expect from the meeting, and why have experts started discussing the seemingly impossible intersection of Indian and Chinese interests?

Outlook For the 2026 BRICS Leaders’ Meeting

Principles in Action

“Humanity first” and a “new format of cooperation” – this is precisely the approach to BRICS that India, through its leader Prime Minister Narendra Modi, declared while preparing for the chairmanship. His interpretation is multifaceted and includes, among other things, ensuring a peaceful and secure international environment, combating common challenges facing peoples, collective efforts for development, an anti-terrorism agenda, dialogue and cooperation in conflict resolution, innovation, sustainable development, health security, environmental protection… All of these concepts and characteristics, from the perspective of India’s philosophy of inter-BRICS relations, are interconnected and, moreover, achievable through sustained work, starting, for example, with the promotion of universal principles of counter-terrorism and common initiatives of the group at the UN, and ending with such concrete matters as the activities of the Vaccine Research and Development Center established by BRICS in 2022.
Considering threats from the militarizing Collective West, which is unleashing, fueling, and stimulating international conflicts, mutual support is especially important for BRICS states

India’s previous chairmanships in earlier cycles have shown that New Delhi readily assumes commitment and responsibility for formulating clear development goals for the group, coordinating common positions on international issues, and using the authority of member states internationally to articulate the concerns of the developing world and propose solutions to them. The country’s leadership highly appreciates the global role of BRICS and the prospects for cooperation within this association. It has traditionally been interested in deepening partnerships among member states, deepening contacts, and coordinating positions in international political institutions. For India, interaction through BRICS mechanisms is important both with partners from the “historical five” and with new members from among the leading countries of the Global South from various continents. With the emergence and development of the BRICS+ and BRICS Outreach formats, India is also seeking to attract as many states of the global majority, developing economies, and regional international organizations that share its values as possible to participate in BRICS events.

During India’s 2026 chairmanship, more than 250 high‑level meetings and other events have already been held, aimed at strengthening strategic partnerships among the participants across all key areas, including politics and security, economy and finance, and cultural and humanitarian ties. Among them are efforts to expand settlements in national currencies; an increase in the number of BRICS New Development Bank member states; close contacts between industrial and trade departments; planning for the development of unified transparent technical standards for trade and innovation; agreements between the heads of emergency response departments on joint implementation of measures to improve the protection of infrastructure facilities; informative and mutually beneficial meetings of high-level representatives in charge of security issues, chairmen of supreme courts, heads of national space agencies; proposals to create a unified virtual working group on the anti-drug agenda and a network of BRICS centers of excellence on mental health; a ministerial meeting on the status of women; promotion of the idea of responsible and ethical use of artificial intelligence; negotiations of the working group on environment and the contact group on climate change and sustainable development; initiatives to create a repository of scientific data of the BRICS association and a pilot registry of BRICS artists, which will help direct cultural exchanges and professional relations between representatives of creative professions; popularization of traditional national sports of the group’s countries.

Furthermore, India expressed support for Russia’s initiatives on logistics cooperation related to the Northern Sea Route, joint projects to develop civilian unmanned technologies, the BRICS Centre of Industrial Competence, partnership in the metallurgy and mining industries, engaging teenagers in BRICS youth exchanges, and other initiatives. The culmination of the year should logically be the summit in New Delhi. The event promises to be as representative as possible. Modi sent personal invitations to BRICS and BRICS+ leaders, and he invited many of them in person. This includes, of course, the President of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping. Here we must go into more detail.

BRICS First, Borders Later

All BRICS members and, in general, all countries in the Asia‑Pacific region are aware of the protracted border dispute between India and China. It is impossible to talk about a quick resolution to the issue. At the same time, both states understand that stabilizing relations is in the interests of each of them, and they have learned to separate issues in their communication at various levels. Of course, the dispute is not going away; they continue and will continue to pay attention to it and seek solutions for its resolution. As recently as August, the 36th round of border consultations was held in a fairly calm atmosphere. The parties continued to discuss the delimitation of the border, border control, and cross‑border interaction. Contacts via diplomatic and military channels will continue to be maintained. Against the background of the current international situation, when countries with an independent foreign policy and a common vision of multipolarity are trying to stick together, develop cooperation, and present a united front for socio‑economic development and the protection of their interests, “personal” issues in their relations will inevitably retreat to the background.

And now Xi Jinping is thanking Narendra Modi for inviting him to the summit and offering all possible support from China to the Indian presidency, and Indian expert circles are declaring that “the interests of India and China coincide, although without geopolitical positions necessarily coinciding,” suggesting that the countries will join forces to resolve the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz. This way BRICS becomes as a diplomatic alternative to the US negotiating model, be committed to strategic cooperation while maintaining economic competition – which will pay dividends to both and have a positive impact on the work of the BRICS institutions – and “find a way to work together” to “build peace and prosperity in the region.” And some are even ready to create a military‑political alliance within BRICS that will “change the global balance of power.”

What’s most surprising is that, in principle, all these ideas seem realistic. Considering threats from the militarizing collective West, which is unleashing, fueling, and stimulating international conflicts, mutual support is especially important for BRICS states. Furthermore, the format itself, with its flexibility, absence of typical bureaucratization of international structures, openness, and mutual respect, creates a microclimate for communication such that cooperation within it naturally develops even between such “sworn enemies” as Beijing and New Delhi. This is perhaps one of the best and most telling characteristics of BRICS as a phenomenon of multilateral diplomacy.

In addition, at the Eastern Economic Forum, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov announced the prospect of resuming work within the Russia–India–China format and the desire of all three parties to preserve this type of cooperation. This also indicates an increased willingness on the part of India and China not only to engage in dialogue with each other but also to work together with other centers of power in the multipolar world to find solutions to its problems, using various combinations and formats.

* * *

There is very little time left before the summit in New Delhi begins. It appears that the global majority will expect its participants to clearly formulate a unified position on international issues, put forward new initiatives to promote the interests of developing economies at the global level, present new options for solving the problems of our time, and, what is also important, provide information regarding the prospects for expanding the number of permanent members and partners of BRICS. It should be noted that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian also confirmed his attendance at the forum, which means that Middle Eastern issues will certainly not be left out. Narendra Modi has already expressed hope for the in‑person participation of his Iranian counterpart.

The association, which encompasses nearly 46% of the world’s population and a third of the global economy, continues to move towards the goal that Russia, as a co‑founder of BRICS, defines as “facilitating the adaptation of the world order to the realities of a multipolar world.” The relationships between the participants, the sense of trust, stability, and a support system to rely on are more important than ever in this movement. And today’s BRICS has everything it needs to meet such expectations.

 

Ksenia Muratshina, PhD in History, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and Culture Editor of “New Eastern Outlook”

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