The Mecca defence pact brings Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan together at a moment when confidence in the U.S.-led regional security architecture has eroded. The regional analysts I have consulted identify no clear enemy that the pact is targeting. Its real significance may therefore lie in whether regional deterrence can evolve into a credible new security architecture and withstand its first serious test.
The agreement draws the attention of analysts I have discussed with because its strategic significance remains unsettled. It unites three countries with distinct military capabilities, geographic priorities, and relationships with Washington. While the principle is clear—an armed attack against one member is considered an attack against all—the practical implications remain uncertain.
A regional security order in the making
Ambassador Professor Mohamed A. Qubaty, a former Yemeni minister and ambassador, sees the agreement as “the beginning of an indigenous regional security architecture.” He shifts the focus from identifying an enemy to a broader transformation: regional powers seeking to shape their own security strategies instead of relying on external guarantors.
Yemeni strategic adviser Mohammed Salem Mujawar offers a similar view. He notes that Israel, Iran, and the Houthis are all part of the strategic environment, but none should be singled out as the sole target. The key development, he suggests, is the desire of Riyadh, Ankara, and Islamabad to strengthen their ability to shape regional security.
Kristian Alexander, a regional security specialist based in Dubai, also rejects the “Muslim NATO” label. He sees the pact as formalising existing bilateral relationships into a more coherent framework for collective deterrence. Its significance is that regional powers are taking greater responsibility for their own security as confidence in external guarantees declines.
This interpretation aligns with the broader context. Signed on August 7 after months of regional instability with the U.S.-Israel-led war in Iran, the agreement brings together Saudi financial and energy resources, Turkish military-industrial capacity, and Pakistan’s significant armed forces and nuclear capability.
Autonomy may be the key concept.
Not one enemy, but several layers of deterrence
My sources revealed significant disagreement about the pact’s intended target.
The Pakistani analyst Abdul Moiz Khan, a research officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies in Islamabad, takes the official position most literally: there is no single target. For Khan, the agreement is defensive and intended to deter any actor considering aggression against one of the three states.
Iranian perspectives are especially revealing, as they highlight the strategic ambiguity underlying the official language.
Mohammadreza Mohammadi, an Iranian international-affairs researcher, argues that the pact is aimed at both Iran and Israel, but believes its deeper political meaning may be the containment of Israel. He notes that Tehran does not appear particularly alarmed because, in Iranian calculations, Türkiye and Pakistan are unlikely to engage in a full-scale confrontation with either Iran or Israel.
Ali Mohebi, an Iranian political analyst specialising in foreign policy and transatlantic relations, goes further. In his view, Saudi Arabia is concerned with the Axis of Resistance, Pakistan remains heavily focused on India, while Türkiye is particularly concerned with Israel. He therefore identifies Israel as the most important common strategic denominator.
Seyed Mojtaba Jalalzadeh, an Iranian independent researcher, offers a nuanced formulation: the pact is a mechanism of multi-directional balancing. Iran and Iran-aligned armed groups, including the Houthis, remain important considerations; Israel is also part of the deterrence equation, but the United States is not an enemy. Instead, the pact hedges against excessive dependence on Washington.
This strategic ambiguity makes the pact unusual. Ambiguity allows each member to interpret the arrangement based on its own threat perception.
Yemen, the Red Sea—and the credibility test
At this point, the agreement shifts from geopolitical theory to operational reality.
Ambassador Qubaty identifies Yemen and Bab el-Mandeb as the potentially decisive test. Maritime security, he argues, cannot ultimately be separated from territorial security. Protecting shipping is one thing; stabilising the territory from which threats emerge is another.
The issue is now practical. The Houthis and the Red Sea security present a scenario where the pact could be tested without a conventional state-on-state conflict.
The central question is not whether Iran, Israel, or the Houthis are the “target” of this pact, but whether the three governments would act collectively if one is attacked.
Mojtaba Jalalzadeh notes that the agreement lacks a functioning joint command structure, a coherent operational doctrine, and clear rules for activating collective defence. For now, it is best seen as a framework for collective deterrence rather than a fully institutionalised military alliance.
Mohammad Khatibi, an Iranian foreign-policy analyst and broadcast journalist, draws a similar conclusion. The pact’s significance will depend on whether intelligence sharing, air defence, joint exercises, and practical conditions for military intervention are established. The members have different priorities: Pakistan focuses on India, Türkiye pursues its regional agenda and Israel, and Saudi Arabia is mainly concerned with Iran, the Houthis, and potentially Israel.
That is the central paradox of the Mecca agreement. It may be strategically important precisely before it becomes a military alliance.
The pact’s initial value is in raising the perceived cost of attacking any member. However, deterrence is effective only if adversaries believe the threatened response is credible.
The real test will not be another summit or communiqué, but the first serious crisis.
If a Houthi missile keeps threatening Saudi territory, if Israel and Türkiye enter direct confrontation, or if conflict reaches Pakistan, will Ankara, Riyadh, and Islamabad act together?
Until that question is answered, the Mecca pact is neither a new NATO nor just a symbolic declaration. It remains a fluid experiment in the absence of U.S. credibility, a search for regional strategic autonomy, and its credibility will be tested when deterrence fails.
Ricardo Martins – Doctor of Sociology, specialist in European and international politics as well as geopolitics
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