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Japan in Europe: New Realities for Russian Foreign Policy

Vladimir Terehov, July 03, 2026

The intensification of Japan’s political course on the European front, which has been observed over the past few years, received further confirmation this June in the form of a trip to the continent by the Imperial Couple and the country’s Prime Minister.

Visit of the Emperor of Japan to Europe

The Imperial Couple Visits the Netherlands and Belgium

On 13 June, Japan’s Imperial Couple, Naruhito and Masako, departed on a two-week visit to the Netherlands and Belgium, having been invited by the monarchs who head those countries. And I would reiterate, those who ‘head,’ because unlike in Japan, where the post-war Constitution reduces the Emperor’s status to representative functions, in both of the European countries – particularly in Belgium – the monarchs are integrated into the actual process of state governance.

However, the specifics of Japan’s ancient culture also manifest themselves in the fact that the real role of the Japanese Emperor in the functioning of the state extends far beyond constitutional bounds. Within the country, he enjoys unquestionable moral authority, and any contact with foreign dignitaries – whether on Japanese soil or during overseas trips – carries a perfectly clear political message: ‘This country, or the region where it is located, is particularly important to Tokyo for one reason or another.’

Prior to departing for Europe, Emperor Naruhito urged that ‘the difficulties of the past be left behind,’ which commentators interpreted as an allusion to Japan’s ‘troubles’ in Indonesia during the Second World War

It is easily possible to discern the political specifics of the following kind in the faits accomplis of visits by members of the Imperial Family to certain Southeast Asian countries, to the United Kingdom, to Mongolia, as well as in the Emperor’s reception on the grounds of his Tokyo residence of the President of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, or the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi. Although outwardly these actions are presented as apolitical ‘gestures of goodwill,’ the above-mentioned countries and regions are in fact areas of growing interest for Japan, where competition for influence with its main geopolitical opponent, the People’s Republic of China, is becoming increasingly pronounced.

It is primarily from this perspective that we should approach and perceive the current trip of the Imperial Couple to the Netherlands and Belgium – the countries that might not seem the most important in Europe. Yet neither can they be called secondary, especially the former. Suffice it to recall the role of Advanced Semiconductor Materials Lithography (ASML) in the revolution of the past two decades in computing systems. Evidence of the extreme significance of this company came in the form of claims by US Commerce Secretary G. Lutnick regarding the possible transfer of samples of its most advanced products to the PRC, in connection with which the company’s management had to publicly explain itself.

Furthermore, the Netherlands is increasingly signalling its intention to return to a region where it once had a notable presence. This process of coming back already embraces a military component, which has drawn a negative reaction – this time from the PRC. During the Imperial Couple’s stay in the Netherlands, a document on security for the next five years was published, which, among other things, highlights the factor of the ‘Chinese threat’ – a point that also received the expected evaluation in Beijing.

Prior to departing for Europe, Emperor Naruhito urged that ‘the difficulties of the past be left behind’, which commentators interpreted as an allusion to Japan’s ‘troubles’ in Indonesia during the Second World War.

And indeed, there are so many things happening in interstate relations.

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s European Tour

Evidence of the growing importance of the European component in Japan’s foreign policy, and of the intensifying competition with the PRC for influence there, came in the form of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s tour of the continent, which coincided with the Imperial Couple’s stay in Europe. The main reason for Ms. Takaichi’s trip was her participation in the latest G7 Summit. Her role in that event and the summit’s outcomes, received fairly general assessments.

At the same time, one can note something more specific and particular regarding the content of Ms. Takaichi’s talks during her visits to the United Kingdom and Italy, which took place prior to the G7 Summit. In terms of all the issues discussed in those countries, let us highlight two of them. The first boils down to the general ‘supply chain problem,’ among various aspects of which the PRC is again mentioned in a negative light, mainly in terms of a perceived shortage, allegedly caused by China, on world markets of certain minerals that play a key role in the most advanced technologies.

However, quite recently, the same ‘supply chain problem’ has acquired an ‘energy’ component, owing to well-known actions in the Middle East by a leading member of the G7 itself. It goes without saying that neither Ms. Takaichi nor her interlocutors pointed to the culprit behind the emergence of this ‘component,’ limiting themselves to the mere indication of it.

The second issue worth paying attention to in Ms. Takaichi’s talks concerned the project to develop a ‘sixth-generation’ fighter aircraft, in which the United Kingdom, Japan, and Italy are participating. Recently, however, the first of the mentioned countries has begun to speak of funding problems for the project. One particular outcome of Ms. Takaichi’s talks in London with her colleague Keir Starmer was a confirmation of the intention to continue its implementation nonetheless.

The ‘Pivot to the East’: Russia and the Changing Geopolitical Landscape

The Japanese–European diplomatic manoeuvres, which themselves merit close attention, inevitably attract Russia’s interest. The reason lies not only in their significance but also in the fact that they are taking place on the European continent – a region that has for centuries been the primary focus of Russian foreign policy. It is exactly his long-standing orientation towards Europe, as it seems, that has held back the implementation of the ‘pivot to the East’ – a concept that was first articulated more than two centuries ago.

In the European narrative, the current conflict, which is essentially yet another provoked war between the Russian Federation and Europe, has been labelled ‘Putin’s aggression against Ukraine.’ Initially, the ‘London–Brussels’ axis waged this war using American resources and Ukrainian soldiers. However, recent events suggest more direct participation by European players is being required.

In light of the current geopolitical realities, it seems appropriate to make a number of key observations that may determine the future trajectory of Russian foreign policy:

  1. Abandoning Eurocentrism: not a breach, but a rebalancing act.

The centuries-long orientation of Russian foreign policy towards Europe needs to be rethought. This does not mean a complete severance of relations with Russia’s western neighbours, but it does imply moving beyond a narrowly European vision and shaping a more balanced approach.

  1. The ‘Pivot to the East’: an objective necessity, not a reaction.

The ‘pivot to the East’ is not merely a consequence of the deterioration in relations with Europe. It is a natural process driven by fundamental, objective reasons. The rapprochement between Russia and China, for example, is dictated by the exceptional importance of the bilateral relationship itself, and not only by confrontation with the West. It is important to build relations on the basis of mutual benefit and long-term prospects, rather than simply as a response to external challenges.

  1. Asia being a field for multilateral interaction.

In the Asia-Pacific region, Russia will encounter not only traditional players such as Japan, but also leading European countries that have their own history and interests in the region. This means that Russian participation will take place in the context of complex multilateral interaction, where the interests of all the parties must be taken into account.

  1. Navigating in conditions of uncertainty.

Russia is ‘pivoting’ to a region that is in a state of transition. The direction of this transition is not yet clear, as the process is influenced by many factors of high uncertainty. This requires Moscow to be flexible, to think strategically, and to be ready to adapt.

  1. Peacemaker, but not a party to conflicts.

During this ‘pivot,’ Russia must avoid being drawn into competing configurations and confrontations. On the contrary, Russia’s role should be to position itself as a peacemaker, capable of facilitating the settlement of longstanding conflicts and preventing the emergence of new ones. This will provide for bolstering its positions and contributing to global stability.

Whatever the outcome of the current confrontation with Europe, the question of the ‘pivot to the East’ will preserve its relevance for Russia’s foreign policy. The key factor here is the inexorable shift of global political and economic centres of power towards Asia. This region encompasses two-thirds of Russian territory and is characterised by a clear deficit of Russian presence.

An important stage in laying the foundation for the emerging ‘pivot to the East’ in Russia’s foreign policy course was the latest ASEAN+Russia Summit held in Kazan.

As for the global scale of the problem of shaping a new world order, it is reasonable to pay attention to the Better Order Project initiative of the Quincy Institute, commented on in one of the recent issues of NEO.

 

Vladimir Terekhov, Expert on Asia-Pacific Affairs

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