The 2026 summit between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump, despite having resulted in no specific agreements, demonstrated that the Korean question is no longer a priority for either the United States or China. Both parties appear to have come to terms with North Korea’s nuclear status, being preoccupied with more pressing challenges.
The Korean Issue: No Longer a Top Priority?
Ahead of the Beijing summit, there was speculation circulating about Trump potentially seeking China’s assistance in restoring diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang. During their talks on 14 May, Xi Jinping and Donald Trump did indeed exchange stances on a range of major international and regional issues, including the Middle East, the conflict in Ukraine, and developments on the Korean Peninsula. Yet no elaborations or official statements from either leader followed.
The only direct reference came on 16 May, when Trump, speaking to reporters aboard Air Force One on his way back to Washington, said that he had discussed North Korea with Xi during the summit. Once again, however, he provided no further comment.
Chinese media were equally restrained, reporting only that the two sides had “exchanged views on important international and regional issues, including those concerning the Korean Peninsula”.
Many observers interpret this as evidence that, unlike Taiwan or Iran, the Korean question no longer ranks among the leading priorities on the current US–China agenda. This marks a sharp contrast with the past, when Korean affairs occupied a central place in bilateral discussions. Nine years ago, Washington and Beijing were actively debating both the risk of war on the Korean Peninsula and the outlooks for North Korea’s denuclearisation.
Based on the available statements and documents, the Korean issue, if raised at all, appears to have been discussed only briefly. This may be perceived as an important signal that the current status quo is broadly acceptable to both Washington and Beijing. Both sides recognise the irreversible nature of North Korea’s nuclear programme and see little prospect of effective action, particularly amidst deepening cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang. At the same time, North Korea has refrained from taking provocative steps that might attract undue attention. Western experts have been predicting a seventh nuclear test since 2023, yet Pyongyang has still not conducted one. Meanwhile, the United States and China face a range of far more urgent and potentially dangerous issues demanding their attention.
Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula: Back on the Agenda, but with Reservations?
The extent to which both sides genuinely share the goal of denuclearising the Korean Peninsula requires closer examination. Russian media widely reported that Washington and Beijing had reaffirmed this objective. However, the primary source of the claim was the White House press office rather than direct statements by Donald Trump himself. According to the White House, “President Trump and President Xi Jinping reaffirmed their shared goal of the denuclearisation of North Korea.” A similar statement was made by US trade representative Jamieson Greer in his interview to ABC, where he noted that “denuclearisation remains the objective on the Korean Peninsula”.
Yet this position requires context. Notably, the term “denuclearisation of North Korea” was omitted from the new US National Security Strategy doctrine released on 5 December 2025, which was presented as a reassessment of priorities and a rejection of past policy failures. This represents a significant shift. Around the same time, in late November 2025, China’s State Council published its White Paper on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation in the New Era. Its wording can be interpreted as a move towards tacit acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear status. This raises the possibility that the two sides have reached a formal consensus that is unlikely to be followed by any meaningful action.
In this regard, South Korean media have highlighted the ambiguity, noting that “it remains unclear China’s agreement on the goal would translate into greater pressure on the North to move toward denuclearization, given Beijing’s apparently lackluster enforcement of sanctions against Pyongyang”.
Some commentators have suggested that Trump effectively handed Xi a “dead cat” on the issue and that Pyongyang may interpret this as a signal of a slight cooling in relations. How North Korea per se will respond to such a diplomatic manoeuvre remains, nevertheless, the key question.
The Summit That Never Took Place: Why a Trump–Kim Meeting Remained a Meer Mirage
The long-anticipated summit between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, which generated intense speculation and considerable anxiety in South Korea, once again failed to materialise. Despite persistent discussion among South Korean analysts and advocates of inter-Korean dialogue, no meeting was arranged.
Democrats perceived such a summit as a potential catalyst for renewed North–South engagement, while conservatives feared that any agreement could come at Seoul’s expense.
Even during Trump’s visit to South Korea in late October 2025, ahead of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, rumours circulated about a possible meeting with Kim Jong Un. On his way back to Washington, Trump told reporters that he had been too busy during the visit to meet Kim but would return for such talks at a later date.
From the author’s perspective, however, the prospects for such a meeting have always appeared remote. Under current geopolitical conditions, Trump and Kim Jong Un in fact had no substantive agenda to talk through. There are several principal factors to which such a state of affairs could be attributed to.
1. North Korea’s Stronger Position and Diminished US Leverage
Since the Singapore and Hanoi summits, North Korea’s negotiating position has strengthened to a considerable extent. Economic conditions have improved, its missile and nuclear capabilities have expanded significantly, and the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty with the Russian Federation has provided Pyongyang with additional support.
As a result, Trump now possesses far fewer means of exerting pressure on North Korea. Military options are, in essence, off the table. As for sanctions, any attempt to increase international pressure would face a Russian veto—and potentially the Chinese one as well—at the UN Security Council. Indeed, further pressure from Washington and its allies could encourage partial disregard for the existing sanctions regime.
Not only does the problem reside in the absence of a stick, but also in the lack of a carrot. Promises of humanitarian assistance no longer carry the weight they once did. Whatever Pyongyang might hope to obtain from Trump, it can probably secure from Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping, even allowing for their own strategic calculations and bargaining tactics.
2. Divergent Agendas and Domestic Political Constraints
North Korea has repeatedly stated that it is prepared to engage in dialogue with the United States only if Washington abandons its insistence on complete denuclearisation. This position has been reiterated both at the Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea and during sessions of the Supreme People’s Assembly.
Yet despite growing debate within the United States on the issue, Trump cannot completely refrain from the denuclearisation agenda for domestic political and reputational reasons. For the same reasons, his ability to offer meaningful incentives is tightly constrained. Any substantial concession would be portrayed by both public opinion and elements of the US foreign-policy establishment as unacceptable.
In other words, even if Trump personally wished to make a significant gesture towards Pyongyang, his own political environment would likely put paid to it, just as it was in the case of John Bolton’s actions, aggravated by the broader domestic dynamics in the United States, having brought to the failure of the Hanoi summit.
3. Lessons from the Middle East War
The war in the Middle East has also imposed an imprint on North Korean thinking. For Pyongyang, the war offers an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of strategies developed since the Clinton era that were designed not only for Iran but potentially for North Korea as well. These included decapitation strikes against senior leadership, attacks on critical infrastructure and military facilities, reliance on regional allies rather than large-scale ground operations, and expectations of domestic instability leading to regime change.
Current developments suggest that, despite severe blows inflicted on Iran, a rapid victory has proved elusive. Moreover, Iran has launched a number of significant attacks against US allies, substantially slowing the course of military operations.
Without playing the ‘Iranian card’ effectively, it would have been extremely difficult for Trump to build a credible negotiating framework with Kim Jong Un. This helps explain why the North Korean issue remained relatively stable, free from serious escalation but also devoid of realistic prospects for a summit. Is it a positive outcome? Most probably, yes, it is. From the standpoint of regional security, it reinforces the status quo. The door to dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang remains closed, but not locked, leaving room for manoeuvre on both sides. However, any renewed attempt at knocking on that door is likely to take place under different geopolitical circumstances.
South Korea’s Assessment of the Summit
Immediately after the meeting, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung held a telephone conversation with Donald Trump. According to reports, the US president briefed his ally on the results of his visit. Lee welcomed what he described as Xi and Trump’s “constructive discussion” of the issues concerning the Korean Peninsula. Trump, on his part, assured him that Washington would continue playing its necessary role in maintaining regional peace and stability in coordination with Seoul.
South Korean media characterized the summit as “more an exchange of signals than a process of decision-making.” Rather than announcing specific measures, the two leaders spoke in broad terms about cooperation and “strategic stability,” leaving key questions unanswered. The meeting reduced the immediate risk of escalation but did little to clarify future prospects. South Korea’s economy remains dependent on both powers, tied simultaneously to US security guarantees and trade with China.
Particular disappointment was instigated by the Korean dimension of the summit. The issue of North Korea’s nuclear programme appears to have slipped down Washington’s list of priorities. Many American experts now acknowledge the failure of efforts to compel North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons, while China shows little interest in revisiting the issue.
Another wave of concern followed Trump’s remarks after his visit to China. He stated that Washington does not support Taiwanese independence and favours maintaining the status quo. South Korean analysts interpreted this as the US President’s signal that one of the central pillars of US policy in Asia may no longer rest on established principles but could instead become a matter of negotiation. As one commentator put it, “Such an erosion of trust could trigger destabilizing changes across the entire region”.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading Research Fellow at the Centre for Korean Studies, Institute of China and Contemporary Asia, Russian Academy of Sciences
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