Following its landslide victory in the February 8 election, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), in close cooperation with the Ishin no Kai party, is promoting initiatives to increase Japan’s military capabilities.
The Ruling Coalition: Signals and Prospects
After the elections, the LDP was able to independently and swiftly push its laws through the Diet. Despite this, the party decided to maintain its alliance with the Ishin no Kai. On February 15, Hirofumi Yoshimura, chairman of the Ishin no Kai, announced that his party had received an offer from Sanae Takaichi to continue cooperation. And on February 18, during the Diet vote to select a Prime Minister, the Ishin no Kai did not nominate its candidate and supported LDP Chairman Takaichi.
In the broader standoff, Sanae Takaichi would benefit from maintaining a strong alliance with one of the parties. To amend Japan’s Constitution (something Japanese conservatives have been seeking for decades), the LDP needs to secure a 2/3 majority in both the Lower and Upper Houses. Elections for the upper house will be held in 2028.
Takaichi made numerous bold promises to the public: to temporarily abolish food taxes, to increase Japan’s energy independence, to reduce the national debt, to strengthen the country’s defense capabilities, to create a unified intelligence agency, and to revise the Constitution (specifically, to clearly define the status of the Japan Self-Defense Forces). Implementing all of this will be difficult, and voters’ expectations of the prime minister remain high. Therefore, a landslide victory like the one achieved in the February elections is unlikely to be repeated in 2028.
Sanae Takaichi herself probably isn’t counting on a second miracle either, and is therefore seeking to maintain her alliance with the Ishin no Kai in order to secure a joint majority in the Upper House. For the Ishin no Kai, this will be an opportunity to advance its reforms related to decentralization and increasing the influence of Osaka, the party’s homeland.
At the same time, the risk of the Ishin no Kai leaving the coalition cannot be ruled out. The party may resort to such a step if the LDP ignores its proposals. The LDP could also team up with another party to revise the Constitution, but with the Ishin no Kai, it will be somewhat easier to reach an agreement on the content of the reform; the parties’ positions on this issue do not differ significantly (compared to other parties).
Although the development of a number of joint reforms is not going entirely according to plan (for example, the Ishin no Kai had to give up some of the benefits that Osaka would receive if it became the second capital), the parties are still working well together, and there are no signs of a split in their alliance.
The Gap in Priorities Between the Citizens and the LDP
The Takaichi cabinet’s priorities can be gauged by the following events. In April, Japan relaxed restrictions on the export of arms and military equipment. On April 23, the Lower House voted to pass a bill establishing a centralized intelligence agency. Since early April, the LDP has proposed to establish a constitutional amendment committee in the Diet to conduct specific discussions on constitutional revision. At the same time, Japan has been highly active diplomatically in the international arena. This creates the impression that the government’s key priorities are constitutional revision, security issues, and international relations.
Against this backdrop, the Asahi Shimbun published sensational news on May 10: according to the newspaper’s polls, only 1% of citizens considered revising the Japanese Constitution a top priority. Foreign policy and national security were also seen as relatively low priority – only 10% of respondents marked that answer. 38% considered pensions, healthcare, and elderly care to be the most important; 17% – fiscal policy and taxation; and 13% – childcare and education.
It’s important to note the details of this poll’s methodology. Respondents were asked to select only one answer from 12 options. It’s therefore unsurprising that the majority prioritized pursuing policies that directly affect them. At the same time, given this context, the figure of 10% of citizens marking international relations and security as the priority is quite high for Japan.
Meanwhile, only 1% of LDP supporters favored constitutional revision, lower than the percentages of supporters of the Conservative Party (5%) and the Democratic Party For the People (3%). This raises questions about the gap between Sanae Takaichi’s ambitions and the demands of the average LDP supporter, for whom constitutional revision is less of a priority, and security issues, while important, are less so than the state of the economy.
Sanae Takaichi promised to improve citizens’ well-being and build a strong economy. However, not all of these goals have been realized so far. Foreign policy developments, such as the war in Iran and the resulting restrictions on passage through the Strait of Hormuz, are also creating additional challenges for the Japanese Prime Minister. Energy security issues are once again coming to the forefront, and Japan is forced to seek ways to diversify its energy import routes and sources. One way or another, Takaichi will need to take steps to address the economic challenges. Otherwise, the chances that citizens will support constitutional revision in the referendum will decrease.
Furthermore, while the Takaichi cabinet’s approval rating remains high, the reasons for this have changed. According to an Asahi Shimbun poll last October, “politics” was the top reason for approval of the cabinet, chosen by 25% of respondents; 21% supported the Takaichi administration because her party was “better than the alternatives.” However, in a poll conducted in April this year, approval based on “politics” fell to 14%, while 29% of respondents supported the LDP because it was “better than the alternatives.”
This can be interpreted as growing disillusionment with Sanae Takaichi’s policies. However, support for her remains, as there are currently no better alternatives. These poll results also demonstrate the opposition’s weakness, which is not perceived as a viable alternative to the ruling party.
The Formation of New Groups Within the LDP: Return to the Factional System?
Meanwhile, new alliances are being formed within the LDP. On the one hand, there are dietmen who don’t agree with Takaichi on some issues. They seek to create counterweights to correct her policy. Iwaya Takeshi, former Foreign Minister under Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, has openly proposed such an initiative. Although he didn’t advocate for Takaichi’s ouster or provoke a split within the party, his intentions were perceived as such online, attracting a barrage of criticism.
In April and May, several groups of LDP members emerged. They sought to avoid Iwaya Takeshi’s mistakes and were more cautious in their rhetoric. The members cited the need to discuss and study important topics or to share experiences as reasons for creating their groups. The latter was indeed an issue. The February elections brought in many new LDP deputies (dubbed “Takaichi’s children”), who were inexperienced in politics. Previously, young dietmen had trained and made important connections within factions, but all of these (except Aso Taro’s faction) were abolished.
However, beyond the new deputies and networking, such groups could indeed act as a counterweight to Sanae Takaichi, similar to how factions operated in the past. Some groups are even being formed by members of former factions, such as Takeda Ryota’s “Comprehensive Security Research Group” (Nikai faction). While the nature and structure of most such groups are currently quite different from factions, they are still worth monitoring.
It’s also interesting that on May 7, Aso Taro created a support group for Sanae Takaichi, the “National Power Research Association.” It’s quite possible this group was created in response to the emergence of other political groups within the LDP.
Conclusions
The LDP and the Ishin no Kai continue to dominate Japanese politics, retain voter support, and anticipate no serious threats to their alliance. While the issues we’ve identified are unlikely to undermine the ruling party’s power, they could impact it in the long term.
For Sanae Takaichi, the main battle will come after the election of half of the Upper House members in 2028. If successful in the election, the Prime Minister will indeed be able to amend the Constitution, but the trends we’ve identified raise several concerns. Will the LDP be able to maintain support for the Ishin no Kai? Will citizens support this reform? Is there a chance that groups emerging within the LDP may complicate the decision-making process in order to bargain for something with the Prime Minister? While the risks of such complications are currently low, they should not be ignored.
Daniil Romanenko, a Japanologist researcher from the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences
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