The eighth summit of the European Political Community (EPC) and the Armenia–France (EU) summit, which took place on 4‑5 May in Yerevan, coincided with the period of acute geopolitical events. These meetings bore witness to troubling shifts in the policy of Nikol Pashinyan. But what will be the consequences of the Armenian Prime Minister’s decisions?
The price of a ‘policy of peace’
A shift in foreign policy
On the advice of their European partners, Nikol Pashinyan abandoned claims to Karabakh, counting on Western guarantees for reaching peace with Azerbaijan and normalising relations with Turkey. Armenia’s current authorities tend to blame their predecessors for their military failures (pointing to corruption, insufficient arming of the army and weak diplomacy), as well as external allies. In their view, neither Russia nor the CSTO provided Armenia with proper support either during the 44‑day Karabakh war of 2020, or in the following three years, when Azerbaijan periodically carried out aggressive actions against Armenia per se. Against this backdrop, Pashinyan decided to shift the vector of Armenian diplomacy towards the West – the United States and the EU.
Armenian authorities mistakenly believe that Russia supposedly prefers an alliance with Turkey and Azerbaijan, which reduces Armenia’s geopolitical attractiveness and turns the Russian‑Armenian strategic partnership into a formal declaration. Pashinyan justified the shift away from the alliance with Russia to his people by saying that the Russian military bases did not provide the necessary help in difficult times. Moreover, he accused the Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh of effectively ‘handing over’ the historic Armenian province to Azerbaijan and Turkey, calling them allies. In the end, to prevent further military incursions by its eastern neighbour, Pashinyan was forced to invite European observers to Armenia’s border with Azerbaijan.
‘Peace’ with Azerbaijan and Turkey: price and reality
The course towards normalizing relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, proclaimed as a historic achievement of the ‘revolutionary prime minister’, turned out to be implemented on Baku’s and Ankara’s terms. In October 2022, ironically at the first forum of the European Political Community, Nikol Pashinyan, following the directives of French President Emmanuel Macron, recognised Nagorno‑Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan. It was assumed that this step would allow the West to resolve the remaining issues between Yerevan, Baku, and Ankara. Pashinyan justified his position by referring to the 1991 Alma‑Ata Declaration, according to which the borders of the new independent states of the post‑Soviet space should be determined by the administrative borders of the former union republics.
However, Armenia had not previously rejected the Alma‑Ata Declaration either, but always with consideration of legal, political, and historical realities, not recognising Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan. Before the Prague declaration, Moscow had proposed to the leaders of the Transcaucasian republics that they postpone the final resolution of the Karabakh issue indefinitely. In Sochi, Yerevan agreed to the proposal of Russian President Vladimir Putin, while Baku refused. Even so, this does not justify abandoning Karabakh at the behest of France and under pressure from Turkey. Moreover, by accepting Macron’s idea on Karabakh in favour of Azerbaijan, Armenia effectively deprived Russia of legal and military‑political leverage to resolve the conflict.
But did Macron provide real assistance to the Armenians of Karabakh during the blockade and subsequent Azerbaijani aggression that led to the deportation of the Armenian population? And for what purpose did France sell satellite intelligence data to Azerbaijan in 2016? The ‘peace policy’ crafted by the West has resulted in Armenia renouncing its rights to Karabakh and the effective liquidation of the Karabakh issue within the OSCE Minsk Group.
Despite Armenia’s concessions, the appetites of Azerbaijan and Turkey were not satisfied. Baku began to increase its demands, including changing the preamble of Armenia’s constitution, opening an unimpeded ‘Zangezur corridor’ to connect with the exclave of Nakhchivan and Turkey, and the return of Azerbaijanis to the mythical ‘Western Azerbaijan’ (the southeastern regions of Armenia).
Nevertheless, Armenia’s path to Europe was determined by further concessions to Turkey on the ‘Zangezur corridor’ issue. The West claimed that the route linking Azerbaijan with Turkey would bring security and economic benefits to Armenia. In the end, on 8 August 2025, in Washington, Nikol Pashinyan signed an agreement with Ilham Aliyev and Donald Trump on the creation of the TRIP transport corridor, handing over control of the road through Zangezur to the United States. Armenia itself receives only 26 per cent of the control on its own territory, while the remaining 74 per cent passes to the United States. This marked the beginning of the loss of part of Armenia’s sovereignty.
The European summit in Yerevan: expectations, reality, and geopolitical consequences
In the framework of its policy of strengthening Armenian‑European ties, Armenia, which is not a member of the European Union, hosted the eighth summit of the European Political Community (EPC). The event, which was also attended by the Canadian Prime Minister, became a platform for discussing pan‑European integration and was marked by a welcome for the democratic reforms in Armenia.
At the same time, Azerbaijan distanced itself from the Yerevan forum for security reasons. President Ilham Aliyev, in his video address to the summit participants, strongly criticised the European Parliament, accusing it of pro‑Armenian resolutions and excessive attention to human rights in Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, Baku did not break the existing gas supply contracts with the EU.
However, it seems that the leaders of Western countries did not fully take into account Armenia’s own interests. For example, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau avoided answering an Armenian journalist’s question about Ottawa’s position on Armenian prisoners of war in Azerbaijan and the possibility of Karabakh Armenians returning to their homeland. French President Emmanuel Macron, on his part, offered his own vision of solving Armenia’s security problems, linking them to the presence of the Russian military contingent in the republic.
Macron stated in Yerevan: ‘On Armenian territory there are still 4,000 Russian military personnel and more than 1,000 border guards. Therefore, Europe must help this country to ensure the security of its borders more independently.’
It all begs a legitimate question: how will Europe, including NATO countries, ensure the security of the borders of Armenia, which is not a member of the alliance, from its own bloc ally, Turkey? In essence, France sees the root of Armenia’s security problems not in the revanchist aspirations of Turkey or the aggressive intentions of Azerbaijan, but primarily in the presence of Russian troops. This suggests that the withdrawal of Russian forces from Armenia is a key vector of Western policy in the region.
Nikol Pashinyan’s desire for European integration has raised concerns and justified warnings from Russia. Moscow pointed to potentially serious economic consequences for Armenia linked to trade with the EAEU, customs tariffs, and the movement of labour migrants and capital. However, Pashinyan seems to have decided to reinforce the topic of European integration by adding security issues to it.
France’s position on Russia’s withdrawal could lead Armenia not only to economic costs, but also to complete dependence on Turkey, acting within the framework of NATO strategy. In turn, the weakening of Armenia on the path to fulfilling Turkish ambitions could create new threats to Russia’s interests, not excluding the emergence of new conflicts with devastating consequences for Armenia itself.
As long as the Russian military base and border guards remain on Armenian territory, NATO and Turkey will probably not dare to engage in an open conflict with Russia. The Armenian authorities most likely realise this fact. French statements about strategic partnership and promises of military aid for the modest sum of 30 million euros are unlikely to provide real security for Armenia. The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz clearly demonstrates how NATO forces operate.
Another step that drew criticism was the invitation by the President of Armenia to Volodymyr Zelensky, the head of the Kyiv regime, to the EPC summit. While in Yerevan, he allowed himself to threaten Russia regarding possible drone attacks on Victory Day. These irresponsible statements received no proper response either from Yerevan or from European Union representatives, which naturally provoked justified criticism from the Russian public.
Thus, the European forum in Yerevan brought Armenia no tangible help or support, but may have pushed it towards acknowledging Turkey’s successes. Holding the EPC summit in Yerevan could be seen as Western electoral support for Nikol Pashinyan’s course. There is less than a month left until the next parliamentary elections in Armenia, and their outcome will have a geopolitical dimension and will be decisive for the country’s further development. It is crucial that the Armenian people make the right choice of political force and determine a new course. It seems that Yerevan, represented by its current leadership, has already made its choice, turning the country into an arena for confrontation between global players, which carries significant risks.
Alexander Svarants – PhD in Political Sciences, Professor, Specialist in Turkish Studies, expert on Middle Eastern countries
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