In late April to early May, Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Penny Wong, went on a tour of East Asian countries, having visited Japan, China and South Korea. The aim of this trip was Canberra’s desire to maintain a foreign policy balance among the region’s key players. However, achieving this goal is becoming increasingly difficult.
Strengthening defence policy: a new priority for Australia
The tour by the head of the Australian foreign ministry can also be viewed as an attempt at domestic political balancing. It was intended to partially compensate for the growing influence of the Ministry of Defence and, more broadly, the increasing role of the national security factor in the country’s state policy. Two years ago, these changes in Canberra’s political course were already discussed in terms of the adoption of two strategic documents in the field of military development: the ‘National Defence Strategy’ and the ‘Integrated Investment Program’.
However, at that time, Australia predicted that due to the rapidly changing situation in the Indo-Pacific region, both documents might be revised as early as 2026. That is exactly what happened this April, when their new editions were published. These are two extensive documents on which only the most general comments can be made here.
It should be noted that the Australian government plans to allocate a number of resources, which is impressive even by global standards, for the radical modernisation of the national armed forces. Specifically, over the next ten years, between 94 and 130 billion Australian dollars will be spent on sharply increasing the potential of ‘undersea warfare,’ the main component of which will be nuclear-powered submarines ‘with conventional armament.’ The construction of nuclear-powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy served as the reason for creating AUKUS in 2021, also involving the United States and the United Kingdom – the configuration which is seen as one of the elements of a future ‘Asian NATO’ on an obvious anti-China basis.
As the main factor of the negative ‘dynamics of the situation in the Indo-Pacific’, China is identified in the ‘Strategic Competition in the Indo-Pacific’ section of the first of the above-mentioned documents. The PRC is mentioned in less than kind terms in its other sections as well. Meanwhile, the United States and AUKUS are quite predictably presented as the most important positive elements of the surrounding environment. Japan is also identified in the same positive light, for example, in paragraphs 7.3.1 and 7.3.2.
Developing comprehensive cooperation with Japan
The increasingly evident tilt of Australia’s political course towards Japan was demonstrated, in particular, during the early April trip (the second in less than six months) of Defence Minister R. Marles, who held talks with his Japanese counterpart S. Koizumi on further strengthening defence cooperation. Meanwhile, the tour by P. Wong a month later, visiting Tokyo and Beijing, was meant to somewhat balance this trend.
However, this trend emerged much earlier. In particular, the 2022 trip to Perth by the then Prime Minister of Japan, F. Kishida, was a landmark in the process of developing comprehensive Japan-Australia relations. In this regard, the visit of the current Prime Minister, S. Takaichi, to Australia during 3-5 May 2026 proved to be an equally important stage and a continuation of that process. It coincided with the 50th anniversary of the signing of the ‘Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation,’ which launched that process. And what serves as an indicator of this process being accelerated is the fact that the meeting with her counterpart E. Albanese during S. Takaichi’s visit to Australia was already the fourth in the six-month period since she took office as Prime Minister of Japan.
The main issue on the agenda of the summit was the various and extremely serious challenges to the state of the global economy, into which both Australia and Japan are deeply integrated. In turn, these challenges are caused primarily by factors of increasing turbulence and uncertainty that accompany the current process of radical changes in the world order.
Takaichi’s visit to Australia fits into Tokyo’s general foreign policy course known as the ‘movement to the South-West’, which emerged as far back as the second half of the 19th century with the start of the so-called ‘Meiji Restoration.’ Moreover, the list of countries towards which Japan is again showing increased interest is by no means limited to Australia, which is showcased, in particular, by the fact that on her way to Australia, S. Takaichi visited Vietnam, having held equally substantive talks with its leadership.
Difficulties in relations with the PRC
Canberra actively developing ties with Beijing’s key opponents inevitably leads to deteriorating China-Australia relations. A striking example is Australia’s position on the Taiwan question, which is of paramount importance to the PRC. Recent statements and actions by Canberra, particularly regarding the large-scale People’s Liberation Army exercises around Taiwan, demonstrate a more ‘definite’ approach. This differs from Australia’s previous policy of avoiding such steps for decades, and it elicits an understandable reaction from Beijing.
Last year, Australia announced its intention to terminate the lease agreement for the Port of Darwin, signed in 2015 with a Chinese company, citing ‘national security concerns.’ These concerns likely pertain to the fact that the Port of Darwin has become a key logistics hub for the growing United States military presence on Australian territory. In response, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs underlined that the agreement was concluded in full accordance with market rules. The decision to terminate it fits into Canberra’s general line, which demonstrates an unfriendly attitude towards the PRC.
China remains Australia’s main trading partner; therefore, preserving and maintaining relatively normal relations with it is critically important for the country’s economic well-being. In this regard, the visit of Australia’s Foreign Minister P. Wong to Beijing was likely aimed at mitigating the negative consequences of the government’s new defence policy. The formal reason for the visit was the eighth round of the bilateral ‘Foreign and Strategic Dialogue,’ established in 2013.
At the meeting with her Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi verbalised exactly what P. Wong had wanted to hear and why she came to Beijing. In particular, it was confirmed that the PRC intends to continue ‘working with Australia in order to maintain the important consensus reached by the leaders of the two countries, strengthen lines of communication and coordination of activities, deepen mutually beneficial cooperation…’.
Good intentions. The stumbling block, however, is that Australia’s real policy cannot avoid the influence of the sharply deteriorating situation in the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, there is a growing role in the very process of forming this policy for those ministries and agencies that act in opposition to the country’s foreign ministry.
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on Asia-Pacific issues
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