On January 14, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi confirmed her intention to dissolve the lower house of parliament and call a snap election.
Internal political aspects of the pending elections
First of all, it should be noted that, according to Japan’s current constitution, the prime minister has the authority to dissolve the lower house of parliament (the House of Representatives) prematurely. In the country’s political practice of the last several decades, however, this is not an exception to the rule but rather the rule itself, since virtually all of Sanae Takaichi’s predecessors have exercised this right to demonstrate they possess public trust, typically in order to carry out certain measures (often ones that are themselves unpopular).
However, in recent years, it has become increasingly difficult for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to achieve this. In the autumn of 2024, during snap elections at that time, the LDP suffered a historic defeat and its leader, Shigeru Ishiba – the immediate predecessor of Takaichi as prime minister – was forced to govern the country after losing the majority in the lower house. In summer 2025, following another round of partial elections for the upper house, that chamber was also lost.
It is precisely to resolve this uncomfortable situation that the LDP leadership is now resorting to “regularly-scheduled snap elections” for the lower house. Hopes for success are pinned on Takaichi personally maintaining an unprecedentedly high level of trust among the Japanese public, which, according to various polls, exceeds 70%. The elections are expected to take place as early as February 8th, meaning the entire aforementioned process will be accelerated.
Several weeks prior to the election, a reshaping of the major party coalitions took place. Following the split between the LDP and the “pacifist” Komeito party, the LDP’s new coalition minority partner is the politically aligned Japan Innovation Party. However, in the upcoming elections, the LDP and the JIP will not coordinate their strategies. Meanwhile, Komeito has entered into a coalition with the main opposition party, the Constitutional Democratic Party.
It is becoming increasingly noticeable how the Sanseito party – the “Japanese Trumpists” – is playing on roughly the same electoral field as the LDP. The “issue of uncontrolled foreign migration” is one of the signature public messages of Sanseito, which is characterized by overt populism. Being in opposition, one can be as brash as possible without bearing any responsibility for it. Meanwhile, arguably the most severe threat to the survival of the Japanese nation is depopulation. Consequently, all Japanese governments in recent years have encouraged the influx of foreign labor. It should be noted that this process has always been under strict qualitative-quantitative control.
Consequently, the social costs arising from the emergence of large communities of people from different cultures in a country that only began emerging from near-total isolation in the second half of the 19th century have inevitably provoked widespread discontent. This discontent has been effectively exploited by the Sanseito party. As a result, the migration issue has become central to the electoral battle, and Takaichi’s government has proactively taken steps to further tighten both the process for new migrant inflows and the regulations governing the stay of those who have already been living in the country for a long time.
Among other issues fueling intense debate is tax system reform, a matter of critical importance given the economic difficulties that inevitably impact the average citizen. In the realm of defense, the plans announced to revise foundational policy documents have become a subject of fierce domestic debate and have also provoked a predictable reaction from China.
International context
First, it must be noted that there are still no glimmers of hope for improving deteriorating relations with China. No positive signals are facilitated by the aforementioned plans to revise Japan’s key defense and security documents.
However, there are also various issues in relations with the United States, primarily in the sphere of trade and economic relations. In this regard, commentators found the silence of the Bank of Japan, the country’s primary monetary authority, regarding US President Donald Trump’s attacks on the current head of the Federal Reserve, Jerome Powell, to be telling. Expressing direct support for the latter, as the central banks of some other countries have done, would have been a provocative gesture towards the chief ally and would have been particularly ill-timed ahead of Takaichi’s planned visit to the US in the first quarter of this year. However, a precondition for this visit is the success of the LDP, and consequently Takaichi herself, in the upcoming parliamentary elections.
Among other Japanese foreign policy moves in 2026, the January 15-17 visit of Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi to India drew particular attention. Together with his Indian counterpart Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, they held the 18th meeting of the bilateral strategic dialogue. Revitalizing the work of this dialogue was one of the key topics during the talks held in Tokyo last year between Prime Minister Modi and Takaichi’s predecessor, Ishiba.
The platform’s latest ministerial-level meeting was particularly significant due to the postponement of the next Quad Summit, which was supposed to be held in India before the end of last year. The cause for this delay was likely the well-known problems that arose in India-US relations during the summer last year. Among other things, Motegi and Jaishankar were engaged in preparing for a bilateral strategic dialogue summit.
The visit to India was part of the Japanese foreign minister’s nine-day overseas tour, during which he first visited the Philippines, next India, Israel, Palestine, and Qatar. As for his trip’s final stop, the very fact that a number of Greater Middle Eastern countries were included underscores Japan’s concerns over the prospect of complete chaos in the region that serves as its primary source of hydrocarbon imports.
Motegi’s trip to the Philippines is no less noteworthy. Its primary outcome was the signing of another bilateral defense document “aimed at enhancing deterrence against growing Chinese aggression”. It should be noted that various military activities have long been conducted under the same pretext. These occur not only bilaterally but also with the participation of, for example, Australia, not to mention the close military cooperation the United States maintains with all the aforementioned countries.
In conclusion, we can confidently state that should the government of Takaichi – which is quite likely – strengthen its position domestically following the upcoming elections, its international activity will only intensify. This factor will have to be taken into account by all other significant global players.
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on Asia-Pacific issues
Follow new articles on our Telegram channel
