Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, who has retained his post following the results of the October 27 extraordinary general elections, now has the support of less than half of the lower house of parliament.
This is a rather unique situation for post-war Japan, which was the result of serious problems, primarily of an internal nature, which affected the outcome of the general elections mentioned above.
A brief look at the reasons for the LDP’s failure in the recent general election
In fact, these long-standing problems are the reason why Fumio Kishida, the previous leader of the LDP, and therefore head of government, who had held both positions for almost three years resigned early.
What is the reason for the long-evident decline in the popularity of the LDP and the government it formed, and what makes the early resignation of Fumio Kishida, seemingly a successful figure in the political life of modern Japan, a foregone conclusion? As we have already hinted, to find the reasons we need to look beyond domestic politics—after all, at home the Kishida administration’s foreign policy was viewed more or less positively. However, it is a well-known fact that the mood of the electorate is primarily influenced not by successes “somewhere abroad,” but by the quality of life enjoyed at home, and any changes thereto.
And for years almost all the indicators used to measure quality of life have stood at a standstill or been actually declining. This is primarily reflected in the increasingly pessimistic attitudes of young people, as evidenced by the decades-long decline in fertility and marriage rates, as well as by increased levels of drug abuse and suicide. Among married couples, the number of those who have no children at all or limit their number to one child is growing.
All this provokes gloomy talks about the prospect of the Japanese “dying out” as a nation, and in response various measures are already being taken to attract foreign labor, issued with special visas, which now numbers about 3.5 million people.
It therefore seems doubtful that the recent corruption scandals in the LDP, frequently cited as the cause, are in fact the main reason for the sharp decline in the popularity of Fumio Kishida’s party and government. In fact, the true causes are problems of a much more fundamental nature. It was these factors that lay behind the LDP’s “historic failure” in the recent elections, leading to a stalemate in Parliament. And these problems have now been inherited by Shigeru Ishiba, who succeeded Fumio Kishida.
Now, in order to gain parliamentary support for seemingly routine but in reality urgent and vital activities (e.g., the creation of the budget for the next fiscal year, which begins in Japan on April 1), the government will have to engage in complex negotiations with one of the opposition parties on related socio-economic issues.
Meanwhile, in terms of its estimated GDP, in USD, Japan’s economy remains among the top five in the world and one of the most advanced according to a range of different indicators. But this does not mean that it can avoid being affected by one or another of the recent negative trends in the global economy.
That is, in this vital sphere not everything depends on the Japanese government, whatever its party affiliation, and the political and economic trends affecting Japan’s main foreign partners are of utmost importance.
Foreign policy considerations affecting the functioning of Shigeru Ishiba’s government
Among these, relations with the United States remain particularly important for Japan. For almost three quarters of a century, Japan has had a military-political alliance with the USA, and, given the current situation in the region, the importance of these is not diminishing and may even be increasing. The Japanese prime minister favors strengthening relations with the United States in the military sphere and is an advocate of creating a kind of “Asian version of NATO.”
Incidentally, during his first term in office, newly reelected US President Donald Trump threatened to cut off military support to Tokyo altogether if the Japanese government did not take any measures to reduce the persistently negative balance in bilateral trade, which annually stands at $70 billion. While the Japanese government spends about $2 billion annually in financial support for the US troops based in Japan (primarily in Okinawa), this is a small amount, to put it mildly, compared to Japan’s revenues from trade with its key military and political ally.
All these issues, as well as the US President-elect’s announcement of his plans to sharply increase tariffs on imported products, which caused considerable concern in Japan, and his characteristic attitude toward allies in general, form the background for Shigeru Ishiba’s upcoming talks with Donald Trump, which are to be held in the United States, where the Japanese prime minister will travel from Latin America after attending the APEC and G20 Summits.
On the margins of these events, Shigeru Ishiba is also expected to meet with the Chinese leader Xi Jinping—after all, China is another extremely important country for Japan. Relations between Japan and China are quite complex, dominated as they are by political and strategic competition, which is intensifying as the role of both countries in the “Great World Game” increases.
Therefore, in terms of the shaping of the situation in the Indo-Pacific region, the relations between the three leading Asian powers, China, Japan and India, will inevitably increase. Consequently, changes in relations between the PRC and Japan, one of the sides of this geopolitical triangle, will also increase in importance.
And there have been some positive developments in these relations recently. In particular, Fumio Kishida and Li Qiang met in late May of this year, the first meeting between the two countries’ prime ministers in three years. The meeting took place on the margins of the resumed (after a six-year break) three-party talks between China, Japan and the Republic of Korea. Also, noteworthy was the October 10 meeting between Shigeru Ishiba and Li Qiang. Three weeks later, negotiations were held in Beijing between Wang Yi and his Japanese counterpart Takeo Akiba, i.e. the de facto second-in-commands for foreign policy issues in both countries.
In conclusion, it should be noted that in the current conditions of high uncertainty, caused both by the transitional state of the world order—a transition in which Japan is playing an increasingly important role—and by the precarious position of Japan’s current government, unexpected developments in Japan’s foreign policy are very much a possibility.
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region.
