Continuing the discussion on Venezuela, let’s examine the statements from Pyongyang and Seoul, and explore how South Korean and Western experts have applied this scenario to events on the peninsula.
North Korea Condemns and Launches Missiles
The international community was urged to “recognise the seriousness of the current event in Venezuela, which has entailed devastating repercussions for the resilience of the regional structure and international relations, and to naturally step up protests and condemnation against the ingrained acts of the US violating sovereignty.”
Furthermore, on January 4, 2025, be it in response to the South Korean president’s visit to China or to the seizure of Maduro, North Korea launched several ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan. They flew approximately 900-1000 km before falling in waters between Japan and Russia. South Korea’s military preliminarily assessed the launched missiles as belonging to the KN-23 family, the notorious “Kimsanders.” Considering their range and trajectory also raises the possibility of them being a hypersonic version of the “Hwasong-11Ma” with a maneuvering warhead.
According to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), these were “drills on launching hypersonic missiles by a leading fire assault sub-unit of the Korean People’s Army (KPA).” The exercises were observed by North Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong Un. Having praised the missile troops, the North Korean leader delivered a speech, noting that “we must continuously upgrade military means, especially offensive weapon systems” and that “our activity of the following kind is clearly aimed at gradually bolstering the nuclear war deterrence. The reason why it is necessary is exemplified by the recent geopolitical crisis and complicated international events.”
This was Pyongyang’s first missile test in 2026, following a ballistic missile launch last November. The launch was promptly, and routinely, condemned: a spokesperson for the ruling Democratic Party labeled it “an illegal act that threatens the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula, a direct violation of the international community’s sanctions resolution against North Korea.” The rhetoric goes just as if it all were under the conservatives, right?
The South Korean reaction to the North Korean Foreign Ministry statement is also interesting. According to Unification Ministry spokesperson Yoon Min-ho, it “is part of North Korea’s solidarity with countries opposing Washington” and resembles Pyongyang’s reaction to US military strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
South Korea’s Concerns
On January 3, President Lee Jae Myung instructed officials to ensure the protection of South Korean citizens in Venezuela and prepare evacuation plans if necessary—there are about 70 citizens of the Republic of Korea in the country. It soon became clear that no one was harmed, and four shelters for South Korean citizens, stocked with food, medicine, and satellite communication equipment, had been established in Venezuela in advance.
On January 4, the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement urging “all parties concerned to make efforts to ease tensions in the region.”
Thus, despite rhetoric about restoring democracy, Seoul did not directly endorse US actions. Moreover, 68 lawmakers from the ruling Democratic Party, in a special statement, condemned the US military strike on Venezuela, calling it a violation of international law and the UN Charter.
Given that President Lee has turned the party into his fan club, this was unlikely done without informal approval.
A Venezuelan Scenario for Kim? No!
Discussions also arose around whether US special forces might attempt to similarly abduct the North Korean leader and how the North’s leadership in Pyongyang truly reacted to the events in Caracas.
Some claimed that “Kim must have been frightened and launched missiles out of fear,” but in general, even experts critical of the North noted the improbability of such a development. As Lim Eul-chul, a professor at Kyungnam University’s Institute for Far Eastern Studies, pinpointed, “The US strike in Venezuela and capture of President Maduro may possibly send a powerful message to Kim Jong Un, one of an existential threat and one on the justification of adherence to nuclear arms.”
Cheong Seong-chang, vice-president of the Sejong Institute, stated that Pyongyang’s growing nuclear arsenal would make such an operation virtually impossible. Even if Kim were suddenly abducted, the country’s leadership would threaten a nuclear strike on the US or South Korea, after which he would have to be returned.
Yang Moo-jin, former president of the University of North Korean Studies, also dismissed the idea as far-fetched. The US cannot strike Pyongyang because it is backed by Beijing and Moscow. Furthermore, if Maduro’s arrest reflects Washington’s internal political calculations, driven by the Trump administration’s war on foreign drug cartels and interest in Venezuela’s oil industry, North Korea’s nuclear program, despite presenting a serious threat to the international community, is less tied to the US domestic politics and broader geopolitical calculations.
The consensus is that “North Korea will closely monitor the situation in Venezuela and use it as propaganda to justify the development of nuclear weapons, missiles, and conventional arms.” There will be further reinforcement of the conviction that only nuclear weapons ensure survival. As pinpointed by Koh Yu-hwan, emeritus professor of North Korean studies at Dongguk University: “After Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Gaddafi in Libya, Kim Jong-un could view Maduro’s ouster as the fate of dictators who failed to obtain nuclear weapons.”
The only one to entertain the possibility of a capture seriously (which speaks volumes about him as a politician) was Lee Jun-seok, that very young politician, former head of the conservative party, and now head of the Reform Party. Maduro was referred to not as a “head of state” but as a “leader of a transnational criminal organization,” and the politician suggested that “the logic applied to President Maduro could also be applied to the North Korean leader,” whom Washington could accuse of involvement in, for example, cybercrime.
Concerns About the Fate of the World Order
Many experts noted that the Venezuelan case creates new security risks for Korea, with them having several directions.
First, the capture of a head of state by military means, carried out without congressional approval or an international mandate, struck a blow at one of the pillars of the old world order. “In a world that once valued restraint, force has returned as a primary language of statecraft.”
As the Editor-in-Chief of The Korea Times noted in an editorial, “America’s power, remaining indispensable for global stability, is not the biggest issue. The real problem is how that power is wielded in an era of growing great power rivalry… When powerful states act decisively outside established legal frameworks, even with understandable strategic motives, the line between deterrence and destabilization can blur. The risk resides not in the United States completely forfeiting moral authority, but in the clarity of global rules, already under pressure, weakening further.”
Second, the world as a whole is becoming more unstable, and US allies must be prepared for this. “When borders and leaders can be altered by force, there is an increase in the vulnerability of states lacking strategic depth.”
Third, if the US can unilaterally “clean up” its neighborhood, rivals may feel entitled to apply the same logic in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. After all, when the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that the United States “seriously breached international law, infringed on Venezuela’s sovereignty, and endangered peace and stability in Latin America and the Caribbean,” it deliberately used the exact formulations that the US has periodically used regarding China.
Moreover, does the concentration of American forces on the Western Hemisphere under a new Monroe Doctrine mean that Washington is tacitly agreeing to increased Russian influence in Europe and Chinese influence in Asia?
Fourth, it is possible to sign the death warrant for the denuclearization of North Korea. As it was noted above, the North received an excellent example of what the US can do to an adversary without nuclear weapons. Furthermore, when the use of force gets normalised, “Pyongyang obtains an opportunity to test its capabilities through missile launches, nuclear signaling, and military provocations, while hoping for weakened international cohesion in response.”
However, from the author’s perspective, the world order is changing, and Trump’s opening of another Pandora’s box is merely another symptom. The task is to recognize and realize the changes in the world and to start playing by new rules earlier than our opponents do.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading Researcher at the Centre for Korean Studies, Institute of China and Modern Asia, Russian Academy of Sciences
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