Belgium has taken delivery of its first F-35s, yet the country cannot fully operate them: its airspace is simply too narrow for the aircraft’s advanced training needs. A €5.6 billion investment now faces unexpected structural constraints that raise pressing questions about capability, planning, and national readiness.
A Procurement Decision Marked by Controversy
In 2018, the Belgian government opted to purchase 34 F-35A aircraft for an estimated €5.6 billion. Produced by Lockheed Martin, the platform represents the benchmark of fifth-generation fighter technology, combining stealth, sensor fusion, and enhanced situational awareness. The acquisition was presented as essential to maintain Belgium’s interoperability within NATO and to ensure the long-term relevance of its air combat capabilities.
However, the decision generated considerable controversy, particularly because it excluded the French Rafale, intensifying a longstanding competition between the two models and potentially undermining the EU policy of buying European.
The diplomatic reverberations of this choice were significant. Belgian-French defence cooperation is extensive, particularly in areas such as armoured vehicles and artillery, and the rejection of the Rafale was perceived in Paris as a political setback rather than merely a technical preference. At the time, the debate surrounding the procurement process highlighted concerns over influence, strategic autonomy, and the future of Europe’s defence industrial base.
A key argument supporting the Belgian choice was the industrial robustness behind the F-35. Lockheed Martin’s production facility in Fort Worth, spanning nearly 1.6 kilometres, manufactures around 250 aircraft per year, with a monthly output of approximately 15 units. This scale vastly exceeds the annual production of the Rafale, reinforcing the perception that the F-35 benefits from economies of scale, global demand, and long-term logistical predictability. From a procurement perspective, the Belgian authorities viewed this as a guarantee of sustained availability, lower risk, and long-term viability.
The public debate intensified following a polemical opinion column in De Standaard by Joren Vermeersch, adviser to then-Defence Minister Theo Francken. Vermeersch argued that rejecting American defence technology equated to marginalising oneself strategically, contending that France continued to overvalue its defence industry while underestimating the advantages of transatlantic cooperation.
Vermeersch’s characterisation of France as a “Gaulish village surrounded by angry Romans” was widely criticised for its undiplomatic tone, particularly given Belgium’s role as a major client of French land systems, including 382 Griffon vehicles, 60 Jaguar reconnaissance platforms, 28 Caesar artillery systems, and 24 Griffon MEPAC units.
Yet the F-35 programme is far from an exclusively American enterprise. It relies on an extensive network of international suppliers, including a significant European industrial base. Belgian companies such as Syensqo, BMT, Asco, Feronyl, Sabca, and Sonaca contribute components to the production chain.
Moreover, part of the assembly for European aircraft takes place at the Cameri facility in Italy, where Belgian- and German-manufactured parts are incorporated. This embeddedness in a transnational production structure has strengthened Belgium’s argument that the choice does not undermine European defence industry interests but rather situates Belgium within a broader cooperative framework.
The Constraints of a Limited National Airspace
However, the operational integration of the F-35 into Belgian airspace has proven far more complex than anticipated. Reporting by Le Vif has underscored a longstanding structural issue: Belgium’s airspace is among the most congested and restricted in Europe, heavily influenced by civilian air traffic corridors and geographical limitations.
The F-35’s training requirements—particularly for high-intensity manoeuvres, stealth testing, and complex sensor-driven exercises—cannot be met within national boundaries alone. This constraint poses risks for pilot preparedness and limits Belgium’s capacity to exploit the aircraft’s full potential.
In response, Defence Minister Theo Francken has opened discussions with partner countries to secure access to broader training zones. Negotiations are ongoing with Italy, Norway, and the Netherlands to allow Belgian pilots to conduct advanced training missions within their airspace. Such arrangements would mirror existing NATO practices but also demonstrate Belgium’s structural dependency on external partners for routine operational readiness.
The introduction of the first aircraft was additionally complicated by technical issues. While four F-35s were initially expected in mid-October, a malfunction forced one of them to make an extended stop in the Azores. Lockheed Martin dispatched a specialised team to resolve the problem promptly, enabling the remaining three aircraft to be delivered on schedule. The handover ceremony—attended by the King—reflected the symbolic importance attributed to the programme, despite the operational hurdles.
The grounding of the Belgian F-35s should therefore not be interpreted as a failure of the aircraft itself but as an illustration of the tension between ambitious procurement choices and structural national constraints.
Belgium has invested in one of the most advanced combat aircraft available, yet its effective deployment depends on addressing long-standing geographical limitations and strengthening cooperation with regional partners.
The episode illustrates how defence modernisation is not solely a matter of acquiring cutting-edge technology but of ensuring that national infrastructure and strategic planning are aligned with the capabilities being purchased.
Ricardo Martins—Doctor of Sociology, specialist in European and international politics as well as geopolitics
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