Problems such as border issues, Helmand rights, trafficking, and financial crises continue to affect relations. Therefore, Iran’s recognition of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is not an urgent matter.
Politics and Geopolitics
The visit of Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in January 2025, the first senior Iranian diplomat to the new Afghanistan, marked a new stage in relations.
Although the Taliban’s main demand from Iran is formal recognition of the current government, Tehran still considers recognition of the Taliban premature, given political pragmatism, active diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, and the transfer of Afghan political missions in Iran to the Taliban.
In the past year, bilateral meetings of political and economic officials have expanded. For example, the invitation of Amir Khan Mottaqi, the Taliban’s acting foreign minister, to the Tehran Dialogue Forum; the meeting with President Massoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi; and the presence of Afghan Deputy Interior Minister Ibrahim Sadr at the ECO member states’ meeting in Tehran are important.
In fact, despite not recognizing the Taliban, Tehran considers the development of relations with its neighbors, including Afghanistan, a priority, and is satisfied with Afghanistan’s stance in condemning the attack on Iran.
Iran has also not supported the Taliban opposition in a good-neighborly manner so far and believes that the future political order of Afghanistan should be established through national and regional processes and that there should be no opportunity for the West to intervene again in Afghanistan.
In this perspective, Tehran considers multilateral cooperation with China and Russia in the geopolitical sphere and opposition to the re-presence of NATO and the United States in Afghanistan to be strategic. In this context, although the lack of a “comprehensive” government in Afghanistan is important and is an obstacle to recognizing the Taliban government, it continues to vigorously develop other aspects of relations between the two countries with the same culture and language.
Despite more than 900 kilometers of common border and a policy of closing its border with Afghanistan, stability on Iran’s eastern borders for containing terrorist threats such as Jaish al-Adl and ISIS Khorasan (ISKP) is also very important.
Iran has an interest in cooperating with the Taliban to coordinate actions against these groups. Also, while the Taliban has repeatedly announced the continuation of the reduction of cultivation, smuggling, and sale of drugs in Afghanistan. Tehran is pursuing the elimination of the threat of human and drug trafficking and terrorism on the common borders.
In another dimension, Iran is also concerned about very large-scale conflicts between Pakistan and Afghanistan, such as in October 2025. Therefore, to prevent the escalation of tensions, it is ready to help and mediate.
Afghan refugees
Iran has been hosting Afghans for decades. After 2021, millions of new refugees from Afghanistan poured into Iran. Iran implemented an open border policy, and the number of Afghan refugees and migrants in Iran increased to 6-9 million. However, it has created economic, educational, health, and security problems and costs billions of dollars annually.
Therefore, Tehran has considered the return of illegal refugees from Iran to Afghanistan to regulate the passage and design a system for the legal and organized entry of labor from Afghanistan. In this approach, Iran is also planning to establish a national migration organization build a wall along its eastern borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan to stop irregular migration flows and drug and fuel smuggling.
Water Disputes and Environmental Concerns
A long-standing dispute over the Helmand River water resources, climate challenges, recurrent droughts, and Afghanistan’s infrastructure projects have led to reduced water flows and created tension.
Iran has repeatedly expressed its concern about the failure to deliver the agreed share of Helmand River water. Tehran has used diplomatic channels to force Kabul officials to fulfill their commitments and has demanded that Kabul take practical steps to implement the agreements.
Meanwhile, despite Taliban leaders’ promises to address agricultural and environmental challenges in eastern Iran, the recent visit of Kazem Gharibabadi, Deputy Minister of Legal Affairs and International Affairs of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, to Afghanistan and his meetings with Taliban officials on the issue of water rights, border, legal, and judicial issues are significant. The issue of Iran’s rights to the Harirud River and securing Iran’s rights and the legal regime related to the Harirud River are also on the agenda.
Economy and Investment
Despite the Taliban’s ideological stance, Iran’s intention to strengthen trade relations and pragmatic interactions in trade and infrastructure projects is also in line with the principle of de-escalation with its neighbors.
Important bilateral economic developments, such as the Chabahar transit, the establishment of the Iran-Afghanistan Joint Chamber of Commerce, and the increase in rail connectivity through the Khaf-Herat railway, are Iran’s focus on infrastructure investment in Afghanistan to develop strategic relations.
In September 2025, a high-ranking Iranian economic delegation, led by Mohammad Atabak, Minister of Industry, Mines, and Trade, visited Afghanistan to discuss increasing investment and trade as well as improving cooperation in transportation and joint ventures. In addition, in order to deepen the ties between the border provinces, developing tourism services, especially health tourism for Afghan refugees, joint investment, and training and technical skills have been considered.
Iran’s willingness to cooperate in the construction of the Herat-Mazar-e-Sharif railway, Iran-Afghanistan railway cooperation programs, and the practical exploitation of the Iran-Afghanistan-China railway route can create a huge transformation in the movement of cargo and passengers and increase the volume of trade in the region. Cooperation on the further use of Chabahar Port and increasing the shipping capacity of Chabahar Port and expanding cargo movement through the Khaf-Herat railway could lead to trade development.
New agreements and investment opportunities could lead to the expansion of bilateral trade between Afghanistan and Iran to $10 billion from the current $3.5 billion. There is also rarely a village or neighborhood in Afghanistan that has not experienced contact with Iran. The educated class, Afghan politicians, Pashtuns, Tajiks, Baloch, and Hazaras have interacted with Iran economically, culturally, or politically.
Challenges and Outlook
The lack of recognition of the Taliban rule by the international community and the lack of a clear vision have made it difficult to conclude major contracts and understandings. Without a legitimate government and official international recognition of the government, the process of negotiations and reaching a precise scientific, practical, and legal understanding in the water sector, especially Harirud, is difficult.
Although many in Kabul believe that the illegal entry of Afghan nationals into Iran has decreased from 100% to 10% in terms of preventing human trafficking, there are also complex challenges. Problems such as border issues, Helmand rights, trafficking, and financial crises continue to affect relations. Therefore, Iran’s recognition of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is not an urgent matter.
Therefore, Tehran will likely continue to consider repelling challenges and eliminating threats, forming an inclusive government, combating terrorism, effectively combating drugs, strengthening borders, combating human trafficking, and the return of refugees as its most important demands from the current Afghan rulers.
Samyar Rostami, а political observer and senior researcher in international relations
