Despite the Taliban’s expectation of “flexibility” from Pakistan, it will continue its multifaceted diplomatic and economic policy and efforts to reduce tensions with Pakistan. But the challenge of how to manage relations with anti-Pakistani groups will remain the main stumbling block in relations.
The Taliban leaders’ attitude towards Pakistan is also influenced by diplomatic, geopolitical, security, ethnic, ideological, and economic factors. Pakistan’s recent relations with the Taliban have also been much more complex and fraught with challenges and confrontations.
Despite the de facto increase in bilateral diplomatic presence, Pakistan declared in October 2025 that it wanted a peaceful, stable, friendly, inclusive, regionally connected, and prosperous Afghanistan. Islamabad even expressed hope that one day the people of Afghanistan would be liberated and governed by a truly representative government.
The Taliban have high expectations from Pakistan, aiming to gradually emerge from international isolation, establish a regional position, and gain regional and international credibility.
The meetings of Pakistanis with anti-Taliban figures, the Afghan opposition, and ethnic parties over the past year can be seen as a means of putting pressure on the Taliban.
Therefore, the Taliban do not want Pakistan to be an ally of the West in pressuring them to establish an inclusive government, respect human rights, and provide access to education and basic freedoms for Afghan citizens.
Pashtuns constitute 15 percent of Pakistan’s population. Some Taliban officials sometimes speak of the return of Pashtunistan and Balochistan Provinces and the invalidity of the Durand Line, calling it an “imaginary line.” In this approach, there are still claims on Pakistani territory, and anti-Pakistani sentiments are also interpreted as a “nationalist” move.
The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which considers itself an “offshoot of the Islamic Emirate” with 50,000 fighters, is the main problem in security and political relations. Islamabad wants the Taliban to actually fight the Pakistani Taliban, has repeatedly expressed its concerns about terrorism, and expects specific and provable measures against terrorism from the Taliban.
Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif has publicly asked the Afghan government to choose between the TTP and Pakistan. In contrast, the Taliban has always considered the problem a Pakistani issue, sometimes considering mediation and peace talks between the Pakistani Taliban and Islamabad, or doesn’t want to change previous reactions and commitments. It can even be said that they want to use the TTP as a bargaining tool in dealing with the Pakistani government.
In the security sphere, the Taliban has a special approach. The Taliban do not want Islamabad to exert extensive pressure on them in the future in the security and political fields, including strengthening border management and bases, and to be listed as a terrorist organization by Pakistan.
From the Taliban’s perspective, Pakistan seeks to cover up the weaknesses of its security organizations by blaming Afghanistan for terrorist attacks on its soil.
The Taliban also sometimes accuse the Pakistani army of conspiring against Afghanistan by spreading disinformation, inciting border tensions, and harboring ISIS-K*-linked militants, and reject using Afghan soil as a launching pad for attacks.
Meanwhile, despite dozens of visits by Pakistani officials with the Taliban, eight meetings of the Joint Coordination Committee, and 13 statements on terrorism with Kabul officials, the Taliban still does not recognize the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan as a terrorist group.
The failure of previous talks between the two sides on cross-border terrorism and safe havens in Afghanistan led to the deadliest mutual conflict in October 2025.
In fact, the Taliban has accused Pakistan of violating Afghan sovereignty and warned it of serious consequences and launched retaliatory attacks on Pakistani military posts. For the Taliban, getting closer to India is both an attempt to escape diplomatic isolation and strengthen legitimacy, and to use the India card against Pakistan. Pakistan still believes that the Pakistani Taliban is supported by India, but it seems that the Taliban is not interested in using actors such as China, Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Qatar to reduce tension and strengthen relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Part of the Taliban’s foreign and regional policy is to strengthen economic relations, trade, transportation, and energy transit with its neighbors. The Taliban is trying to create a bridge between Central Asia and South Asia through Afghanistan. So, Kabul has expectations from Pakistan about a tripartite agreement to launch a regional railway project and join Afghanistan to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
Trade between the two countries has declined sharply, and Afghanistan’s transit routes through Pakistan are increasingly challenging. The Taliban also want Pakistan to ease restrictions on transit trade with Afghanistan and on bilateral trade, investment, and infrastructure development by Pakistan.
While Pakistan has undertaken a massive deportation of Afghan refugees in the country, and will take all necessary steps to regularize the presence of Afghan nationals on its soil, the Taliban have repeatedly called for a reduction in the deportation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan.
Outlook
The Taliban’s most important diplomatic and political demand will continue to be formal recognition of the Taliban government by Pakistan.
The Taliban fear that Pakistan will also try to expand its ties with Tajiks, Taliban opponents, and support the Taliban’s military and political opposition and even regime change in Kabul. Despite the Taliban’s need for investment and economic self-sufficiency, recent security and military tensions, as well as statements by officials on both sides, indicate the increasing tension between the Taliban and Pakistan.
Despite the Taliban’s expectation of “flexibility” from Pakistan, it will continue its multifaceted diplomatic and economic policy and efforts to reduce tensions with Pakistan. But the challenge of how to manage relations with anti-Pakistani groups will remain the main stumbling block in relations.
Pakistan and the Taliban signed a ceasefire agreement in Doha to end the worst fighting since 2021. But without a framework to monitor compliance with commitments, joint border patrols, and monitoring of TTP camps, the outlook for relations is not looking so positive.
Samyar Rostami, а political observer and senior researcher in international relations
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