It has been noted on multiple occasions that ROK President Lee Jae Myung, when describing inter-Korean policy in his speeches, voices mutually exclusive passages, which brings us to the assumption that each “tower” within the Blue House is pulling to its own side.
Minister of Unification Against Unification
Firstly, by now he has continually stated that “in reality, South Korea and the DPRK are two states”. Of course, it implies a recognition of their “statehood, not a permanent division”. The unification of Korea remains the goal, but is shifted to the long-term perspective, including in the form of a confederation, while the main task at issue is to transform the “two hostile states”, as the North puts it, into “two peacefully coexisting states”.
Hence, Chung suggested setting aside “useless disputes about national identity”, restoring dialogue and channels of communication, and “focusing on practical tasks”, including the one which has never been put to practice, with it being “cross-recognition” of the diplomatic relations between North Korea on one side and the US and Japan on the other.
Undoubtedly, over 50% of the ROK population considers North Korea a state. But should Seoul want to move from words to deeds, it will first have to modify the country’s Constitution: Article 3 declares the entire peninsula to be ROK territory, and Article 4 speaks of “striving for unification.” Otherwise, all statements about respecting the DPRK’s political system and renouncing “unification through absorption” are, strictly speaking, grounds for impeachment or charges of high treason.
Secondly, during a meeting with Hyundai Group Chairperson Hyun Jeong-eun, the Minister of Unification stated that, despite the prolonged rupture in the relations between the two Koreas, it is necessary to strive to implement a tourism project linking the Wonsan Kalma and Kumgangsan areas in North Korea. It begs the question: taking into account the fact that the resort built by South Koreans is being repurposed for Chinese tourists, and that Kim Jong Un once again reiterated that “we will have no business with them“, did it all simply pass him by, or is he living in his own universe?
Thirdly, Chung Dong-young called for “a cold mind” in admitting the fact that “the DPRK has become one of the three states (alongside China and Russia) capable of striking the territory of the United States”. He claimed that back in 2019, during the meeting in Hanoi, Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump failed to make use of the opportunity to resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, and the DPRK has become much more perilous so far. However, the opportunity to attack the continental part of the US already was at Pyongyang’s hand back then, during the Hanoi summit.
Minister of Unification vs. Other ROK Leadership Representatives
Other members of the South Korean leadership, however, adhere to a different stance.
For instance, on September 23, National Security Advisor Wi Sung-lac stated that Seoul “does not support or recognise the concept of two Korean states”. The government’s position is based on the provisions of the 1991 South – North Basic Agreement, which consider the relations between the South and the North as “special”, not those of two sovereign states, with the unification declared the ultimate goal. Hence, under current conditions, the normalization of relations between Seoul and Pyongyang will inevitably be a lengthy process, with the establishment of “special relations” as its final result.
Neither does Chung Dong-young see eye to eye with ROK Minister of National Defense Ahn Gyu-back. Their standpoints collide when it comes to using the term “enemy” in reference to the DPRK. Chung believes the DPRK’s status should be downgraded at least to a “threat”, while Ahn sticks to the traditional wording.
President Lee himself has also spoken out against using the term “enemy”, which was common under Yoon Suk Yeol’s administration.
Furthermore, Chung Dong-young reported that his ministry is discussing with the Ministry of Defense possible suspension of live-fire exercises, as stipulated by the inter-Korean agreement of September 19, 2018, and that generally, for the sake of the dialogue with Pyongyang, military maneuvers should be reduced or cancelled. The military, however, is in favour of maintaining the previous scale of drills, pointing to the president’s promises regarding the return of operational control of troops. The jury is still out on who is winning the debate, but the major “Hoguk” exercises were nevertheless postponed from October to November, officially due to the APEC summit and parliamentary hearings.
Who Pulls Harder?
Andrei Lankov, a Russian-speaking Korea expert, considers Chung Dong-young’s “tower” to be the most influential, and notes that in the autumn of 2024, several renowned officials from the Moon Jae-in administration (for example, his Chief of Staff, Im Jong-seok), who used to be ardent supporters of inter-Korean dialogue, stated that, casting a sober glance at the situation, unification is not particularly desirable and, in the near future, is unfeasible. From Lankov’s standpoint, Chung is a veteran of the Democratic Party, while Wi is known primarily as a professional diplomat and occupies the niche of an “invited specialist”. But it is arguable. Chung spent a very long time in political oblivion, and during Moon Jae-in’s tenure, he was not among the decision-makers. His appointment as minister was most probably either an indicator of a personnel crisis, when no other candidate could be found, or a signal to Pyongyang – a familiar name suggesting a familiar course.
To sum up: it is good that the recognition of the established realities on the peninsula is being discussed at least at the ministerial level. Acknowledging reality, albeit a bitter one, cuts down on the likelihood of a conflict on the peninsula, as the concept of a single country the must be unified would finally be brought to naught.
The bad news is that this is not a real step in that direction, but merely a demonstratively raised foot. There is no room for normal inter-Korean dialogue in the current situation. Seoul understands this, but fills the vacuum in the agenda with statements like these. It still remains to be seen, even with a compliant parliament, whether populist Lee Jae Myung undertakes the structural changes to the Constitution needed to provide a legislative basis for this thesis.
What is neither good nor bad is that various officials are putting forward different concepts, and the President alternates between them, voicing one idea first, then pivoting to the other: for a populist, this is business as usual. It is of greater importance that it demonstrates a scarcely unified course, which is exactly why the author poses such a question in the title.
“As these pages were being typeset” …
Whilst this text was undergoing preparations for publication, during a hearing at the National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee, Chung Dong-young reiterated that the concept of “two peaceful states on the Korean Peninsula” would be taken up by Seoul as an official position. According to Chung, the issue is being specified and discussed. It goes without saying that the statement was criticised amidst members of the opposition People Power Party, who labelled it “unconstitutional.”
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Centre for Korean Studies of the Institute of China and Modern Asia at the Russian Academy of Sciences
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