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Split in Japan’s Government: Reasons for the Collapse of the LDP–Komeito Coalition

Daniil Romanenko, October 20, 2025

10 October 2025, shortly after meeting with the newly elected president of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Sanae Takaichi, Komeito leader Tetsuo Saito announced his party’s decision to withdraw from the coalition with the LDP.

Takaichi meets Tamaki

Despite longstanding policy differences and sporadic tensions between the representatives of the two parties, the abrupt end of their 26-year-long alliance came as a shock to observers. This article examines the factors that precipitated the coalition’s demise and have led to yet another (over the past year) reshuffling of power in Japan’s Diet.

First Years, First Warning Signs

Komeito, founded by the Soka Gakkai new religious movement, has positioned itself as a pacifist moderate left-liberal party advocating for increased social benefits and international cooperation. By contrast, the LDP is a conservative party that emphasizes social stability and cautious reform; a party that relies on the U.S.–Japan security alliance while gradually expanding Japan Self-Defense Forces’ budget and capabilities since the late 1990s.

In 1999, the two parties forged a coalition after the LDP lost its Upper-House majority and sought a partner among the opposition forces. By then, Komeito had revised its stance on the constitutionality of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces and the necessity of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, making compromise possible in exchange for the possibility of realizing its welfare promises.

The alliance offered both parties not only a solid majority in the Diet but also electoral cooperation: the LDP’s rural voter base complemented Komeito’s urban support, enabling them to avoid competing against each other in key districts and maximize success in electoral districts of all types by supporting each other’s candidates.

with the rise of Sanae Takaichi as the LDP president and the departure of Komeito from the alliance, the force that united moderates from both camps disappeared

However, policy disagreements began surfacing within a few years. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (2001–2006) pursued neoliberal reforms focused on decentralization and competition in various spheres of the economy and administration. Komeito opposed Koizumi’s privatization initiatives and forced repeated negotiations on coalition legislation. Furthermore, in 2003, Japan sent its Self-Defense Forces to Iraq to assist the United States. The Komeito leadership initially opposed this US action, but eventually supported the LDP’s initiative to send Japanese troops to aid their ally, on the condition that they operate in non-combat zones, which provoked a negative reaction from the Komeito electorate.

Meanwhile, in the 2000s, Komeito successfully negotiated the LDP into the expansion of social welfare measures, particularly in healthcare, which helped maintain its base’s trust in an alliance with a conservative partner.

Komeito and Shinzo Abe: Mutual Compromises With Principles

Under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Komeito once again compromised its principles to preserve the coalition. Most notably, the pacifist party supported the LDP-led 2015 security legislation that authorized Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to take part in allies’ overseas military operations if they fall into the “collective self-defense” category; the use of force was now allowed as well. At the same time, under pressure from Komeito, the LDP succeeded in narrowing the law’s scope by specifying far tighter and more concrete conditions for overseas deployment of the Self-Defense Forces. Simultaneously, the LDP acceded to Komeito’s demand for tax-cut measures.

From these episodes, a clear pattern of LDP–Komeito cooperation emerges: both parties proved willing to set aside some of their principles in exchange for reciprocal concessions – either by scaling back contentious reforms or by ensuring support for each party’s key initiatives on a quid pro quo basis. By that point, Komeito had refined its outreach to the Soka Gakkai electorate, persuading its supporters that the LDP genuinely sought to improve the quality of life and that expanded Self-Defense Forces’ powers did not contradict pacifism.

Thus, both parties repeatedly compromised to sustain their alliance. However, once the LDP ceased trading concessions – and that delicate balance collapsed – the coalition itself fell apart. But how exactly did this occur?

Rightward Turn in Japan and the Collapse of the Coalition

The decisive rupture stemmed from Sanae Takaichi’s actions in the days immediately following her election as LDP president. Takaichi first met – ostensibly to discuss cooperation – with Yuichiro Tamaki, leader of the opposition Democratic Party for the People, rather than with its coalition partner, Komeito’s leader Tetsuo Saito. After the initial round of talks on October 7, Saito voiced serious concerns over Takaichi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine (where convicted war criminals are enshrined) and her controversial remarks on Japan’s wartime past.

Yet the principal flashpoint became the issue of political-funds reform. Saito pressed Takaichi for a clear answer on Komeito’s proposal to amend the Political Funds Control Law; Takaichi replied that she was not prepared to give a straight answer, once again deferring action on the scandal-driven reforms, despite nearly two years having passed since the controversy erupted. Moreover, Sanae Takaichi appointed Koichi Hagiuda, who was directly linked to the slush funds scandal, as LDP secretary-general. The unwillingness to compromise and demonstrate any intention to resolve this issue was the main impetus for Komeito’s decision to abandon its cooperation with the LDP.

In addition, Komeito was, most likely, unwilling to remain in partnership under Takaichi because of her sharply anti-immigrant rhetoric and pledges. Komeito is very positive about attracting specialists from different countries and cultures to Japan, and the new conservative party president’s position is unacceptable to Komeito.

It’s possible that Komeito leaders had long considered leaving the coalition, but the LDP’s ability to compromise held the alliance together despite the contradictions. Sanae Takaichi’s actions, however, fractured this order.

Shift in Parliamentary Balance after the LDP–Komeito Split

The coalition between the LDP and Komeito allowed for a balance between policies supported by right-wing and left-wing politicians and voters. However, with the rise of Sanae Takaichi as the LDP president and the departure of Komeito from the alliance, the force that united moderates from both camps disappeared.

As a coalition partner, Komeito managed to push the LDP to adopt measures that, to a certain extent, curbed the conservative party’s right-wing ambitions. But now, it is beneficial for the LDP to join forces with one of the right or centre-right forces, which could significantly alter the country’s political course.

 

Daniil Romanenko, Japanologist, researcher from the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences

 

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