President Trump’s renewed focus on regaining the Bagram Air Base and developing Pakistan’s Pasni Port signals Washington’s attempt to reassert strategic influence in a region increasingly dominated by China, Russia, and Iran.
Bagram, Strategic Bases, and the China Factor
When President Donald Trump stated that the US is “trying to get back” Bagram Air Base, he did more than express nostalgia; he revealed a strategic calculation. Bagram is not merely an airstrip but a key power position. Trump was clear when he emphasised Bagram’s proximity to areas where he claimed China “makes its nuclear missiles,” directly highlighting how Washington perceives Afghanistan as more than just a counterterrorism site. In fact, Trump made it clear that the airbase now has implications in the ongoing contest with Beijing. Though the Taliban have already rejected the US demand and Trump has threatened severe consequences, his goal is obvious: to send a message to China that the US still has interests in regions China may see as its exclusive zone of influence, such as Western China / Xinjiang, while reminding Russia and Iran that Afghanistan cannot be ignored. With Russia recently hosting Taliban delegations and warning against foreign military presence in the region as destabilising, it is clear Moscow is also aware of what Washington might pursue.
The Pasni Port: Economic Foothold with Strategic Ripples
Parallel to the Bagram gambit is Pakistan’s pitch to the US to develop Pasni, a small port town on the Arabian Sea, into a deep-sea port connected by railway to mineral-rich interior regions. The plan reportedly involves investments of around US$1.2 billion. While it is designed to enable Pakistan to export critical minerals — copper, antimony, neodymium and other rare earths — to the US, which are becoming increasingly essential to modern defence, renewable energy, and critical infrastructure supply chains, the port may also serve broader US strategic interests as well. Although this port does not have direct military implications, at least in its formal terms, its location is still eye-opening: just 70 miles from China-backed Gwadar and 100 miles from the Iran border. The port, therefore, gives the US a near-sea access point to the Arabian Sea, enabling influence over maritime routes, and indirectly constraining China’s ambitions under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Thus, the port would not serve as an economic lever but could be dual-use: infrastructure, trade, logistics, even strategic monitoring.
Countering Russia, China, and Iran: The Triangular Chess Game
China is perhaps the chief target. Under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has invested heavily in Pakistan’s infrastructure (especially Gwadar), in Central Asia, and in expanding its reach into neighbouring Afghanistan. A US return to Bagram or a presence via Pasni would undercut China’s influence: adding alternatives to Chinese-backed ports, increasing US leverage in mineral supply chains, and complicating China’s plans for strategic depth, especially in the Arabian Sea.
Russia has for years sought to reestablish itself in South Asia by working with the Taliban, promoting multilateral formats (e.g. the Moscow Format on Afghanistan), emphasizing regional security cooperation, and warning consistently against foreign military bases in neighbouring states. Moscow would see a US return to Bagram—if realized—as a direct challenge not only to its standing in South Asia but also in Central Asia. Let us not forget that the US under President Trump has also been making moves to re-enter the Central Asian geopolitics.
Iran has its own stakes. Bordering Pakistan and Afghanistan, with historical ties to Shia groups, the Taliban (Sunni), and with interest in trade routes that bypass US-and Western-controlled corridors, Tehran will be wary. A US presence at Pasni could enable monitoring of Iranian maritime routes, sea lanes in the Gulf, and what Iran considers its backyard.
Can the US Actually Achieve Its Objectives?
Achieving these objectives will be a lot harder—and costly—than Washington might perceive at this stage. Firstly, Washington’s rhetorical posture around Bagram is strong, but turning rhetoric into control means overcoming Afghan—and Taliban—sovereignty, resistance, and regional opposition. The Taliban have rejected any U.S. return to Bagram outright, insisting on national independence and rejecting foreign military presence. Acquiring the airbase without any significant reciprocal benefits, i.e., unfreezing Afghanistan’s assets, remains unlikely. Unless the US can make a major change in its post-2021 policy towards Afghanistan and the Taliban, the possibility of the US regaining the base remains slim. Yet, reestablishing a military footprint in the region, which is still affected by Islamist militancy of groups like the IS-K, could invite a lot of backlashes in the domestic political arena for the Trump administration.
Secondly, the Pasni port proposal gives more realistic ground for US influence, but its actual execution depends on stability, funding, and Pakistani buy-in. For instance, Islamabad’s offer notwithstanding, Pakistan cannot realistically alienate China, given China’s economic and military footprint in Pakistan, without serious repercussions (investment loss and political pressure).
Thirdly, Russia, China, and Iran are not passive. China will likely push back diplomatically, economically, including by trying to build deeper relations with Pakistan’s military in response. Russia will double down on its formats with the Taliban, using them to lock out US influence and restrain any US overreach. Iran will seek alliances (perhaps deepen ties with Pakistan or Afghanistan) and leverage trans-border networks.
In the end, therefore, while Washington may continue to rhetorically push for its “second coming” to the region post-2021, there is little denying that the space available for its manoeuvres is extremely limited. Its success will depend less on reclaiming old bases and more on adapting to a multipolar terrain where power is traded, not imposed.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs
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