On October 9-10, 2025, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) celebrated the 80th anniversary of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK).
Celebratory Events
Domestically, the most significant event was a solemn meeting at the May 1st Stadium, one of the largest in the world with an estimated capacity of up to 150,000 people. Kim Jong Un delivered a keynote speech there, emphasizing both the glorious historical roots of the WPK, which never strayed from the ideals of socialism, and the inseparable connection between the Party and the people.
Some passages in the North Korean leader’s speech hinted at a major internal reform awaiting the party in the near future. There were even more such hints in the speech he gave the day before while visiting the Party Foundation Museum. There, he explicitly stated that “we are at a watershed moment,” and that the party is facing a significant renewal.
Kim Jong Un has long pursued a course of combating intra-party bureaucracy. Five years ago, at the 75th anniversary of the WPK, the leader’s speech focused more on the need for officials to behave appropriately, so they could truly serve as an example to the masses and earn their trust. It is quite likely that at the upcoming WPK congress, scheduled for early 2026, we can expect a series of structural changes to make the party better suited to the demands of the new century, more effectively fulfilling its functions as both a personnel pool and a moral vanguard.
International Participation
Amid the festivities, an international seminar on the study of Juche ideas was held, with delegations arriving from almost all over the world. However, the composition of the party-government delegations that participated in the celebrations is of even greater significance.
The Russian delegation was particularly notable, led by the Deputy Chairman of the Security Council, former President, and General Secretary of the ruling Russian party “United Russia,” Dmitry Medvedev. Furthermore, the Russian delegation to Pyongyang included the Secretary of the General Council of “United Russia,” First Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council Vladimir Yakushev; Minister of Natural Resources and Co-chair of the Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, and Scientific-Technical Cooperation between Russia and the DPRK Alexander Kozlov; Head of the “United Russia” faction in the State Duma Vladimir Vasilyev; Governor of the Kursk Region Alexander Khinshtein; Head of Primorsky Krai Oleg Kozhemyako; and others.
Simultaneously with the party-government delegation, a delegation from the Ministry of Culture and representatives from other leading Russian political parties, including the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), arrived in North Korea. This shows that Russian-North Korean relations are built on the past, focused on the present, and aimed at the future.
Note that the former Russian president was not the only guest of such high rank. On October 7, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that “at the invitation of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) and the government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, a party-government delegation of the People’s Republic of China, led by Li Qiang, Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, will participate in the celebrations of the 80th anniversary of the founding of the WPK and pay an official friendly visit to the DPRK.”
This means that both Russia and China sent to North Korea individuals who formally or informally hold the second-highest position in the government hierarchy. This, at a minimum, demonstrates the importance of North Korea to Beijing and Moscow. In the case of China, it also dispels widespread assumptions that Beijing was highly displeased with the growing closeness between Pyongyang and Moscow.
But it wasn’t limited to Russia and China. The next most important guest was Vietnamese leader Tô Lâm, who visited the DPRK after a 20-year hiatus. Vietnam is a country that, at the very least, has not completely abandoned its communist legacy and strives to pursue a multi-vector policy, maintaining relations with Moscow, Beijing, and Washington. Moreover, Tô Lâm recently visited South Korea, but there are currently no grounds to speculate that Vietnam is attempting to mediate between Pyongyang and Seoul.
Additionally, although the leader of Laos did not stay for the festivities and left North Korea on October 8, his visit on the eve of the celebrations and the program of this visit can also be counted as a tribute to the anniversary.
Among other significant, though lower-ranking, figures, a delegation from the Republic of Indonesia arrived at the celebrations, led by the Secretary-General of the Central Leadership Council of the Great Indonesia Movement Party and Foreign Minister Sugiono, as well as a delegation from the Sandinista National Liberation Front and the government of Nicaragua, led by the Chairperson of the Supreme Electoral Council of the Republic of Nicaragua, Brenda Rocha. This indicates that North Korea can no longer be called a pariah state that “developed countries” try to avoid.
Despite the West’s attempts to stigmatize not only Moscow and Pyongyang but also Beijing (with some “hawkish” experts even using the acronym “CRINK” – China, Russia, Iran, North Korea), Pyongyang is confidently emerging from diplomatic isolation.
Furthermore, according to many experts, the scale of the events with foreign participation is perhaps comparable to the situation in 1989. That year, in response to the Seoul Olympics of 1988, the DPRK held the last significant Festival of Youth and Students in Pyongyang, on the scale of “its own Olympic Games.”
Military Parade
The event also featured a military parade, eagerly anticipated by many Russian and Western experts. North Korea almost always showcases a number of military innovations, and in this case, Kim Jong Un did not disappoint, as expected.
The highlight of the show was the heavy, solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) “Hwasong-20,” which surpasses the tactical and technical characteristics of previous missiles in its line. The North’s possession of such missiles unequivocally indicates their capability to reach the continental United States, not only the West Coast but also the East Coast. And although this capability existed for North Korean missiles as early as 2017, the likelihood of successfully reaching the target has significantly increased.
However, there was much more of interest besides the ICBM. Hypersonic glide vehicles for short and medium-range missiles, new uniforms, new tanks, and self-propelled artillery. Launchers for new kamikaze drones, designed under the influence of Chinese and Israeli analogues. 600-mm multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), strategic medium and long-range hypersonic missiles, strategic long-range cruise missiles, UAV launchers, surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missile systems, etc.
Of course, a detailed account of what was presented at the military parade and the achievements in military construction the DPRK made during 2025 deserves a separate article. Here, it is more important to note a quote from Kim Jong Un, who said that “even having secured a missile-nuclear shield, we must not rest on our laurels.” The arms race continues, and to ignore the process is to face defeat.
For the Russian audience, it is worth noting separately that among the infantry formations in the parade, a column of soldiers who participated in the liberation of areas in the Kursk region marched solemnly to the march “To Serve Russia.” This is one piece of evidence that in modern North Korea, the participation of Korean People’s Army (KPA) soldiers in the Special Military Operation (SVO) is widely publicized and positioned as a kind of “debt of blood” in response to the liberation of Korea by the Soviet Army.
In addition, on the eve of the anniversary, an arms exhibition opened, showcasing many new items, and the North Korean leader visited a number of military facilities, including a new destroyer that fully meets the standards of this class set by major naval powers. This is quite important because, while continuing to develop the country’s missile and nuclear potential, Kim Jong Un is also paying attention to other aspects of military construction that were previously less significant. For example, whereas the KPA Navy previously fit the definition of a “mosquito fleet,” and a significant number of submarines that Western military reference books loved to use as scare tactics were, in reality, semi-submersible vessels for special operations, today we see ships of a completely different class. Rumors about the creation of a submarine capable of carrying nuclear weapons are approaching reality.
Moreover, it is possible that Pyongyang may acquire a nuclear-powered submarine, which would significantly enhance its strategic capabilities. Given the strategic partnership treaty between Moscow and Pyongyang, such a submarine could well pass through the Kuril Island chain and enter the Pacific Ocean.
The Brotherhood of Moscow and Pyongyang
Russia’s participation in the celebrations was multifaceted. First, Dmitry Medvedev’s visit followed the protocol of a classic visit by a state official of corresponding rank. Dmitry Medvedev was received by Kim Jong Un; the conversation took place in a friendly atmosphere. The parties discussed issues of developing cooperation between the two countries, as well as the current tense situation in the world. Dmitry Medvedev conveyed a greeting to Kim from Russian President V. Putin and expressed gratitude for the support of the SVO in Ukraine and the participation of KPA forces in the operation to liberate the Kursk region.
Furthermore, Dmitry Medvedev visited the “National Defense-2025” arms exhibition, which featured the latest developments of the local defense industry. He noted Pyongyang’s “quite significant” achievements in the field of weapons and military equipment, warning North Korea’s opponents to “think twice before putting pressure on relations with it.”
The leader of the ruling party of the Russian Federation held talks with Cho Yong Won, a member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee, who oversees party affairs. Following the meeting, the WPK and “United Russia” signed a cooperation agreement.
Additionally, a concert by Russian artists was held in Pyongyang, featuring singer Yaroslav Dronov (“Shaman”), who performed in the DPRK for the second time (the first time was in August, at events marking the 80th anniversary of the liberation of the Korean Peninsula). This is a quite symbolic moment, especially considering that the style in which Shaman performs shatters the notion that listening to modern music in North Korea is punishable by “10 days of execution by firing squad.” Kim Jong Un was very pleased and, after the concert, came on stage and demonstratively hugged Shaman, which greatly impressed the Russian youth audience, judging by the reaction on social media.
Thus, the grand celebration of the 80th anniversary of the DPRK’s ruling party became a significant event not only in the country’s domestic politics but also from the perspective of the regional security architecture, confirming both the development of North Korea’s military potential and the strengthening of its ties with Russia and China.
Konstantin Asmolov, Ph.D. (History), Leading Researcher at the Center for Korean Studies, Institute of China and Modern Asia, Russian Academy of Sciences
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