The process of India’s maneuvering on the international stage, previously discussed in NVO, was marked in the second half of August by several notable events.
As for the main casualties of these U.S. policy changes, they turned out to be countries that, until recently, were among Washington’s key political and economic partners — a group that in recent years included India. It is hardly surprising that its leadership is now seeking alternatives to its previous strategy of rapprochement with Washington.
Attempts to Resolve Issues in Relations with China
It should be noted once again that the overall picture of relations between these two Asian giants is extremely complex and by no means limited to the obvious mutual territorial claims. The territorial issue itself largely took shape half a century before the formation of today’s PRC and the Republic of India. It was only aggravated by a series of border incidents between these two countries, the latest of which, in the summer of 2020, caused a sharp deterioration in bilateral relations. Although subsequent measures helped reduce this local tension, the broader problem of the absence of a mutually recognized border between the two states persists.
Negotiations on resolving this issue have been taking place at various levels since the mid-1950s. It was also a central topic during the visit to India of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on August 18–20. This visit continued a series of bilateral contacts in recent years, among which a milestone event was the direct meeting between the leaders of the two countries, Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi, held in October 2024 in Kazan on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit.
Two months later, the generalized “border issue” was discussed by the same Wang Yi with India’s National Security Advisor Ajit Doval during his visit to Beijing. Both continued the discussion during Wang Yi’s current visit to New Delhi. The Chinese Foreign Minister also held talks with his Indian counterpart S. Jaishankar and was received by Prime Minister N. Modi. The outcomes of all these meetings were described in positive and general terms by Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning.
Evidence that the issues in Sino-Indian relations are not confined to their “territorial-border” component, but are instead of a complex nature, can be seen in certain aspects of Wang Yi’s visits to Islamabad and Kabul immediately following his trip to New Delhi.
Wang Yi in Pakistan and Afghanistan
In Islamabad, Wang Yi, together with his Pakistani counterpart I. Dar, took part in the sixth Strategic Dialogue at the level of foreign ministers of the two countries, a meeting that has been held annually in recent years. It should be noted that the two had met as recently as the end of May, when I. Dar visited Beijing. That visit took place two weeks after the conclusion of a brief but intense Indo-Pakistani armed conflict, during which, as Islamabad claims, its Air Force achieved success — a success in which Chinese-supplied fighter jets, air-to-air missiles, and command systems played a significant role.
Meanwhile, the end of that conflict, according to Pakistan’s leadership, was linked to the intervention of U.S. President D. Trump. Moreover, there has been heightened activity by members of Sh. Sharif’s government, and by Sharif himself, aimed at partially restoring relations with the United States, which during the Cold War were almost allied in character. This could not fail to alert Beijing, which was receiving assurances of Pakistan’s unwavering commitment to maintaining and strengthening the “ironclad” nature of bilateral relations. This long-established formula was reiterated by both I. Dar and Prime Minister Sh. Sharif at meetings with Wang Yi in Islamabad.
In a trilateral format, I. Dar and Wang Yi met again in Kabul, where they were received by Afghan counterpart A. H. Muttaqi and Prime Minister M. H. Akhund. It should be noted that China’s heightened interest in developing relations with Afghanistan fits into the broader policy of increasing its presence in Central Asia, a region once again becoming a crossroads for the complex processes unfolding across the continent today.
As for Pakistan, the problematic nature of its relations with fellow Muslim Afghanistan is multifaceted, but mainly rooted in the fact that more than a century ago, a British Indian administrator named Durand literally divided a region inhabited for millennia by Pashtun tribes. The Pashtuns, now split between two independent states, naturally refuse to accept all the negative consequences of this act.
It is these strained relations with Pakistan that explain the seemingly strange preference that Kabul has always given to “pagan” India — under all ruling regimes in Kabul, whether “secular” or under the current “clerical” government. Nothing can be done — Realpolitik operates everywhere and regardless of religion. Incidentally, in India, the news that Kabul had discussed the possible prospect of Afghanistan joining the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project, implemented since the mid-2010s, was received with a certain degree of apprehension.
Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar Visits Russia
The visit to Russia by Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar on August 20–21, as well as the results of his talks with Russian counterpart S. V. Lavrov, Deputy Prime Minister D. V. Manturov, and President V. V. Putin, was a highly significant event not only in the context of bilateral relations but also in the broader “Great Global Game.” Commentators on the motives behind this event often focus on the above-mentioned shifts in U.S. foreign policy, which, as we have noted, are clearly counterproductive for India. The current U.S. president, however, seems hardly concerned with assessments of the consequences of his “tremendously magnificent” moves on the world stage.
Meanwhile, those hit by his “tariff war” are beginning to search for alternative options for their positioning at the global game table, as well as for more reliable partners seated at it. For New Delhi, Russia has always been such a partner. In the author’s view, this — and not Russian oil and weapons — was the main reason for Jaishankar’s current visit to Moscow. The suppliers of both these commodities, perhaps at higher prices, could well be other countries.
Quite modern weaponry, for example, can be supplied by Japan, relations with which over the past decade have developed very positively for New Delhi. At the end of August, on his way to the SCO Summit in Tianjin, China, Prime Minister N. Modi plans to visit Tokyo. This will already be his eighth trip to Japan during his tenure in the current office — though he had visited before as well.
Both these significant events in the continuing process of India’s maneuvering on the international stage will require separate commentary.
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on issues of the Asia-Pacific region
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