Recently, a number of noteworthy developments have taken place in the relations between Japan and Australia, both significant players in the unfolding game within the Indo-Pacific region.
Bilateral cooperation in defense only grew stronger under the Labor government led by Anthony Albanese, which replaced the conservatives in May 2022, as well as under the succession of Japanese prime ministers appearing like a kaleidoscope. Among the concrete manifestations of this ongoing process, let us focus here on the most recent ones.
Japan to Modernize Australia’s Frigate Fleet
Foremost among these is the early August announcement by Canberra that Japan has been awarded the contract to modernize the Royal Australian Navy’s frigate fleet. On the surface, this decision was the result of an international tender announced by the Australian Ministry of Defence at the start of 2024, in which the two main contenders by November of that year were companies from Japan and Germany: Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Blohm + Voss. In other words, all the usual “free-market courtesies” were observed. And yet, for the reasons mentioned above, the outcome of this decision was hardly in doubt from the start.
Notably, the Blohm + Voss proposal was based on the MEKO 200-class frigate, itself due for replacement, developed by the same German company in the mid-1980s for the German Navy as well as for several other countries. Those intended for Australia’s Navy were built primarily in Australian shipyards under the name ANZAC. In total, 10 ANZAC frigates were built between 1993 and 2006, eight of which joined the Royal Australian Navy, while two were purchased by New Zealand. In other words, these are by no means obsolete ships. Moreover, their original design allowed for modernization. It is also worth noting that the implementation of the German project would have cost Canberra 20% less than adopting the “Japanese” option.
However, one of the key advantages of the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries proposal for the Mogami-class frigate was the higher level of automation in the operation of its main systems. This will make it possible to halve the crew size compared to the Blohm + Voss design, thereby reducing operating costs throughout the frigates’ service life. According to Australia’s Minister for Defence Industry, P. Conroy, the overall financial outlay for the program will ultimately be lower under the MHI option. It is also noted that this will ease the acute personnel shortage facing the Royal Australian Navy. As in most Western countries, Australian youth are hardly eager to enlist in the armed forces.
Even so, in the case of financially and economically prosperous Australia, the “cost-effectiveness” factor likely played only a minor role, giving way instead to the imperatives of “big politics.” It appears that the prefix “quasi,” which in recent years has often accompanied the description of Japan-Australia relations as “allied,” may soon prove unnecessary.
This seems to have been the decisive factor in choosing the Japanese company to execute one of the largest defense programs, estimated at 10 billion Australian dollars (6.5 billion USD). A total of 11 Mogami-class frigates will be ordered, with the first three to be built in Japan and the remaining eight in Australia. They will begin entering service after Japan’s own Navy completes its Mogami-class upgrade program, expected by the end of this decade.
Let us again highlight another extremely significant consequence of MHI’s success in this tender: the determined entry of Japan’s defense industry into the international arms market, which it had effectively closed to itself throughout the postwar period. This trend first emerged somewhat earlier, with the agreement to sell decommissioned Abukuma-class escort destroyers from Japan’s Navy to the Philippines. These vessels are being replaced in Japan by Mogami-class frigates, which have also attracted interest from other countries, such as India and Indonesia.
Australia Hosts Another Round of Talisman Sabre International Exercises
Another important symbol of the deepening quasi-alliance between Japan and Australia was the large-scale participation of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) in the latest Talisman Sabre military exercises. Held biennially since 2005, these exercises take place on Australian territory, in adjacent maritime zones, and in the territories of some neighboring countries. Initially a bilateral U.S.-Australia format, since 2015 they have gradually taken on an international character, expanding in scale and in the number and level of participating countries.
The most recent Talisman Sabre 25 exercises, held from mid-July to early August this year, involved 19 countries, compared to 13 in the previous edition. One notable trend is the increasing participation of Europeans, which first became evident two years ago. Particularly striking this time was the presence of the United Kingdom, which dispatched a strike group led by the aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales to Australian waters. While aboard the carrier, UK Defence Secretary J. Heappey made provocative statements regarding China, especially on the Taiwan issue.
As for Japan, it first joined Talisman Sabre in 2015, and then only in a symbolic capacity. In the most recent drills, as in the previous edition, Japan’s presence was substantial, with units from all three main branches of the JSDF. Another remarkable event followed immediately after Talisman Sabre 25: two Japanese Navy ships visited New Zealand, marking the first such visit in 90 years. It also served as further evidence of New Zealand’s reemergence from the foreign-policy hibernation of the preceding decades, a trend first observed in 2023.
Summing up the results of Talisman Sabre 25, Admiral S. Paparo, head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, declared that the drills were “a testament to our readiness to respond to potential challenges with unified goals and actions.”
Finally, let us underline several key points concerning the evolving political game in the Indo-Pacific region. First, the strengthening of the quasi-alliance between its two major players — Japan and Australia — fits within the U.S. strategy of building a military-political web aimed at its chief geopolitical rival, China. However, both Tokyo and Canberra are increasingly signaling that their positions on the international stage are guided above all by their own national interests. These undoubtedly include preserving the ability to maintain constructive relations with Beijing. Washington, it should be added, intends to keep this option open for itself as well.
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the Asia-Pacific region
Follow new articles on our Telegram channel
