The declared purpose of the visit of Philippine President F. Marcos Jr. to the United States, which took place from July 20 to 22, was to resolve the “tariff issue” in bilateral relations.
The United States remains the Philippines’ principal military-political partner. Since 1951, the two countries have been bound by the Mutual Defense Treaty, which remains in effect despite the complications in bilateral relations during the presidency of Rodrigo Duterte, the predecessor of F. Marcos Jr. Under the latter, these allied ties have only strengthened. It should also be noted that Washington and Manila are indirectly connected through the status of “Major Non-NATO Ally,” which the Philippines shares with a number of other states.
Some outcomes of F. Marcos Jr.’s visit to the United States
It is precisely the factor of formally documented alliance relations that gives the Philippines particular importance for Washington among the countries of Southeast Asia. The costs to the United States in the trade sphere of these relations are negligible compared to those in trade not only with the world’s leading economies but also with some other Southeast Asian states. In 2024, the volume of U.S.-Philippine trade stood at $24 billion, with a negative balance for the United States of about $5 billion (which, however, had grown by 22% compared to the previous year). By contrast, in trade with neighboring Indonesia, the United States annually incurs losses of $30 billion. Vietnam plays a trade game with the United States that is essentially “one-sided,” with the staggering score of $137 to $14 (in billions of dollars).
Be that as it may, the Philippines became the fifth country with which D. Trump managed to conclude a “deal” in the trade and economic sphere of bilateral relations. In this connection, F. Marcos Jr.’s counterpart allowed himself to announce a “concession” (bordering on the sarcastic) by lowering the initially declared tariff barrier on imports from the Philippines from 20% to 19%. Meanwhile, U.S. exports to that country would not be subject to any duties at all. It is worth noting that D. Trump himself called the visit “magnificent.” Yet, as we see, not without a “light flick on the nose” of the guest — namely, the president of a country important to the United States. Judging by responses within Philippine public circles, there is disappointment with the rigidity of the key ally’s position in what would appear to be a rather secondary sphere of bilateral relations.
Still, everyone has their little weaknesses, including the current U.S. president. Why not allow oneself a small pleasure, even if modest, in resolving an issue whose “price” in the broader relationship with the Philippines is negligible? In real life — especially for responsible statesmen — there are so few joys.
The “price” mentioned above, to reiterate, lies almost entirely in other aspects of Washington’s relations with Manila. These were the subjects of discussion between the President of the Philippines and the current heads of the U.S. defense and foreign policy departments, namely P. Hegseth and M. Rubio. Notably, F. Marcos Jr. had already spoken with the former four months earlier, when the U.S. Secretary of Defense visited the Philippines — his first foreign trip in that capacity.
During the current meeting, P. Hegseth did not lag behind his chief in the vividness of his expressions describing the bilateral relations within his purview. In particular, he mentioned the fact that one month after his visit to the Philippines, another joint military exercise, “Balikatan,” had been held.
In the U.S. State Department’s statement regarding M. Rubio’s meeting with F. Marcos Jr., particular attention was drawn to the mention of the project to create the so-called “Luzon Economic Corridor,” which had previously been discussed in the NWO. In reality, this project extends far beyond “purely economic” boundaries and touches on a number of important political issues in the Southeast Asian subregion, including that of Taiwan.
The situation in the Southeast Asian subregion remains uncertain
The very fact and the main results of the Philippine president’s visit to the United States fit into the general trend of Washington’s comprehensive strengthening — especially in military-political aspects — of its position in Southeast Asia. That is to say, in a subregion located practically on the other side of the globe from the United States. Here, a mass of “specifically local” problems is accumulating, which, however, serve Washington more as a pretext for implementing its “peace through strength” strategy. This strategy, of course, will not be accepted by its main opponent — Beijing.
Meanwhile, there is growing evidence of the negative trend mentioned above. In particular, a few days before F. Marcos Jr.’s departure for Washington, there was a report of the U.S. Department of Defense’s intention to build two facilities on Palawan Island, located in the South China Sea and belonging to the Philippines. These facilities are officially intended for the “repair and maintenance” of Philippine naval vessels participating in almost continuous confrontations in the area with Chinese coast guard ships.
It is also worth noting the increasingly visible maneuvering of participants in the “China–Japan–Europe” triangle, observed on the international stage in general and in Southeast Asia in particular. For various reasons, this has been periodically discussed in the NWO, but it requires another separate commentary. The weight of this topic in global politics will only grow over time, as it is a source of various factors of uncertainty in world affairs.
Nothing is “definitively” settled in the relationship between the two leading world powers either. There is no shortage of evidence for this. Among the more recent is the fact of the meeting between the foreign ministers of the United States and China, which, for the first time, took place in the format of direct contact. Ten days before the Philippine president’s visit, it was held in the Malaysian capital Kuala Lumpur on the sidelines of an ASEAN event. Both sides described the negotiations as “positive, pragmatic, and constructive.” They stressed the need to maintain various levels of bilateral contacts in order to “develop bilateral ties, resolve differences, and identify areas for expanded cooperation.”
These intentions were confirmed by another round of negotiations on the same “tariff issue” between authorized representatives of both countries, S. Bessent and He Lifeng, which took place in Stockholm at the end of July. A visit by D. Trump to Beijing could become an extremely important event in the relationship between the two leading world powers. Yet this matter, too, remains in a state of uncertainty.
Nevertheless, all of the above makes it possible to state that despite the worrisome trends in the “Great Game” unfolding in today’s global political arena in general and in the Southeast Asian subregion in particular, its overall picture remains in the process of formation. In other words, it does not appear hopeless, as it continues to be filled with various factors of uncertainty.
This means that the dream of those paranoiacs who intend to solve almost all of the world’s accumulated problems through the use of “nuclear weapons” is, thank God, still a long way off. Likewise, the escalation of various local conflicts into another global conflagration is also distant. This applies, in particular, to the conflict in Ukraine, which — despite attempts from various (and seemingly opposing) sides to give it global significance — remains within the boundaries of a local and, in general, secondary conflict.
As for the one and only planet on which humanity can exist, each of its current inhabitants must do everything possible to ensure that “that day” of global nuclear apocalypse in no case “draws nearer.”
Vladimir Terehov, PhD in Engineering, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region
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