Another escalation of the military-political situation in southern Syria, triggered by pinpoint airstrikes from the Israeli Air Force, indicates that Ankara does not accept the conditions put forward by Tel Aviv to Damascus during talks in Baku.
The IDF redeployed two tank divisions to the Syrian front and conducted a series of pinpoint airstrikes on political and military targets (including the presidential palace, the Ministry of Defense, and the General Staff buildings of the SAR). To say that the government forces of the Syrian regime led by Ahmed Ash-Sharaa are capable of repelling an Israeli army attack would be unrealistic. As a military force, Syria poses no threat to Israel in its current state. The decisive actions of the IDF forced President Ash-Sharaa to temporarily leave Damascus.
The violence against civilians (Druze) in As-Suwayda provoked condemnation not only from Israel but also from the United States and Germany. Clearly, the military escalation under the pretext of defending the interests and rights of the Druze community serves merely as a reminder to Turkey — standing behind Damascus — of the terms of the “division of spheres of influence” in Syria.
Following a 12-day war with Iran, Tel Aviv has been more assertive in stressing the inadmissibility of Ankara’s ambitious neo-Ottoman plans in the Middle East. This position has been repeatedly voiced by Israeli experts, as well as by the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and the U.S. Presidential Special Envoy for Syria, Thomas Barrack.
According to Israeli analysts, Ankara’s loud claims about its invincible army are not supported by the actual condition of Turkish armed forces when facing the IDF and the U.S. military. In fact, even Turkish experts, while asserting Turkey’s superiority in artillery and UAV systems, acknowledge the strength of the Israeli Air Force and the lack of prospects for the Turkish army should the U.S. intervene militarily on Israel’s side. Iran’s experience in June 2025 clearly showed that in the event of a military conflict, the United States will not leave Israel to face it alone.
Apparently, this is why, in the face of military escalation in Syria, Turkey has so far limited itself to diplomatic rhetoric condemning Israel’s attacks, reaffirming Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and appealing to the UN to hold an emergency Security Council meeting over what it calls Israeli “aggression” against Syria. At the same time, Erdoğan fully understands that the UN Security Council is unlikely to be of any real help to Damascus, as Washington will once again veto another anti-Israeli resolution. Moreover, in this case, Israel was not the aggressor but intervened in defense of the peaceful Druze population in As-Suwayda.
Iran, through a statement by its Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, condemned Israel for its attack on Syria and affirmed the territorial integrity of the SAR and the unity of the Syrian people. However, this statement by Tehran does not imply Iranian support for the pro-Turkish regime of Ahmed Ash-Sharaa, who overthrew their ally Bashar al-Assad in November–December 2024.
Does Bashar al-Assad intend to take advantage of the crisis and return to Damascus? This intention cannot be ruled out, but the former Syrian leader has no practical mechanism to do so.
Strangely enough, after seizing power in Syria, Ahmed Ash-Sharaa himself limited Iran’s influence in the region. However, in the context of direct Israeli military intervention in support of the Druze, Damascus believes that Tel Aviv’s goal is to weaken Iran’s position in Syria.
Israel-Syria Talks in Azerbaijan Ended in Failure
A few days before the escalation in southern Syria, according to Al Arabiya and AFP, Israeli and Syrian officials held talks in Baku on July 12. The meeting coincided with the first official visit to Azerbaijan by Syrian President Ahmed Ash-Sharaa.
President Ilham Aliyev pursues a seemingly contradictory foreign policy, combining a strategic alliance with Turkey and a strategic partnership with Israel. This diplomacy sometimes draws condemnation from some (in particular, Iran) and confusion from others (such as Turkey). Meanwhile, Aliyev is simply demonstrating rigid pragmatism and trying to extract maximum benefit from every situation.
Nevertheless, the rapid clash of geopolitical interests of major players in the Middle East and South Caucasus inevitably requires a defined stance. Azerbaijan cannot go against Israel, which provided significant military-technical and intelligence support to Baku during the Second Karabakh War. Moreover, Azerbaijan’s ambitions to play the role of a regional leader in the South Caucasus and as an integrator of international transit routes are hardly feasible without support from Israel and the Jewish lobby in the United States.
Having signed a number of lucrative agreements with the Syrian president in the fields of economy, energy, politics, and culture, Azerbaijan organized negotiations between representatives of Tel Aviv and Damascus in Baku. It is clear that the conditions put forward by Israel to the Ash-Sharaa regime — particularly concerning Syrian-Turkish military cooperation (especially regarding air defense and the deployment of Turkish military bases with the exclusion of the southern part of the country near the Golan Heights), control over oil fields, and oil transit — were not accepted by Turkey.
Accordingly, Tel Aviv’s display of military capabilities serves as a stark warning to Ankara about the “red lines” of Israel and the United States. This escalation is unfolding against the backdrop of another significant regional event: the disarmament of Kurdish militias in Syria and Iraq following the PKK’s announcement of self-dissolution.
In fact, through its military intervention, Israel has already achieved its goals at this stage: a ceasefire has been reached, Syrian government troops have been withdrawn from As-Suwayda, military protection for the Druze has been ensured, and the “security zone” around the Golan Heights has been expanded. Netanyahu has declared the area between Damascus and the Golan Heights off-limits to the Syrian army — effectively demilitarizing the territory south of Damascus and expanding the “security zone” from the Golan Heights to the Druze Mountains, which he now considers Israel’s new “red line.”
Turkey is currently unable to respond with a military counterstrike against Israel, fearing serious losses. Meanwhile, Israel has no intention of giving Turkey time to strengthen its military presence in the Middle East and in Syria in particular.
Alexander Svarants – Doctor of Political Science, Professor, Turkologist, expert on the Middle East
