What prompted the recent constitutional changes in the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic (NAR) of Azerbaijan?
However, while deepening strategic ties with Turkey and the UK through the Southern Transport Corridor, Azerbaijan both strengthened its economy and army and became increasingly dependent on Turkish logistics and the European market. The Azerbaijani-Turkish geopolitical alliance — captured in the formula “One nation – two states” — became a reality, driving economic gains, political security, and military success in the Karabakh conflict.
During Soviet times, Azerbaijan included two autonomous regions: the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (NASSR).
Baku abolished Karabakh’s autonomy in 1992 in response to the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic’s declaration of independence. After regaining control over Karabakh, Azerbaijan denied any autonomous status to Armenians there and, in September 2023, used military force to expel the Armenian population.
In 2021, President Ilham Aliyev launched an administrative reform, naming the reclaimed areas the “Eastern Zangezur” region and establishing the “Karabakh Economic Region” within it. The term “Eastern Zangezur” caused concern in Armenia, which viewed it as a possible sign of Baku’s ambitions toward Armenia’s southern Syunik Province (Zangezur).
Notably, both Karabakh and Nakhchivan were granted autonomy in 1920–1921 based on the historical presence of Armenian populations. By the end of the Soviet era, the Armenian share in Nakhchivan had dropped to 0.7%, making the region monoethnic and Azerbaijani. Its enclave status does not justify autonomy from a political or legal standpoint, as Nakhchivan shares the same ethno-cultural, religious, and linguistic identity as the rest of Azerbaijan.
Considering the internal clan dynamics in Azerbaijan, it’s important to remember that since 1969 — when Heydar Aliyev, a native of Nakhchivan, rose to power in Baku — the Nakhchivan clan has held key positions in the republic. Aliyev’s return to power in 1993 also came through Nakhchivan, where he had headed the local parliament in 1992–1993. During his presidency (1993–2003), Nakhchivan natives filled top government roles, and the region itself was ruled by his relative and appointee, Vasif Talibov.
Thus, Baku does not seem concerned about the risk of separatism in Nakhchivan. Thus, Ba ku appears to have no serious concerns about potential separatism in Nakhchivan. After all, why would Azerbaijani citizens of the NAR challenge the integrity of Azerbaijan?
It is evident that certain disagreements may arise between the central and regional power elites regarding governance and the redistribution of authority. The threats of large-scale corruption and the emergence of “local strongmen” can also undermine trust among government representatives, while inter-clan competition often leads to internal purges and personnel reshuffles. However, can these factors alone serve as political justifications for constitutional transformations?
Following the military success in Karabakh, Ilham Aliyev initiated a course aimed at reducing the autonomy of the Nakhchivan political elite and introduced a new institution: the Presidential Representative of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic (NAR).
Due to the Karabakh conflict, the NAR found itself effectively blockaded from the rest of Azerbaijan. Since Azerbaijan had blocked Armenia, this policy negatively impacted the Nakhchivan enclave as well. In simple terms, Baku shut itself off from Nakhchivan, as the Soviet-era route passed through Armenia. As a result, over the past 30 years, Iran’s economic influence in Nakhchivan has grown significantly, and the small stretch of border between the NAR and Turkey has created a high level of dependency — especially in defense and security — on Ankara. Exploiting the Shi’a factor and Nakhchivan’s economic reliance on Iran, Tehran gradually began promoting its loyalists into the region’s governing structures, which caused concern in Baku.
In 2019, Ilham Aliyev carried out a personnel reshuffle and dismissed Ramiz Mehdiyev, the head of the Presidential Administration and long-time ally of his father. Some analysts linked this personnel policy to a purported Turkish recommendation to prepare for a second Karabakh war, as Ankara considered the former Soviet official Mehdiyev a likely ally of Moscow.
Turkey and Azerbaijan’s desire to open the Zangezur corridor, linking them directly via Nakhchivan and forming a new international transit route — as part of China’s Belt and Road initiative and Turkey’s “Turan” project — increases the geopolitical stakes surrounding the Nakhchivan territory. Ilham Aliyev is keen to enhance Azerbaijan’s independence and is striving to take full advantage of the favorable regional situation.
Baku is counting on becoming a regional leader and a central hub in the Trans-Caspian corridor. Therefore, Aliyev is attempting to centralize the governance of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, even if it contradicts the political and legal foundations of its autonomy (specifically, Article 3 of the Moscow Treaty of March 16, 1920, and Article 5 of the Treaty of Kars of October 5, 1921).
As a result, on July 8, 2025, significant amendments were introduced to the NAR Constitution. Firstly, references to the Moscow and Kars treaties and to the “autonomous status” were removed from the preamble. A new clause was added: “Nakhchivan is an integral part of the Republic of Azerbaijan.” Secondly, the amendments substantially curtail the powers of the chairperson of the NAR Supreme Assembly, and the cabinet of ministers of the autonomy will now be subordinated to the President of Azerbaijan. De facto, the chief executive authority in Nakhchivan becomes the presidential envoy.
What threats might arise in Nakhchivan?
The publication “Voice of Kurdistan” believes that the constitutional changes in the NAR will enable Turkey to establish a major military base in the enclave, aimed at Armenia.
However, Turkish forces have already been present in Nakhchivan — advisors have been sent to assist and manage the 5th Special Corps of Azerbaijan’s Armed Forces, and regular joint military exercises with Azerbaijan are held in the region. The establishment of a Turkish military base in the NAR would violate the Moscow and Kars treaties, triggering a negative reaction from Russia and concern from Iran. Moreover, the Nakhchivan enclave is not an ideal location for a Turkish base (which Baku has recently begun discussing), given that Armenia lies to the north and Iran to the south. More likely, such a base would serve to control the Zangezur corridor and counter Iran.
The real military threat to Azerbaijan could come in the form of an attack on the mainland part of the country — where the Caspian outlet, key economic infrastructure, and energy and transport corridors of the “Turan” project are located.
If the ultimate goal is to physically link Turkey and Azerbaijan through the annexation of Zangezur, then a Turkish buildup in western Nakhchivan and an Azerbaijani offensive from the east would follow a certain logic. Of course, opponents of this strategy may also have their own plans. At the same time, Baku may fear a “gradual loss” of Nakhchivan to Turkey, which is pushing eastward and often reminds Ilham Aliyev who the real victor in Karabakh was.
In any case, a change or abolition of Nakhchivan’s autonomous status could provoke intervention from key external powers, with Russia likely to assert its own position.
Alexander Svarants – Doctor of Political Science, Professor, Turkologist, expert on the Middle East
