At the latest NATO summit, member states pledged to boost their defense spending to at least 5% of GDP—a move widely seen as an effort to placate Donald Trump and stave off his criticisms.
The Fateful Summit
In the latest chapter of NATO’s evolving identity crisis, the alliance’s commitment—hailed by many Western mainstream outlets as a “great victory” for Donald Trump—to raise defense spending to 5% of GDP marks less a show of unity than a concession to a broader geopolitical realignment. While the headlines celebrate a perceived win for Trump and his long-standing demand that European allies must pay their fair share, the deeper implications for the future of transatlantic security—and Europe’s autonomy—are far more sobering.
Spain’s refusal to join the new benchmark is telling. It reflects a deeper unease that many European nations and Canada share but are unwilling, at least publicly, to articulate. Agreeing to this massive increase in military spending is not merely about deterrence. It risks tethering Europe’s long-term defense posture to Washington’s shifting strategic agenda, which is increasingly pivoted toward countering China—an adversary that most NATO countries neither fear, at least in a military sense, nor prioritize as a rival.
For Trump, the agreement is a double win. Domestically, it reinforces his “America First” narrative, proving that his pressure tactics can bend NATO to Washington’s will. Internationally, it significantly liberates US resources to be redirected toward the Indo-Pacific, where the real challenge to American primacy lies. As NATO nations shoulder more of the financial burden of defending the European continent, the US is freed up to concentrate its diplomatic and military capital on containing China’s growing influence in technology, trade, and defense.
This dynamic creates a troubling asymmetry within the alliance. The US is preparing for a future defined by Sino-American competition, while European nations remain primarily concerned with what they perceive to be an immediate threat posed by Russia—especially in the wake of their continuing inability to defeat Russia, both militarily and economically, in Ukraine. The difference in strategic focus risks pulling the alliance in divergent directions, further straining unity.
The symbolic disparity was on full display in the recent Hague Declaration. Consisting of a mere five paragraphs, it felt more like a placeholder than a proclamation. Contrast that with the 2024 Washington Summit statement, which ran to 38 paragraphs and included a dedicated section outlining long-term support for Ukraine. In the Hague Declaration, Ukraine merited just one sentence—an alarming signal, especially as the conflict enters a critical phase and Kyiv’s counter-offensive struggles to regain momentum.
This brevity is not just editorial. It reflects the internal frictions within the alliance—between hawkish Eastern members still rattled by Russian military strength and more cautious Western European states grappling with domestic economic and political pressures. Meanwhile, Washington’s own commitment to NATO is no longer sacrosanct, especially under Trump, who has openly questioned whether the US would defend countries that do not meet their spending obligations. Another sign of the differing priorities of Europe and Canada versus the US was the decision by Pete Hegseth, US Secretary of Defense, to step back from leadership of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, an ad-hoc coalition of states worldwide providing military support to Ukraine. Hegseth also did not attend the group’s pre-summit meeting in June.
Yet, the internal state of affairs notwithstanding, doubling down on defense spending is not inherently bad. The issue is what it represents—and what it displaces. At 5% of GDP, the cost is enormous. For comparison, many NATO members already struggle to meet the existing 2% benchmark. Increasing defense budgets to such a level will almost certainly come at the expense of investments in climate action, public health, education, and social welfare—sectors that citizens across Europe consistently rank as higher priorities.
Furthermore, the logic of deterrence only works if all parties share the same threat perception. Europe’s strategic culture has long differed from America’s. Unlike Washington, most NATO members do not view China as a direct threat. They are concerned with economic dependency and supply chains, not with preparing for war in the South China Sea and/or around Taiwan. Aligning Europe’s defense posture with America’s Pacific tilt risks compromising—something that America does not want to do.
The Future
Where does this situation leave Europe? Now that it is committed to massively increasing its spending within the next few years, and it is increasingly clear that the US is more interested in a different strategic theater against a different rival, can European states take the responsibility of defending the continent without relying on, or waiting for, Washington? This is where Europe’s actual source of worry lies. For the US, now that Europe will spend more on making itself militarily prepared, it can allocate its most advanced weapon systems, fleets, and ships to the Indo-Pacific rather than Europe. But Europe still lacks sufficient internal military capacity to build its defenses. Many European countries will rely on a handful of states—the US mainly—to procure critical defence equipment. This would mean that these states, even after increasing their defense spending, will remain dependent on the supply of weapon systems from the US, which increasingly has different priorities. Washington’s review of the AUKUS pact should be a wakeup call for Europe as well.
To overcome this dilemma, NATO’s European members need a different overall strategy. Now that they are spending more and should have more say in the strategic direction of the alliance, they must pursue peace more than the alliance’s expansion to include Ukraine—something that caused Russia to do its special military operations in Ukraine in the first place. Any commitment by the alliance to not encircle Russia can ensure peace in the continent. It will simultaneously allow NATO’s European members to build their domestic military capacity and reduce overdependence on the US.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs
