The border triangle where the boundaries of Sudan, Egypt, and Libya meet appears, as usual, calm.
A Smoldering Conflict: How the Desert Became a Powder Keg
The border triangle, which also touches northern Chad, is one of the most geopolitically vulnerable areas in the region. This remote desert territory serves as a loophole for smugglers and transnational armed groups. After the fall of Gaddafi’s regime in 2011, the area became a hotbed of lawlessness and a transit point for smuggling weapons, gold, and drugs, as well as for human trafficking. The discovery of gold mines stretching from northern Darfur through Libya and Niger to Mauritania between 2011 and 2014 further intensified conflicts over smuggling routes.
The response to last month’s incident was swift. The next day, the Sudanese army issued a statement accusing Haftar’s forces of collaborating with the RSF in attacking Sudanese military positions, forcing them to evacuate. Meanwhile, on June 11, a militia announced on Telegram that it had taken full control of the area. This confirmed that control of the triangle had shifted to the RSF and its allies—a significant turning point in Sudan’s war.
Haftar’s LNA rejected Sudan’s accusations, calling them an attempt to “confuse and export Sudan’s internal crisis.” Haftar’s command urged the Sudanese army not to drag it into the conflict. It seems Haftar views Sudan not just as a neighbor but as a vulnerable flank to exploit. He sees RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemeti) as a useful ally, especially since his faction controls major gold mines in Darfur and Kordofan, with revenues funding his military operations. As a result, this alliance has turned southern Libya and the border triangle into part of Sudan’s war theater. Libya’s involvement is not ideological or official but driven by military and commercial interests. It also gives Haftar a geopolitical edge—his influence on the Chad-Sudan border strengthens his regional standing.
Egypt in a Bind: Between Two Allies and One Threat
These developments have put Egypt in a difficult position. Cairo maintains close ties with Haftar, whom it sees as a key ally in stabilizing eastern Libya and securing its western border. At the same time, it supports the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) under Abdel Fattah al-Burhan as the legitimate authority and a bulwark against chaos in Sudan. Reports that Haftar-backed forces are aiding the RSF present Egypt with a dilemma.
Securing its southern border with Sudan is a top priority for Egypt’s national security. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has warned that state collapse or the spread of armed factions in Sudan would pose a direct threat to Egypt. Escalation in northern Sudan could trigger refugee flows and the infiltration of armed or terrorist elements. Egypt was alarmed by footage of clashes involving Libyan forces—which it considers a red line—and Sudanese armed groups. Cairo also fears alienating Haftar. Egypt has invested political and military resources in Haftar’s forces to stabilize its western border and contain spillover from Libya.
Analysts suggest Egypt has opted for a pragmatic approach. Publicly, it issued a diplomatic statement calling for “restraint and respect for Sudan’s sovereignty” without directly naming Haftar. Behind the scenes, it is believed to have taken steps to prevent future incidents. Egyptian experts warn that Cairo must act before Hemeti consolidates his position. A prolonged RSF presence could turn the triangle into a forward base or mercenary haven, making it harder to dislodge them.
High-Stakes Diplomacy
These events have triggered intense diplomatic activity. In late June, high-level meetings directly linked to the crisis took place. On June 30, President el-Sisi received Haftar in the coastal city of El Alamein. The Egyptian president affirmed that “stability in Libya is integral to Egypt’s national security.” Though the official statement focused on Libya, analysts believe Sudan dominated closed-door talks.
That same day, al-Burhan unexpectedly flew to Cairo from Spain. He held an urgent meeting with el-Sisi in El Alamein, where they discussed military developments in the “triangle.” El-Sisi reiterated Egypt’s support for Sudan’s unity and readiness to assist its people. Sudanese sources said the talks mainly addressed the “border triangle crisis” and coordination between Cairo and Khartoum.
Haftar and al-Burhan’s simultaneous presence in Egypt was likely no coincidence. Diplomatic sources suggest Cairo sought to arrange a private meeting to ease tensions. However, broader calculations may have prevented direct talks. Still, Egypt’s message was clear: Haftar must tread carefully, and al-Burhan has Cairo’s backing.
Meanwhile, in mid-June, Hemeti issued a statement after his forces seized the triangle and another area, Karb al-Tum, in northern Darfur. He said: “Some parties tried to drive a wedge between me and Cairo—they won’t succeed again.” This was seen as an attempt to court Egypt, signaling he seeks no confrontation.
These events show Egypt walking a diplomatic tightrope. It reassures al-Burhan of Cairo’s support, reminds Haftar of their partnership, and subtly signals Hemeti. Now, Egypt must balance two allies—Haftar in the west and al-Burhan in the south—while preventing their conflict from becoming its own.
Muhammad ibn Faisal al-Rashid, Political Analyst, Middle East Expert
