On June 30 of this year, Wang Yi, member of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee and head of China’s Foreign Ministry, embarked on a week-long tour of Europe — his second visit to the continent this year. During the trip, he took part in the latest “China-EU Strategic Dialogue” and also visited Germany and France.
On the Significance of Europe for China — and Not Only for China
The recent strengthening of this trend is due in part to the “Donald Trump factor,” meaning the radical shifts in U.S. policy that began during his first presidency. This factor has generated a range of uncertainties in the global political arena, pushing all major players to seek “backup options” for their positioning in world affairs.
However, Europe remains an attractive partner in its own right, primarily due to its still-substantial economic potential. This is despite all the upheavals of recent times, in which one can clearly detect the seasoned hand of the same provocateurs who orchestrated the last two great continental wars — and are now openly preparing for a third. The conflict in Ukraine is a direct product of their activity. A crucial stage in this process was the seizure of control over Germany — a key European country — by Donald Trump’s adversaries. Following familiar patterns, a new transcontinental “dividing line” is once again being drawn.
As for the current state of China-Europe relations, let us simply point to the volume of bilateral trade — nearly $750 billion. Yet even within this very trade and economic component lies the source of most of the problems in the relationship. One of the main issues is the EU’s trade deficit with China, amounting to almost $300 billion. In other words, it is not so much “American pressure” that drives Brussels to impose various restrictions on trade with China, but rather the EU’s own concern over the imbalance in bilateral trade and its fear of losing control over companies that produce cutting-edge technology.
To these restrictions, China responds in kind. Some of these measures are largely symbolic — such as the imposition of five-year anti-dumping tariffs (ranging from 27.7% to 34.9%) on brandy, one of the EU’s export items to China. However, brandy producers who “behave correctly” may be allowed to avoid the new tariffs. On the other hand, far more serious consequences could result from China’s restrictions on rare earth metal (REM) exports, introduced earlier.
Another major irritant in bilateral relations remains the periodic revival by political hypocrites of the “deep state” — that is, the real power behind Brussels’ bureaucracy — of the “human rights issue” allegedly violated in China.
Be that as it may, over the past year both sides have stepped up efforts to address the above-mentioned and other challenges in China-Europe relations. Let us recall that Wang Yi already visited Europe earlier this year (in February); Chinese President Xi Jinping held phone calls with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron; and He Lifeng, Vice Premier of the State Council of China and Politburo member, also visited the continent.
Wang Yi in Brussels at the 13th “China-EU Strategic Dialogue”
On July 2, the 13th session of the “China-EU Strategic Dialogue” took place in Brussels — one of several platforms that operate within the framework of bilateral relations. On this occasion, Wang Yi’s interlocutor was Kaja Kallas, responsible for foreign policy in Brussels. In the EU’s official communiqué on the session, it expressed a desire to maintain constructive relations with China in order to “jointly respond to global challenges.”
At the same time, Kallas raised the aforementioned and other grievances with Beijing — ranging from trade issues and the conflict in Ukraine to “human rights violations” and “hybrid threats to Europe” supposedly emanating from China. Also unacceptable to Beijing was Kallas’s reiteration of the EU leadership’s stance on the Taiwan issue — a matter of vital importance to China. On the one hand, the principle of “One China” is acknowledged as fundamental, but on the other hand, the EU expresses disapproval of any attempts to alter the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.
Incidentally, this is not the first time Kallas has acted “out of sync” with new European positioning trends on the global stage. It is quite possible that what we are seeing here is the result of the personnel policy of the “deep state” behind the Brussels bureaucracy — with its key ideological tenet of “inclusivity in all areas and for all categories.” This policy has led to the public promotion of individuals of various genders who clearly lack both intellectual capacity and professional competence.
As for Wang Yi’s remarks during the meeting, they were overall optimistic regarding the prospects of China-Europe relations. He stated, in particular, that “China is not the United States” and emphasized the absence of “any fundamental framework of conflict” in these relations.
Wang Yi Visits Germany and France
Beijing devotes no less attention to the leading countries of the continent when it comes to its European policy. During the discussed tour, Wang Yi visited Germany and France, while three weeks earlier, Vice Premier He Lifeng’s only European destination had been the United Kingdom. In London, however, talks took place not only with the British leadership but also with a U.S. delegation to discuss resolving the “tariff problem.” Wang Yi’s counterparts included German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul and Chancellor Friedrich Merz in Berlin, and Jean-Noël Barrot and Emmanuel Macron in Paris.
The main topic of Wang Yi’s negotiations in Berlin was the aforementioned issue of rare earth metals. Here one cannot help but wonder — was it truly so difficult for the Europeans to foresee that, in response to the “tariff war” and other trade restrictions, Beijing would use Europe’s (and the U.S.’s) total dependence on Chinese REM imports as leverage? Even though China applied only moderate pressure to this “sore spot” of its counterparts, it nevertheless made them quite uncomfortable.
However, China’s desire for a mutually beneficial resolution to the full spectrum of issues in its relationship with Europe — stated by Wang Yi in Brussels — was reaffirmed in Berlin, particularly concerning REM exports. At his meeting with Chancellor Merz, Wang Yi stated that REMs “have not been, are not, and will not be a problem” in China-Europe relations. This statement was backed up by specific measures from China’s Ministry of Commerce adopted just before the beginning of Wang Yi’s current tour.
As for France — which claims to represent Europe in the foreign policy sphere — Jean-Noël Barrot, who received his Chinese counterpart, paid special attention to the latest escalation in the Greater Middle East. Wang Yi’s meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron was held in the most positive atmosphere. It is worth noting that Macron had already extended a diplomatic gesture toward Beijing two weeks earlier at the latest Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.
Finally, it should be noted that all bilateral contacts this year — including Wang Yi’s second tour — can also be seen as preparatory steps ahead of the main platform for China-EU relations: the summit at the highest level. The next “China-EU Summit” is scheduled for July 24–25, and its outcomes will certainly merit a separate commentary.
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on Asia-Pacific issues
