Although full restoration of diplomatic relations and recognition is unlikely, the Taliban will continue their diplomatic and economic efforts to fully normalize relations with Tajikistan, gain international legitimacy, and strengthen trade ties.
In the past year, dozens of senior Taliban officials, including Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar and Amir Khan Muttaqi, have traveled to regional and trans-regional countries with the aim of gradually emerging from international isolation and strengthening bilateral and regional relations. Therefore, the strategy of creating a regional position and regional recognition is being pursued instead of waiting for recognition by the West.
In this context, Maulvi Abdul Kabir, the Taliban’s interim deputy prime minister, said in January 2025 that the Taliban in Afghanistan is improving relations with all its neighbors and specifically mentioned Tajikistan. Recently, Zabihullah Mujahid stated: “There is no problem in our relations with Tajikistan.” In the meantime, the Taliban’s efforts to reduce tensions with Tajikistan continue through direct and indirect talks in the areas of bilateral and multilateral cooperation.
Increasing consular services and appointing an ambassador in Dushanbe, as well as Tajikistan’s full diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, are being considered by the Taliban authorities. Although Tajikistan has traditionally and historically been a staunch opponent of the Taliban, in the past year, in addition to the visit of Fasihuddin Fitrat, the chief of staff of the Taliban army (of Tajik origin from Badakhshan), to Dushanbe, and the departure of anti-Taliban officials from Tajikistan, it seems that the Taliban is still dissatisfied with Tajikistan’s performance and lack of recognition.
In May 2025, the Taliban invited Sharafuddin Gadoev, a critic of the Tajik government, trying to strategically use opposition voices as leverage to pressure Dushanbe. At the end of his visit to Kabul, Gadoev called for support from regional countries against Tajikistan. This approach reflects a kind of mutual confrontation and the use of influence tools beyond conventional diplomacy.
However, the Taliban also maintains a conservative view of pressure on Tajikistan. In this regard, in March, Amanuddin Mansur, the commander of the Taliban in Badakhshan, retracted his statements about attacking Tajikistan. He stated that his remarks were old and that “enemies” were spreading them to disrupt relations.
Kabul still wants the Taliban to return former military equipment. In March 2025, retired military officials at a gathering in Kabul called on Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to return the military hardware that was transferred to these countries when the previous government fell to the Taliban.
In the security sphere, in contrast to Tajikistan’s cautious stance, the Taliban has taken a more assertive approach toward Dushanbe. Recently, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov stated that more than 20 radical groups are present in Afghanistan. In February 2025, the United Nations reported that the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) and Jamaat Ansarullah (JA) have established training camps in Afghanistan with the support of Al-Qaeda* and the Taliban. This undermines the Taliban’s claims that Afghan soil poses no threat to Tajikistan.
In response, the Taliban argue that among the ISIS* militants, some are Tajik citizens. Some pro-Taliban individuals and media outlets even consider Tajikistan a haven for ISIS or a supporter of ISIS Khorasan*.
In another development, in May, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) announced at its meeting in Bishkek that it would initiate a program to send weapons and equipment to reinforce Tajikistan’s southern border with Afghanistan beginning in 2026. This border reinforcement process is planned in three stages.
However, despite the presence of the Working Group on Afghanistan within the CSTO and other multilateral regional cooperation platforms involving Afghanistan’s neighbors, the Taliban’s opposition to the idea of a security belt around Afghanistan remains strong. From the Taliban’s perspective, there is no threat emanating from Afghanistan, drug production has been eliminated and banned, and claims about arms smuggling from the country are false.
To demonstrate control, the Taliban have increased visits and surveillance along the Afghan-Tajik border. Additionally, Tajikistan’s membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the CSTO, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has prompted the Taliban to ensure that Dushanbe does not become a major obstacle to their engagement with these institutions.
In the economic sphere, it appears that significant progress is underway. The Taliban are seeking to expand trade and economic relations with Tajikistan as a sign of political and diplomatic change. Tajikistan continues to supply electricity to northern Afghanistan and Kabul.
In a notable development, Tajikistan hosted a Taliban delegation led by Abdul Bari Omar, head of the Breshna Company, in Dushanbe. Both sides emphasized the importance of expanding cooperation in the electricity sector, which is seen as an important step in strengthening economic ties.
Last month, the Taliban Ministry of Communications and Information Technology announced that the acting head of the ministry had reached an agreement during a trilateral meeting with the technology ministers of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan on expanding regional cooperation.
Moreover, joint use of the Amu Darya River, enhancing the work of the border market along the Tajik-Afghan frontier, cooperation in the Central-South Asia (CASA) 1000 project, the BRI corridor (China-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Iran and West Asia), and the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Tajikistan (TAT) railway initiative can serve as platforms for broader bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Afghanistan remains one of Tajikistan’s significant trading partners, and their economies can complement each other.
Perspective
Although the Republic of Tajikistan does not support the division of Afghanistan, the marginalization of Tajiks (the second-largest ethnic group in Afghanistan) by the Taliban is far from the formula of an inclusive government that Tajikistan and other regional players would like to see.
While full diplomatic restoration and formal recognition remain unlikely in the near term, the Taliban will continue pursuing diplomatic and economic engagement with Tajikistan to normalize relations, gain legitimacy, and strengthen trade ties. Despite underlying political and security tensions, Tajik-Taliban relations — especially in trade, energy, and economic domains — are likely to continue developing and becoming more resilient.
* ‒ organizations banned in Russia
Farzad Bonesh ‒ geopolitical and geoeconomic analyst, researcher and writer
