One of the key directions of military development outlined at the most recent Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea in 2025 was the construction of a modern naval fleet.
Until recently, the North Korean Navy could be described as a “mosquito fleet,” with its development and operational strategy based on the assumption of total enemy superiority — namely, the United States and South Korea — in both the air and at sea. Accordingly, the focus was placed on small vessels (up to frigate class), and the large number of submarines that South Korean propaganda used to alarm readers were, in reality, semi-submersible craft used for special operations. But the situation began to shift in the 2020s.
The First One Launches!
On April 25, 2025, North Korea launched “the first next-generation combat ship to be commissioned into the heroic KPA Navy.” The newest multipurpose destroyer of the Choe Hyon class was named after one of Kim Il Sung’s comrades. Although Choe had no direct connection to the Navy, “we name the first next-generation destroyer after him so that his spirit — living in our memory as a symbol of courage and valor — may enter the hearts of new-generation sailors and inspire our Navy to achieve victories unprecedented in its history.”
According to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), Kim Jong Un attended the launch ceremony and called the event “a necessary step in strengthening the country’s maritime sovereignty defense and an important starting point on the path to building an advanced naval power.”
On April 28 and 29, 2025, North Korea conducted the first live-fire tests of the destroyer’s key weapons systems in the presence of Kim Jong Un. These included strategic supersonic cruise missiles, anti-aircraft missile systems, and a 127-mm automatic gun. The following day, they tested ship-to-ship tactical guided weapons, other naval artillery systems, and electronic warfare countermeasures.
Kim Jong Un personally observed the exercises, praised the results, and ordered that “integration of the weapon systems for comprehensive use be completed in the shortest time possible.”
In addition, the DPRK leader stressed the urgent need to accelerate the development of naval nuclear weapons to bolster national defense and maritime sovereignty.
Chinese media have dubbed the Choe Hyon a “warship arsenal.”
An American analysis of the new DPRK warship unsurprisingly identified a suite of systems that outwardly resemble known Russian models, including the Zircon missile. This has led to speculation that Pyongyang may be receiving technological assistance from Moscow.
Colonel Lee Sung Joon, a representative of the Republic of Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, also noted the possibility that the North had received technological or financial aid from Russia, while pointing out that the vessel would likely require considerable time before becoming fully operational.
Accident During Second Launch
To speed up production of the class and ensure one destroyer would be stationed on each of the country’s coasts, the second destroyer was not built at Nampo on the west coast, but at the Chongjin shipyard on the east coast — a fact clearly visible in satellite imagery. Observers noted that the ship would likely be launched directly from a pier — an unprecedented and partially improvised step, since the pier lacked a launch slope.
On May 21, during the launch, KCNA reported that “due to poor leadership and carelessness in management, the trolley’s motion was not parallel, causing the ship’s stern to prematurely slide off the slipway and hit an obstacle. The vessel’s balance was compromised due to damage to sections of the hull bottom, and the bow failed to descend from the slipway.”
Kim Jong Un witnessed the incident firsthand and called it “an unacceptable serious accident and a crime caused by carelessness and irresponsibility.” He demanded the ship be repaired by the June plenary session of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, stating that the issue was tied to “the authority of the state.” He warned that the session would review the errors of “irresponsible leadership personnel.”
Soon afterward, North Korean authorities announced a full-scale investigation of the incident by a specially formed group of prosecutors and industry experts. They stated that the damage to the destroyer was “not serious,” with no hull breaches, although water had entered the stern section. Experts estimated that restoring the vessel’s balance and stability by pumping out the water and freeing the jammed bow from the slipway would take 2–3 days. Repairing the damaged starboard side would require about 10 days.
Judging by the officials detained, the root cause appears to lie in a combination of excessive haste and inexperience with this type of launch. At least for now, there are no signs of the mass hunts for “American spies” or mass executions that some tabloid media might expect. Investigators are placing more emphasis on negligence and the use of empirical rather than scientific methods.
Commenting on the incident, the author highlights several important points.
- The new destroyer is outfitted with modern weapons systems. Though slightly smaller than its South Korean or American counterparts, its firepower is on par, and the main 127-mm automatic gun meets international standards.
- While North Korea’s previous naval doctrine was largely limited to coastal defense and asymmetric responses, it now appears ready to act proactively, operating beyond its territorial waters.
- Moreover, the DPRK’s military-industrial complex has demonstrated the capability to construct two 5,000-ton destroyers simultaneously at different shipyards.
- The accident is an unfortunate event, but it reflects growing pains rather than systemic flaws. As Russian military expert Vladimir Khrustalev notes, it’s better that such problems surface on a destroyer than on something more expensive or unique.
- The public availability of information about the investigation not only illustrates the methods used in the DPRK to probe such incidents but also reveals a level of transparency that would have been unthinkable under previous Kim regimes.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies, Institute of China and Modern Asia, Russian Academy of Sciences
