It can be expected that strategic and political trade and investment cooperation between Türkiye and Georgia will experience moderate growth in the medium term.
Turkey’s relations with Georgia are at the strategic partnership level, with 76 agreements and the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HLSC) mechanism.
Mutual visits of leaders and high-level officials are held annually at the executive and legislative levels with the aim of further developing bilateral relations.
The multilateral mechanisms of Turkey-Azerbaijan-Hungary-Georgia, Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan, Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan-Iran, as well as the 3+3 (three actors of the South Caucasus and Iran, Turkey, and Russia are also considered by Ankara in its relations with Georgia.
The importance of the Black Sea maritime security has become more important for Turkey. Turkey and Georgia share a border in the eastern Black Sea. Therefore, multilateral cooperation is also pursued in the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, BLACKFOR (Black Sea Maritime Cooperation Task Force), and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization.
While the Georgian Dream Party has developed a pragmatic foreign policy approach of “multi-vector foreign policy”, Georgia in 2024-2025 has shown unprecedented efforts to resist the West.
In the meeting between Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in April 2025, the high level of strategic partnership between the two countries and their successful cooperation in various sectors were noted.
While Irakli Kobakhidze placed special emphasis on Turkey’s role as a reliable and strategic ally of his country, Erdoğan highlighted the friendship and cooperation between Turkey and Georgia, and noted Turkey’s support for Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.
In May 2025, the Republic of Abkhazia stated that dialogue with Tbilisi would be possible only after recognizing the reality and signing an agreement on the non-use of force. However, Turkey does not recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and supports Georgia’s efforts to resolve the issue peacefully.
In 2024, the Georgian Dream won the parliamentary elections on October 26 with 54% of the vote. In December, the United States and Britain imposed restrictions on Georgia.
Although Western countries seem to expect Turkey’s foreign policy in the South Caucasus to be independent of Western interests, Turkey has adopted a balanced position in Georgia that is consistent with its national interests. Also, although Turkey has not yet been able to lobby NATO members on behalf of Georgia, Turkey is also a provider of military assistance to Georgia and supports Georgia’s NATO membership and Euro-Atlantic integration.
Trilateral cooperation between Baku-Tbilisi-Ankara, in security, sovereignty, and transport, regional conflict management, regular trilateral military exercises, high-level meetings, and deepening strategic cooperation are also considered by Turkey. Part of the trilateral military exercises, are focuses on the security of regional energy pipelines. In addition, in the area of soft power, historical and cultural ties, the presence of Georgians in Turkey and Turks in Georgia is important in Ankara’s approach to Georgia. Muslims, especially in the two southeastern regions with the Azeri minority, make up about 10 percent of Georgia’s population.
Given Turkey’s emphasis on Turkish unity and Islamism, investment in mosques, pro-Turkish networks, and active propaganda activities in Georgia are under consideration. Ankara is also closely following the process of repatriating Ahiska Turks.
While citizens of both countries enjoy a visa-free regime for tourist trips, Turkey continues to attract Georgian tourists. The two countries have close relations and cooperation in a wide range of areas, from energy to trade, and from economics to education and culture. Turkey remains Georgia’s largest trading partner. Turkey’s trade volume with Georgia exceeded $3 billion last year, and the two countries plan to increase it to $5 billion.
Trade relations with Turkey benefit from a $2 billion surplus, and Ankara is the largest foreign direct investor in Georgia. Georgia is also Turkey’s gateway to the East and a reliable partner in energy trade, transport, and corridors.
From this point of view, the middle corridor passes through Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the Caspian Sea, which can complement China’s Silk Road Economic Belt. The importance of the middle corridor, a key east-west transit route, and the full utilization of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway capacity in strengthening regional connectivity is Turkey’s goal.
While Georgia focuses on reforming and rebuilding its economy, Turkey is trying to show itself as a more reliable partner than the West.
In the meantime, with Georgia’s free trade agreements with Turkey in 2008 and multidimensional cooperation, Turkish investors have a fundamental position in important sectors of the Georgian economy, with about 260 projects.
One of the economic approaches of Turkey’s foreign policy is to have close relations and grow trade, develop exports, attract foreign investment, foreign contracting, free trade agreements, create a positive image, and strengthen economic diplomacy with the countries of the region.
The two countries have an important position in the Caspian energy trade to the global and European markets. In addition to the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) project that passes through Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) gas pipelines are models of win-win energy cooperation. Ankara continues to actively cooperate in implementing the Southern Energy Corridor and high-voltage transmission lines between the two countries as new opportunities for energy trade.
Outlook
In the past two decades, some approaches and statements about Adjara and even the city of Batumi by Turkish officials have caused friction and hostility between Georgia and Turkey. In addition, although there is still a possibility of geopolitical, political, and economic differences in areas such as the Black Sea, it seems that there are many opportunities for cooperation in various areas, especially energy and transit, and the potential has not yet been filled. Therefore, it can be expected that strategic and political trade and investment cooperation between Türkiye and Georgia will experience moderate growth in the medium term.
Samyar Rostami, а political observer and senior researcher in international relations
