On May 13, 2025, the 4th Ministerial Meeting of the China-CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean Countries) Forum was held in Beijing with 33 Latin American states represented by 17 foreign ministers and delegations of various levels.
For the first time, the leaders of China (Xi Jinping), Brazil (Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva), Colombia (Gustavo Petro), and Chile (Gabriel Borich) were among the key participants in the meeting.
The main goal of the forum was aimed at strengthening relations between Beijing and the Latin American continent amid the “trade war” launched by U.S. President D. Trump.
In his opening remarks, the Chinese leader noted that China and Latin America are important members of the Global South and it is necessary to strengthen ties in the face of external pressures. It was stated that China is willing to support Latin American countries in matters affecting Chinese interests. In addition, China officially announced an initiative to “build a Sino-Latin American and Caribbean Community of Shared Future,” saying that Beijing’s interests in the region are long-term in nature.
To implement this initiative, China has proposed five programs to foster cooperation: Solidarity Program (aimed at strengthening political ties); Development Program (focusing on increased investments in infrastructure, agriculture, energy, mining, telecommunications, artificial intelligence, etc.); Civilizations Program (to promote cultural exchange); Peace Program (involving enhanced cooperation in security, counterterrorism, combating transnational organized crime, drug trafficking, corruption, etc.); People’s Program (including scholarships, quotas for study in China, poverty alleviation training, expanded tourism cooperation, and visa waiver facilitation).
Trade and economic interaction
It was noted that the region has become one of the largest trade partners for Beijing. In 2024, mutual trade turnover amounted to a record $518.4 billion (for comparison, in 2023 trade turnover was at the level of $450 billion). Special attention was also paid to China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative, which has 23 of the 33 Latin American states as its members.
According to Xi Jinping, the OBOR initiative has helped the region realize 268 infrastructure projects and create more than 1 million jobs, with Chinese direct investment reaching $600.8 billion in 2023. The Chinese side made it clear that Beijing intends to further strengthen its regional presence, and to this end, the Chinese President announced a $9.18 billion loan to CELAC members. In addition, Xi promised that the PRC will also increase imports from Latin America and encourage Chinese companies to increase investment.
In particular, the Brazil-China Business Forum resulted in the announcement of a package of more than $5 billion in investments in Brazil. In addition, 37 agreements were signed between Brazil and China during the China-CELAC Forum in the areas of trade, investment, agriculture, energy, mining, technology and innovation. However, one that deserves special attention is the technical agreement on OBOR. Brazil is one of the few countries in the region that has not yet joined the Chinese initiative. This is due to Brazil’s desire to maintain its equidistance and avoid falling under the PRC’s sphere of influence. However, the Brazilian authorities have apparently decided to reconsider this issue.
As President Lula da Silva noted, Brazil needs to develop transportation corridors that would ensure the country’s stable development and China should play a key role in this regard. On the sidelines of the BRICS summit to be held in July 2025 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil expects the two sides to sign agreements on infrastructure projects that should increase Brazilian food exports to China. In particular, the projects in question are the Aisalandia – Port Barcarena railroad, the Southeast Rail Ring, the Central-East Corridor, and the Bioceanic Railroad, which will connect the Chinese port of Chancay in Peru with the MATOPIBA agrarian region (a highly productive agricultural area that unites the states of Bahia, Tocantins, Maranhão, and Piaui).
However, Brazil is not the only country willing to reconsider its possible participation in the OBOR. Following a meeting in Beijing, the Colombian president signed an agreement for Bogota to formally join the OBOR. Chinese influence in Colombia has increased significantly in recent years and has effectively eclipsed the U.S. presence.
Key infrastructure projects in the country are also owned by Chinese companies, notably Metro Línea 1 SAS, which is part of Xi’an Metro Company Limited and Harbour Engineering Company Limited (CHEC) is responsible for the construction of the Bogotá metro. CHEC is also leading the implementation of the Autopista al Mar 2 project, a transportation corridor including the construction of 62 bridges and 12 tunnels that will connect Medellín to the Urabá sub-region. In national mining, Chinese companies are also seeking to take the lead. For example, Zijing Mining Group controls Colombia’s largest gold mine, Buriticá, which produces more than 8.3 million tons of the precious metal per year.
In addition, in the context of protectionist measures announced by D. Trump, Chilean President G. Borich emphasized during the forum that it is necessary to promote free and fair trade. It is worth noting that Chile is the first Latin American country to sign a free trade agreement with China in 2005. Mutual trade turnover between the countries amounts to 58.7 billion dollars and grows by 11% annually.
The importance of Chile for China is due to the fact that Santiago is the largest producer of copper, 51.3% of which is exported to China. In addition to copper, Beijing has a keen interest in Chilean lithium. After the China-CELAC forum, the Chinese government demanded that BYD and Tsingnshan Holding Group finalize their $523 million investment projects to build lithium cathode plants in the Antafogasta region.
China’s regional presence as a response to Washington’s pressure
In general, Beijing’s decision to strengthen its interaction with the region is dictated by the U.S. anti-China initiatives. It is noteworthy that simultaneously with the China-CELAC forum, the 10th Hemispheric Security Conference was held in Miami, Florida, from May 12 to 13 in the United States, where one of the main topics was countering the Asian country’s influence in the region.
In turn, China is sending Washington a clear signal that it does not intend to leave the “backyard” of the Americans. Moreover, Beijing will use Trump’s tariffs, which also affect Latin American economies, as a window of opportunity to strengthen its influence on the continent.
However, attention should be paid to the fact that China views Latin America not so much as a field for geopolitical confrontation with the United States, but as a potential ally in the fight against U.S. imperialism. This was pointed out by Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Miao Deyu, who noted that Latin America is not the “backyard” of the United States, but is building “its own house.” In fact, Beijing is saying that the days of Washington’s exclusive dominance in the Western Hemisphere are over, and it will have to put up with the current state of affairs.
Mikhail Ilevich, junior research fellow at the Centre for Scientific and Analytical Information at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences
