Since the overthrow of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in December, 2024, Syria has been on the tip of everyone’s tongue.
Syria is witnessing a sectarian civil war. A terrorist organisation banned in Russia is currently trying to maintain power through mass terror and executions. In your opinion, is there any chance for Syria’s new government to build a normal secular state?
First of all, there was no civil war initially. The situation is gradually transitioning into that phase now. The term ‘civil war’ in relation to Syria has always troubled me because it’s primarily Western propagandists and the so-called secular Syrian opposition who have characterised the events in Syria as such.
In reality, there were peaceful civilian protests against the Assad regime. Moreover, in 2012, a new constitution was adopted that addressed the people’s demands.
But by the time this constitution was ready, it was already too late. Why? Because within three to four months, the peaceful demonstrations turned into armed clashes. This did not happen on its own; it was the result of provocations organised within Syria.
Entire weapon caches were found in mosques. During these demonstrations, shots were fired both at government forces and at the protesters, along with other violent acts. I know this firsthand from conducting interviews, for example in Homs, one of the cities where these protests were most pronounced.
I met with the archbishop, clergymen and members of the Orthodox and Jacobite churches. They told me how they had to survive. There were entire neighborhoods where Christians lived compactly.
At first, they all participated in these demonstrations together, but then they had to form self-defence units and barricade their neighbourhoods, as the unrest and armed confrontations led to repressions from the authorities, on the one hand, and armed looters on the other.
Thus, the civil conflict quickly escalated into a war involving mercenaries and the international jihadist movement. Civil society became divided and continued to fracture.
Civil society created self-defense units, which were often organised along sectarian lines, and various social organisations. They cannot be called purely charitable organisations, because they sought to support the population by forming cooperatives, charities or groups that cared for orphans, as killings and other atrocities began almost immediately.
Many children were left without parents and without the possibility of being taken in by their clans. In the Middle East, there are practically no orphans, as they are taken in by their families or relatives. But there were cases where entire clans were wiped out.
Therefore, 2011-2024 can hardly be called a civil war, in my opinion, even though this term has been widely promoted in the West.
Since January, 2025, the situation can now be characterised as a latent civil war, manifesting in incidents like the ongoing massacre along the coast, which began several months ago and has not stopped.
The only thing that has stopped is the video evidence. Previously, the militants, as per their ISIS* habits, would upload everything online. Now they have been strictly forbidden from doing so, but unfortunately the killings, robberies and other atrocities continue. In Idleb, the market for children – especially girls – has reemerged. This is all ISIS* methods, nothing has changed.
The remnants of those who once fought against the Assad regime and various militias were gathered in Idleb starting around 2017–2018. They stewed in this cauldron, and one of the organisations, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham*, led by Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, suppressed its rivals, but these groups remain.Many of them are foreign fighters: Uyghurs, people from Central Asia and the Caucasus. If we consider Alawites and Christians as full-fledged citizens of Syria, this is a civil war, but a civil war in the form of genocide.
They are being forced out, physically exterminated and made to leave the country. The goal is to completely alter the demographics and resolve the ‘non-Muslim issue’. It is very similar to the Nazis in Germany. They want only Sunnis to live everywhere.
Against this backdrop, is the death of a secular state possible? Of course not
Now we see a contradiction in the constitutional declaration that was adopted. On one hand, it closely resembles Syria’s previous constitution. They borrowed elements from Qatar’s governance model, Egypt’s and others. It is clear that this is an autocracy, or even a harsher dictatorship than under Assad, because everything is entirely centred around the president. Even in the new government structure, the post of prime minister has been eliminated.
The Kurds and Druze also identify as Syrian citizens, but they are less vulnerable. The Kurds have been more or less self-organised in the northeast since 2016 and, under the American umbrella, have felt relatively secure in recent years. Of course, it is hard to talk about security when they are constantly under attack from Türkiye.
The Druze are also quite capable of defending themselves and have Israel’s protection, at least nominally. Israeli intelligence agencies are working actively to provide assistance to the Druze against the central government.
This serves Israel’s interests, not the Druze’s, this is obvious. Thus, the country is fractured. I deliberately did not mention these two regions earlier because, in essence, they exist more or less autonomously at the moment.
The Alawite and Christian coast had no self-defence units. Or rather, it did, but they were underground. We saw organised resistance in one area with several villages where militants tried to capture and kill high-ranking former Alawite military commanders.
This was presented as an uprising and a pretext for massacre. In reality, it was another deception and lie by the militants, the terrorists. But they acted as many have throughout history. In December, they also announced: “We’re disbanding all soldiers and officers, except those we have grievances against, and sending them home”.
Yes, the country is now divided, with society completely split. At the same time, the Sunni part of Syrian society largely justifies and supports what is happening on the coast. But I see this as psychological self-defense; we understand that this is a crime, and they understand it perfectly well, but they justify it by saying: “We were slaves to a bloody regime that oppressed us”.
Against this backdrop, we can speak of a civil war, of divisions in people’s minds. The Syria we knew for decades is gone.
That Syria was characterised above all by its mixed society. Neighbours didn’t care about each other’s religion. Everyone celebrated holidays together, lived and worked together. Now, after everything that has happened, a return to the past is impossible. I repeat, this return is precluded both by the policies of the new authorities, who are actively and successfully altering Syria’s demographics, and by the events themselves.
Even before 2011, the demographic situation was extremely volatile. Remember: there are over six million Syrian refugees, most of whom are Sunnis. There were also huge numbers of Christians and internally displaced persons. The entire eastern population, fleeing various militants, primarily ISIS*, flooded westward, to the coast and Damascus.
These were not urban people; they were accustomed to rural life, or worse, to the desert or semi-desert, Bedouins. They came to the cities and behaved as they always had. In other words, people with a different culture arrived. Two Syrias collided. This civilisational clash played out over these years.
They thought, “What is this? We are Syria, and this is depravity and disgrace!” But this conflict was planted much earlier, and it became one of the triggers for the events.
These people gladly welcomed all the jihadists and thought, “Yes, we wear hijabs, our beards are the right length, we pray correctly”. Society changed very dramatically and very quickly. But for us, external observers, it seemed so sudden.
Syria’s interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has publicly called for Syrians to unite and for an inclusive national dialogue, but in reality, we see a different picture. Do you think Syria’s demographic, ethnic, and confessional map will change in the near future?
Changes to Syria’s demographic map have been underway for the past 20 years. The main cause was the decade-long drought that preceded 2011. As a result, people from rural areas moved to the cities and to the coast, where there was rainfall and opportunities to continue farming.
This strengthened the Sunni component in areas that were previously more mixed in terms of religion. A civilisational clash occurred between rural and urban populations. Arabs call this ‘badawa’, i.e. nomads.
Rural migrants became pariahs in the cities. They became the lowest-paid, most disenfranchised segment of the population – and a massive one at that.
On one hand, they brought with them traditional Islam and the customs of rural life. On the other hand, they faced rejection from the urban population, who were culturally repelled by them and economically exploited them mercilessly.
This was further exacerbated by the infiltration of preachers and imams from Saudi Arabia. This was, of course, a political strategy.
And this alternative Syria has won. It has won ideologically under the banner of what they call moderate Islam, like the Muslim Brotherhood *, but with funding from external sponsors. Ordinary people don’t see that Qatar is financing all this. They see that, for example, life in Idleb is better.
So, they think these people are good, they know how to govern. But we can see now that they don’t know how to govern at all.
It’s clear that the over six million refugees (some in Lebanon, some in Jordan, Türkiye, and of course huge numbers in Europe and America) will not return.
All the Russian efforts in Syria to repatriate refugees were completely unsupported by the Assad government. The Russian military built camps and villages to bring these refugees back. The Assad regime had no interest in increasing its population because it would mean more mouths to feed.
So the demographic policy was clear: the fewer, the better. When the ruling elite’s economy shifted to drug production and trafficking, the population became entirely unnecessary. The only people needed were those who produced and sold drugs. That’s all there is to say about demographics.
To be continued…
*Organisations banned in the Russian Federation
Interview by Vanessa SEVIDOVA, correspondent and author for New Eastern Outlook
