Israel is not abandoning the idea of ethnically cleansing the Gaza Strip. The idea of peacefully displacing civilians is unacceptable to the Arabs and most of the international community. Tel Aviv is counting on solving this issue militarily.
For Israel, an end to the war in Gaza means crushing Hamas and deporting the Arab population
In any war, the conflicting parties often enter into temporary truces to resolve local and tactical issues (e.g. getting a breather to replenish arsenals, accumulating and redeploying forces, solving higher-priority tasks that ultimately contribute to achieving a complete victory etc.).
Israel used the ceasefire to concentrate its forces in the northern (Lebanese) direction and defeat (destroy the military infrastructure and arsenal of) Hezbollah (the IDF’s Operation ‘Northern Arrows’, October 1-November 27, 2024), as well as improving their positions in the eastern (Syrian) direction (from December, 2024) with a change in the emphasis of pro-Palestinian forces on other likely theatres of military operations. As a result, Iran suffered significant losses in Lebanon and Syria. Türkiye, which has constantly been raising its level of anti-Israeli rhetoric with initiatives to resolve the Palestinian issue, has been dragged into the Syrian crisis. For Erdogan today, the preservation of the puppet regime of Ahmed al-Sharaa in Damascus is much more relevant than resolving the Palestinian issue with the support of Hamas.
Despite the fact that Israel is one of the most economically and technologically advanced countries in the Middle East and ranks 29th in the world in terms of GDP, in a situation of prolonged war, the military-industrial complex of the Jewish State cannot provide its army with sufficient weapons and military equipment. Thus, after the start of Hamas’ aggression from October 7, 2023, until the autumn of 2024, the United States spent almost $18 bn on military aid to Israel, a record amount in the history of US-Israeli military and technical cooperation.
In other words, the war in the Gaza Strip consumed significant Israeli resources. In order to manage a ‘second front’ in the Lebanese or Syrian directions, Tel Aviv needed a respite (ceasefire) in the south of the country. Otherwise, the dispersion of forces in all areas of hostilities (the war with Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria, not to mention the Houthis in Yemen) could lead to serious consequences for Israel itself.
In addition, the tactic of ‘small victorious wars’ always remains an option for the Israeli General Staff and serves the interests of the ruling circles. Netanyahu understood that the unfinished war with Hamas, the lack of a full release of Israeli hostages from Palestinian captivity and the security problems of his own population in the north of the country caused protests by Israelis and negatively affected both the reputation of the prime minister and the ruling Likud bloc in the Knesset. Accordingly, the military successes of the Israeli army in Lebanon and the subsequent occupation of the security zone of the Golan Heights in Syria following the fall of the Assad regime allowed Netanyahu and his party to restore their shaky ratings and gain 25 seats in parliament.
With US President Donald Trump back at the White House, Israel not only expects to increase US military assistance, but also to involve Washington in a joint campaign against Tehran under the guise of shutting down the Iranian nuclear file and resolving the crisis in Israeli-Turkish relations in Syria. However, since Trump tends to combine populism with pragmatism, the United States is still focused on a political settlement of relations with Iran and Türkiye via negotiations.
At this stage, the United States is not interested in a hot war between Israel and Iran, much less with NATO member Türkiye. Tel Aviv is shifting the confrontation with Tehran to subversive activities of foreign intelligence agencies to provoke the Islamic Republic to retaliate so as to disrupt negotiations with the United States. In the case of Türkiye, Israel does not recognise the al-Sharaa regime, continues targeted military strikes against Syrian military facilities (allegedly to secure its territory from the unpredictable actions of Sunni extremists) and also tries to present its aggressive actions in Syria as protecting local national minorities (particularly the Druze) from the tyranny of the pro-Turkish regime.
Meanwhile, Tel Aviv has obtained US President Trump’s public support for the idea of mass resettlement (realistically the deportation of two million indigenous people) of Arabs from the Gaza Strip, followed by the transformation of this territory into a kind of world tourism centre under a US protectorate and the restoration of a ‘prosperous paradise’ in the land of Israel with the participation of US business.
In the ceasefire reached with Hamas, Israel reserved the right to resume military operations in the Gaza Strip if the other party does not release all Israeli hostages and Hamas does not stop provocations. In fact, Tel Aviv still has formal reasons to resume military operations in the Gaza Strip.
Citing Israeli media, the Voice of Türkiye newspaper reported that the Netanyahu government has approved a plan to expand its operation and fully occupy the Gaza Strip. At the same time, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich announced the need to occupy the Gaza Strip, expelling the entire population of the exclave.
Thus, Israel is preparing to expand its offensive in the Gaza Strip. The government has approved such a ground operation by the IDF, which may begin after the end of US President Trump’s Middle East tour at the end of May.
In this regard, public demands for the return of hostages from the Gaza Strip have recently increased in Israel, and the army has been replenished with tens of thousands of reservists. In the event of an offensive ground operation, Israel, under the guise of ensuring security, will try to oust the civilian population from the Gaza Strip to the border with Egypt, close humanitarian aid access to the exclave, carry out massive strikes on militant infrastructure and command posts and finish off the remnants of Hamas.
It is no coincidence that, 12 years later, Türkiye and Egypt resumed their partnership and began to conduct joint military exercises (for example, within the framework of the Pakistani Air Force’s exercises in October, 2024, and special forces units in Ankara in May, 2025). Türkiye will try to prevent Arab refugees from crossing the Israeli-Egyptian border and prevent the very fact of the deportation of civilians.
How will the world react to the Israeli policy of the mass deportation of Arabs?
Israeli radicals’ idea of organising the ethnic deportation of the indigenous population from the Gaza Strip has not found widespread support in the international community. Iran, Türkiye, Arab countries and other representatives of the Islamic world are clear opponents of such a prospect of resolving the Palestinian issue in the Gaza Strip. A mass ethnic deportation in the 21st century was not only ill received in the Islamic world, but also in many Christian countries (Russia, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Brazil etc.) and international organisations (including the UN). The late Pope Francis was also opposed to the deportation of Arabs from the Gaza Strip, which caused a critical reaction in Israel.
Meanwhile, it cannot be said that the international community is showing determination to prevent the expulsion of the indigenous population from the Gaza Strip. For example, Egypt is afraid to oppose US President Trump’s plan to deport Arabs. Bahrain, Jordan and Qatar have a similar position.
None of these Arab states really want to accept Palestinian refugees en masse for economic and domestic political reasons. This forced migration will have a severe impact on the burdened socio-economic local budgets, and the emergence of a critical masses can undermine confidence in the government itself. At the same time, there is an understanding that the exodus of Arabs from the Gaza Strip will lead to the final Israeli occupation of this part of Palestine.
Azerbaijan, being a strategic partner of Israel and interested in continuing to receive Israeli military supplies, is unlikely to ‘rebel’ against the policy of deporting fellow Muslims from the Gaza Strip and will limit itself to a declarative statement calling for compliance with international law. Baku is most likely interested in obtaining permits from Tel Aviv and Washington to participate in a business project to rebuild the destroyed Gaza Strip in the post-war period.
The UK will not repeat France’s condemnation of Israel for deporting Arabs, and together with the United States will stop anti-Israel meetings and resolutions in international organisations (primarily the UN).
It is difficult to imagine that any country would launch military operations against Israel for its operation in the Gaza Strip, followed by the displacement of local Palestinians. Iran is currently unable to defeat Israel alone, which enjoys the unconditional support of the United States. Türkiye is most notable for its vocal threats against Israel and warnings from its fighter jets, but it will not cross any red lines because of the United States.
All of this gives Israel reason to believe that beyond public denials, statements, protests and resolutions, the international community will do nothing against the Jewish State. Accordingly, the elimination of Hamas in the Gaza Strip with the following forcible expulsion of the civilian population may become a fait accompli.
Alexander Svarants – Doctor of Political Science, Professor, Turkologist, expert on the Middle East
