Even though Israel prefers a military option to destroy Iran’s nuclear programme, Washington’s talks with Iran show the possibility of a deal.
What Israel Wants
Recent media leaks of Israeli plans to attack and destroy Iran’s nuclear programme are not surprising at all. Indeed, Israel has always preferred this option, evident from its insider attack on Iran’s top nuclear scientist and the numerous cyberattacks it has carried out in recent years. According to the details leaked to the media, which Israel claims were leaked by US officials on purpose, the Israeli plan was to land, with US help, its commandos in Iran to penetrate Iranian nuclear facilities and destroy them completely. The US was to provide Israel with air cover. However, the plan could not be carried out because Trump vetoed it.
According to a news report published by The New York Times, “Mr. Trump informed Israel of his decision that the United States would not support an attack. He discussed it with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu when Mr. Netanyahu visited Washington last week, using an Oval Office meeting to announce that the United States was beginning talks with Iran”. (The same story is explained in detail, drawn from conversations with US officials, actual Israeli plans about Iran. Jerusalem’s plans were encouraged by its calculation that Iran’s power to hit Israel back had been weakened by recent Israeli successes against Hamas, Hezbollah, and the al-Assad regime in Syria.) As it stands, this plan has been put on hold, as US officials have met – and will be meeting again in the coming days – with Iranian officials to discuss a potential deal. While hopes are running high, the question is: why is the Trump administration, otherwise supporting Israel’s genocidal war on the people of Palestine, not willing to support Israel against Iran to the extent of physically attacking it?
Gulf Pressure
A key source of Washington’s ‘restraint’ and preference for talks is the pressure from Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia. Just as US-Iran talks began and the story of the Israeli plan to attack Iran made headlines, the Saudi Defence Minister visited Iran. The purpose of the visit was not only to strengthen bilateral ties; it had at least three interrelated objectives. First, Riyadh wanted to convey a clear message to Washington that it supports talks and a deal with Iran and that it is not willing to sacrifice its ties with Iran for its own deal with Israel. This message was logical because an Israeli attack on Iran would spread the war and affect Gulf states as well. It is conceivable that Riyadh’s message to Iran also emphasised the necessity of a deal given the circumstances. Riyadh will not find a defiant Iran, as Tehran has always sought a deal, and it was the previous Trump administration that unilaterally withdrew from the agreement signed by the Obama administration in 2015. The second purpose of the Saudi Defence Minister’s visit was to assure Tehran that Riyadh does not – and will not – support any Israeli attack on Iran. Reports suggest Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are refusing, once again, to allow their airspace to the US for launching attacks on Iran. Third, the visit aimed to project Saudi relevance to the regional geopolitics. The next round of ongoing talks is taking place in Rome. But these talks, whether they succeed or fail, will ultimately affect the future of the entire Middle East. Riyadh is already flexing its diplomatic muscle to shape these talks to ensure their success and protect the region from wider instability. This diplomacy, combined with Iran’s own pragmatic approach, is working in a way that leaves minimal room for Israel to jeopardise the talks.
Iran’s Pragmatism
It is not hard for Trump to sense that Iran wants to make a deal. The messaging from Iran continues to reinforce pragmatism. During the first round of talks in Muscat, Iran’s President made some significant remarks. He said that Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei is “not opposed to US entities investing capital” in the Iranian economy. Succinctly put, this is a radical departure from Iran’s traditional stance. Second, Pezeshkian said, “We are open to dialogue, but with dignity and pride, we will not compromise on our achievements, and we will not make deals (on them).” This is a striking rebuttal of the Israeli position that any deal that falls short of completely dismantling Iran’s nuclear programme will not be acceptable. Third, the President reiterated once again that Iran is “not looking for an atomic bomb. Who is setting policy above the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, who has officially announced that we are not looking for a nuclear bomb? Check it a thousand times. You can verify a thousand times that we don’t have atomic bombs, but we need nuclear science and nuclear energy.”
Iran’s message for an economic partnership with the US, which could underpin the nuclear deal and provide it stability in the future, is a major indicator of its willingness to make a deal, making it quite difficult for the US to ignore it. For the Trump administration, Iran’s offer of an economic partnership could be harnessed for its stated purpose of ‘Making America Great Again’. For the Gulf states too, this pragmatism holds crucial significance because it provides a leeway to create a future in which they can live, and the cost of ignoring this offer will be too high for everyone to pay. The only actor not happy with these talks is Israel, and the challenge for all stakeholders – the US, Iran, and Gulf states – is to ensure it cannot sabotage the deal even before it is made.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs.
