Following the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, the situation in the Middle East has not only failed to stabilize, but has moved closer to sparking a new conflict between Türkiye and Israel. Will the world witness the first Turkish-Israeli war?
What are the roots of the tensions between Israel and Türkiye?
The concept of “zero problems with neighbors,” proposed by former Turkish Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu within the framework of neo-Ottoman doctrine, remained largely rhetorical. In reality, the more Ankara articulated neo-Ottoman ideas, the more contradictions it encountered in regional diplomacy.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan first disrupted relations with Israel in 2009–2010. It began with a “verbal skirmish” at the Davos forum in January 2009, when Erdoğan accused Israeli President Shimon Peres of various wrongdoings due to Israel’s policy toward the Palestinians. In May 2010, Israeli commandos boarded the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara — part of the “Freedom Flotilla” carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza — in international waters. The raid left nine Turks dead and several others injured. This incident triggered a crisis in Turkish-Israeli relations and the mutual recall of ambassadors. The deterioration in Turkish-Israeli relations clearly unfolded in the context of similar strains between the U.S. and Türkiye, reflecting Erdoğan’s increasingly independent and ambitious foreign policy.
Azerbaijan played a significant role in restoring ties between Israel and Türkiye — a point recently emphasized by President Ilham Aliyev at the international forum “Towards a New World Order.”
However, just a month after the Hamas offensive, Ankara took a pro-Palestinian stance and proposed a conflict resolution based on the recognition of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital. According to Erdoğan, Türkiye should serve as a guarantor of Palestinian security. Naturally, Tel Aviv found this proposal unacceptable, and anti-Israeli rhetoric in Ankara steadily intensified.
Türkiye began labeling Israel’s actions in Gaza as “genocide” against the Palestinian people, imposed a limited trade embargo (though continued allowing Azerbaijani oil exports to Israeli ports through its territory), and called for the arrest of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. In July 2024, Erdoğan unexpectedly declared that Türkiye might intervene in Israel “as it did in Karabakh and Libya.”
Following the launch of the Israel Defense Forces’ “Northern Arrows” operation in Lebanon in October 2024, Erdoğan, condemning Tel Aviv, warned of potential territorial threats to Türkiye from Israel.
The fall of Assad’s regime and the rise of pro-Turkish forces in Damascus, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, marked a regional success for Ankara and fueled hopes among Turkish elites for bolstering Türkiye’s military, economic, and political standing in the region. Türkiye is now close to achieving the goals of its neo-Ottoman doctrine within Syrian territory — turning Syria into an ally, securing control over local resources and communication routes, neutralizing the Kurdish threat, and establishing its own military bases.
Israel cannot accept such plans. It regards the current transitional regime in Damascus as a terrorist entity and is using Syria’s weakened state to occupy parts of its southern territory, solidify its hold on the Golan Heights, and regularly strike Syrian military targets to eliminate any potential for a Syrian military response.
Israel is intensifying its geopolitical confrontation with Türkiye in Syria. Over the past four months, it has carried out roughly 800 airstrikes and over 100 ground incursions in Syrian territory, demanding the complete demilitarization of the country’s south. Tel Aviv has effectively occupied a “buffer zone” in the Golan Heights and pushed deeper into Syria, creating a new buffer zone under the pretext that Syrian forces violated international agreements.
Türkiye, in turn, views Israel’s actions as driven by a “rush of military success” and seeks to use Syrian territory to deter Israeli aggression. In January 2025, during the first visit of Syria’s interim leader al-Sharaa to Ankara, the two countries reached a preliminary understanding on a major military agreement.
Although not yet signed, the agreement envisions the deployment of Turkish military bases in Syria — drone bases like Menagh in Aleppo and fighter jet/PVO system bases like T-4 in Homs or Palmyra. Ankara’s goal is to create a layered air defense system (Hisar, Siper, and possibly S-400, covering short-, medium-, and long-range capabilities) to protect the region’s airspace and establish a deterrent force against the Israeli Air Force. In response, Israel bombed the Hama military airport and the T-4 airbase to prevent Turkish troops from establishing a presence there.
A Real War or Negotiations?
Israel is deeply concerned about Türkiye’s growing influence in Syria and the potential establishment of Turkish military bases. Tel Aviv considers this a red line. According to the proposals of General Nagele’s committee on measures to contain the Turkish threat, Israel has mobilized its military, intelligence, and diplomatic resources for preemptive efforts.
In talks with President Donald Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu conveyed his concerns over Türkiye’s actions in Syria and, evidently, requested U.S. assistance. Trump’s positive response and favorable remarks about Erdoğan suggest that during the Turkish leader’s expected visit to Washington, the topic of Syria and Israel will be high on the agenda. The U.S., under any circumstances, will not leave Israel without support (including both diplomatic and military).
This implies that the U.S. is currently advising Israel not to escalate with Türkiye in Syria or initiate a war. Washington hopes to resolve Israeli-Turkish contradictions through diplomacy, awaiting Erdoğan’s arrival in Washington.
Turkish military experts have begun seriously discussing the prospect of a possible war with Israel, analyzing the balance of forces by branch (air force, air defense, missile forces, navy, etc.). Turks believe that Israel’s military capabilities are limited compared to Türkiye’s, as Ankara, in their view, has the upper hand in air defense systems, navy, and especially cruise missiles. And since Türkiye and Israel do not share a direct border, the focus of a potential war would be on long-range capabilities. Turks also believe that Israel does not possess American fifth-generation F-35 fighter jets.
However, Turkish experts acknowledge that many of their own advanced military systems (including air defense and the KAAN fighter jet) are not expected to be operational until 2026–2030. This suggests that Turkish analyses are more propagandistic in nature — if war becomes a reality, the Israelis, together with the Americans, are unlikely to wait several years for the Turks to complete flight tests and other combat trials of their developing technologies.
Finally, Turks themselves admit that Ankara has a chance at military victory only in the case of facing Israel alone. If the U.S. intervenes on Israel’s side, military success is not guaranteed for Türkiye (more accurately, a complete defeat is guaranteed).
And there is no doubt the Americans will stand up for the Jews. Moreover, under the pretext of a possible conflict with Iran, the U.S. is actively transferring military equipment and personnel to the Middle East (aircraft carriers, bombers, fighters, long-range artillery, ammunition, special forces). And who can guarantee that these same forces stationed in Diego Garcia, Jordan, Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait, UAE, Syria, Iraq, and Israel will not be used against Türkiye itself?
That is precisely why Türkiye and Azerbaijan are making diplomatic efforts to resolve their differences with Israel politically. On the initiative of President I. Aliyev, a meeting and negotiations between the security delegations of the two countries took place on April 9 in Baku. These talks occurred on the eve of the U.S.-Iranian meeting in Oman.
According to Times of Israel, the Baku round of negotiations has not yet led to a resolution of the disagreements. Israel insists on excluding Turkish military bases from Syria. Nevertheless, the parties have not abandoned the search for compromises. Clearly, Erdoğan’s visit to the U.S. will determine the situation. Ankara expects certain benefits from Washington on other tracks (including finance, investment, military deals involving F-16s and F-35s, concessions in the South Caucasus, etc.).
Alexander Svarants – Doctor of Political Science, Professor, Turkologist, and expert on the Middle East
