The EU held its first summit with the Central Asian republics, during which the Turkic countries supported a resolution against the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Does this constitute a “geopolitical blow” to Türkiye, which actively promotes Turkic integration?
The EU has turned its attention to Central Asia’s vast natural resources—but what becomes of the Turan vision?
Given the region’s geographic remoteness and democratic shortcomings, these countries are unlikely to represent genuine geopolitical interest for the EU in terms of full European integration. This is, rather, about the geo-economic priorities of continental Europe—namely, the EU’s bid to gain access to Central Asia’s resources while bypassing Russia and undercutting China.
Of course, the EU isn’t the only power eyeing the region. Türkiye, for its part, makes no secret of its geopolitical and economic ambitions to gain a foothold in this predominantly Turkic region and position itself as the main transit route for Central Asian commodities—oil, gas, uranium, gold, cotton, rare earth metals, and more—into the European market. Ankara is already leveraging its cultural and ethnic ties with these countries and has done much to lay the institutional foundations for broader Turkic integration, including the formation of the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS).
While European integration has remained elusive for Türkiye, despite its geographical proximity to the EU, the prospect seems even more distant for the Turkic states of Central Asia. Türkiye might seem to have little reason for political jealousy here. Still, Ankara continues to promote a phased, multi-level integration process among Turkic nations—from Istanbul to Samarkand—spanning culture, education, economics, politics, defence, and security. The vision of a pan-Turkic union could well lead, in the foreseeable future, to a common Turkic market under NATO-member Türkiye’s leadership—positioning Ankara as both the lead actor and the bridge linking Turkic Asia to Europe.
However, at the recent summit in Samarkand, the participants adopted a resolution in support of the Republic of Cyprus—effectively signalling non-recognition of the TRNC. The EU, after all, recognises only the Republic of Cyprus, which is a member state, and continues to view the island’s northern part as occupied territory.
Does this mean the Turkic states of Central Asia—three of which (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan) are members of the OTS, with Turkmenistan holding observer status—have collectively disavowed the TRNC, thereby weakening the idea of Turkic unity led by Türkiye?..
Türkiye and Azerbaijan Criticise the Cyprus Resolution
Some Turkish and Azerbaijani commentators have condemned the resolution as a betrayal—both of Türkiye and of the broader Turan project. In their view, Central Asia’s Turkic allies, eager to access the European market, have seriously undermined the vision of Turkic unity and the purpose of the OTS.
One such critic is Turkish analyst Arda Zentürk, who lambasted the Samarkand resolution as a “geopolitical blow” to Türkiye and an “act of betrayal” by the Central Asian states. “I don’t understand what Ankara is doing,” he said. “I’m completely baffled… How can we allow such a geopolitical disaster, Mr Hakan Fidan?”
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, whose country wasn’t involved in the EU–Central Asia summit for obvious geographical reasons, also weighed in on the matter. Speaking at the 7th international forum at ADA University in Baku, titled “Towards a New World Order,” Aliyev referred to the Samarkand resolution, saying that Azerbaijan had played an active role in securing observer status for the TRNC within the OTS. “We are thinking only about how to help our brothers preserve their state,” he said.
Before the Second Karabakh War and Azerbaijan’s military reclamation of Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku had refrained from supporting TRNC independence, so as not to contradict the international principle of territorial integrity. Today, however, with Armenia weakened and Türkiye having played a key role in Azerbaijan’s success, Baku’s strategic alliance with Ankara has taken precedence. Although Aliyev’s remarks contain a subtle critique of the Central Asian stance on Cyprus, he also notes that TRNC President Tatar took part in the informal Shusha summit of the OTS. In other words, Azerbaijan hasn’t gone as far as Türkiye in recognising TRNC independence.
Why Did the Central Asian States Support the EU’s Position on Cyprus? It’s clear that Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan are keen to bring their raw materials to European markets—just as Brussels is increasingly interested in Central Asia’s energy resources, particularly gas, oil, and uranium, given Russia’s growing isolation due to the war in Ukraine.
But how exactly does Europe plan to transport Central Asia’s wealth, now that it has closed off routes through Russia? Much like Azerbaijan in the 1990s and 2000s, the plan seems to be exporting resources via alternative corridors. This would involve a network of energy and transport infrastructure, stretching from Central Asia across the Caspian Sea, through Azerbaijan and Georgia, and into Türkiye and Europe.
Naturally, such large-scale infrastructure projects—spanning transport and energy—require vast sums of investment. But neither the Central Asian states, nor Azerbaijan or Türkiye, have such funds readily available. And so, political concessions—such as supportive declarations for Europe—become part of the price. This, in essence, explains why the Central Asian countries have publicly backed the EU’s stance on the TRNC.
President Aliyev has emphasised that, thanks to its independent economic policy, Azerbaijan has “entirely eliminated” its dependence on international financial institutions. He noted that Baku had suspended its cooperation with the IMF and scaled back engagement with other financial bodies, pointing out that the country’s external debt stands at $5 billion—7% below Azerbaijan’s GDP. “We do not need foreign investment or financing,” Aliyev declared.
Even so, at the latest Southern Gas Corridor Advisory Council meeting, President Aliyev sent a clear message to Europe: he called on the EU to reconsider its stance on withdrawing international financial backing for gas projects. In short, the TANAP and TAP pipelines, which operate at full capacity to meet Europe’s gas needs, must be expanded. And for that, investment is needed.
In other words, Aliyev is telling Europe: “If you want more gas, help build the pipelines.” Of course, any boost in gas exports is in Azerbaijan’s interest—as well as Türkiye’s, since the gas transits through its territory. Yet Azerbaijani gas alone won’t meet demand. The EU would also need access to gas from Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. And Türkiye, for its part, has a strong interest in facilitating this transit. Doing so would strengthen Ankara’s influence over Europe’s energy security, increase revenues, and solidify its leadership role in the Turkic world.
But if the goal is access to the European market, then the EU will naturally raise the political stakes: if you want funding, you must at least agree to a declaration on Cyprus. Türkiye, meanwhile, having secured control over gas transit routes from the Caspian and Central Asia under the OTS banner, is unlikely to forget the Cyprus issue. In fact, a wealthier Türkiye, supported by the wider OTS, may be in a better position to press for international recognition of the TRNC—backing it with military, economic, and political resources.
For now, however, no OTS member besides Türkiye (including Azerbaijan) has officially recognised the TRNC. Which suggests that the criticism of the Samarkand resolution may simply be political theatre. At the same time, despite its ongoing border disputes with Turkmenistan over Caspian gas fields, Azerbaijan is unlikely to undermine a common Turkic strategy under Turkish leadership simply out of rivalry.
Alexander Svarants – Doctor of Political Science, Professor, Turkologist, and expert on the Middle East.
