In the name of national security, Israel continues solving its problems through conflict.
Priorities of the Israeli military leadership
Israel cannot wage long-term wars, as it does not have the operational manoeuvre capabilities, the adequate resources and the right to a crushing military defeat. Otherwise, the price of defeat may be the erasure of the Jewish State from the political map of the world.
At the same time, in order to conduct successful military campaigns, Israel is regularly in a state of martial law, it constantly has to maintain the high combat readiness of its armed forces and the effectiveness of its intelligence services. The militarisation of its economy and the military’s technological equipment remain a priority of state policy.
The Gaza Strip. The war in the Gaza Strip, which started with the aggression of Hamas, ended with the defeat of the Palestinians and their allies. A truce has been reached, although it remains fragile and may be violated at the discretion of Israel itself.
In the Gaza Strip, Tel Aviv not only pursues the goal of the military defeat and political disappearance of Hamas, but also the final deportation of Arabs. Israel has the full support of the United States this matter, but is facing international resistance (especially from Islamic countries). Therefore, Israel maintains a state of ‘neither peace nor war’ in the Gaza Strip and is trying to deprive its opponents of the opportunity to resist through the orchestration of new conflicts.
Lebanon. Considering the Shi’a Hezbollah’s military assistance to Hamas via the bordering Southern Lebanon, Israel conducted the successful ‘Operation Northern Arrows’ in the autumn of 2024 after destroying the pockets of resistance in the Gaza Strip. This was referred to as the Third Lebanon War. In two months (September-November, 2024), Israel defeated Hezbollah, destroying its facilities, arsenal, communications, as well as a number of political and military leaders of the organisation (including its leader, Hassan Nasrallah).
In November, 2024, Israel signed a ceasefire agreement in Lebanon with the mediation of the United States and France. However, even in this case Tel Aviv reserved the right to resume hostilities in the event of attacks against its territory from Lebanon, which happened in March, 2025.
Syria. Israel views Syria as an opponent, considering the issues surrounding the occupation of the Golan Heights and the Syrian-Iranian partnership in the era of the al-Assad clan.
Until December, 2024, i.e. before the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the coming to power of the pro-Turkish terrorist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham* (HTS* is banned in the Russian Federation) led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, Israel views Syria as a key transit territory for Iranian weapons supplies to Shi’a militant groups to participate in the war on the side of Hamas. The IRGC used Syria as a stronghold against Israel, relying on Hezbollah.
In this regard, the Israeli intelligence services (Mossad, Aman) conducted a series of subversive operations to eliminate high-ranking IRGC officers and leaders of Shi’a groups operating in Syria. At the same time, Israeli aircraft carried out targeted strikes against military facilities and territory employed by radical organisations. With its attacks and intelligence operations against Syria, Israel ushered in the fall of the Assad regime, which benefitted HTS*.
Israel used the regime change in Damascus to finally capture the Golan Heights and the ‘security zone’, and also continues conducting intensive attacks on the Syrian army’s military facilities and communications to neutralise Syria’s combat potential. Moreover, Israel is apprehensive of Türkiye strengthening its position in Syria.
Yemen. Perhaps one of the most unpleasant opponents of Israel and its Western allies in the region remains Yemen, where the Houthis have launched sensitive strikes against Israel and Western merchant ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden using Iranian missiles.
During the military conflict in the Gaza Strip, the Houthis were the only ones who appealed to the Saudi authorities with a request to provide them with transit to participate in the war against Israel. The positions of the Lebanese Hezbollah are seriously undermined by the actions of the Israeli army and intelligence in Lebanon and Syria; however the Houthis continue to be active adversaries of Tel Aviv.
With the coming to power of President Donald Trump in the United States, Tel Aviv is counting on the involvement of coalition forces to launch massive and targeted strikes against Houthi locations in Yemen. The goal is to localise the Houthi military threat to Israel and ensure the safety of the passage of merchant ships from the Suez Canal through the Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb Strait to the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. The United States is already deploying additional forces to Diego Garcia Island and conducting air and naval operations against Yemen.
Iran. Iran remains one of Israel’s main opponents, as the theocratic regime in Tehran publicly advocates the overthrow of the Zionist leadership. Iran turned out to be the only Islamic state that provided tangible military support against Israel through the formation of a resistance front from among pro-Shi’a groups (in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and Afghanistan), instead of solely relying on aggressive rhetoric.
Furthermore, in response to Israel’s audacious reconnaissance and subversive operations against Iran, Tehran launched missile strikes against Israeli military facilities twice, testing the air defence systems of the Israel Defence Forces. Despite the reduction of Iranian operational and combat capabilities in the Middle East as a result of Israel’s targeted military operations in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen, Tel Aviv nevertheless considers Tehran its main enemy (especially in terms of the Iranian nuclear programme).
Benjamin Netanyahu is trying to use his alliance with Donald Trump to involve the United States in a direct military confrontation with Iran. The goal is to destroy Iranian nuclear facilities, inflict maximum damage to the Iranian energy industry and, if possible, overthrow the undesirable ruling regime in Tehran through the local ethnic separatism of Kurds, Azeris and Balochis.
With the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria and the strengthening of Türkiye’s regional stance, Tel Aviv is increasingly pondering who the main military opponent is: a weakened Iran or a strengthened Türkiye?
Türkiye. With the support of the West, led by the United Kingdom and the United States, Türkiye maintained its partnership with Israel for many years and was the first Muslim country to recognise the Jewish state through the establishment of diplomatic relations. Tel Aviv and Ankara have been developing bilateral ties in the fields of trade, energy, modern technology, defence and security for many years.
During the reign of Erdogan, Türkiye soured relations with Israel twice (in 2010 and 2023), declaring a partial trade embargo on Israel and upping the degree of hostile rhetoric against the Netanyahu regime in support of Hamas. Nevertheless, Türkiye did not stop the transit of Azerbaijani oil through its territory to Israel – even during the war in the Gaza Strip – and did not provide direct military assistance to the Palestinians, unlike Iran.
After the pro-Turkish regime led by Ahmed al-Sharaa came to power in Damascus, Ankara began counting on the implementation of the ambitious doctrine of neo-Ottomanism in Syria, laying a gas pipeline from Qatar, the elimination of the Kurdish issue in Rojava, preferential control of Syrian oil and energy communications, as well as a military alliance with Syria. Within this dynamic, Türkiye is clearly unhappy with Israel’s ongoing military attacks against Syria. Erdogan does not hide his hostility towards Israel.
Meanwhile, Türkiye fears the Israeli army’s superiority in combat readiness and military and technical equipment (especially in terms of manned and unmanned combat aircraft), as well as direct US military assistance to Israel in the event of a Turkish-Israeli military conflict. Moreover, one of the scenarios of Türkiye’s defeat may not only be a military collapse on the battlefield, but also the collapse of the territorial integrity of the current Turkish statehood.
Israel is deciding on the target of its main strike
Analysis suggests that the military and political escalation in the Middle East, with the participation of the United States and Israel, may result in another outbreak of major conflict. Whether this strike will be carried out against Iran within the framework of a broad coalition (Israel, US, UK, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Türkiye), or whether Türkiye will become the target of such an attack, carried out by Israel, the US and other NATO, countries remains to be seen.
Following repeated Israeli attacks on Syria, which undermined the resistance of the new government, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stressed that Ankara does not want a conflict with Israel in Syria and believes that the Syrians themselves should decide on the format of their contacts with Tel Aviv.
Türkiye, like a number of countries of the Arab Middle East, has received a warning from Iran that if it supports anti-Iranian aggression, Tehran will consider them its enemies, which entails all the consequences of retaliatory military strikes.
In other words, if Baku were to provide its territory for US and Israeli attacks against Iran and Iran were to respond to Azerbaijan, triggering Türkiye entering into a war against Tehran in accordance with the strategic agreement on military alliance with Azerbaijan dated July 15, 2021 (Shusha Declaration), then Iran will carry out attacks against Türkiye.
Much depends on diplomacy. Iran does not rule out entering into direct negotiations with the US through a mediator (for example Oman) to exclude a military solution to bilateral issues.
This would mean security guarantees to Israel from Iran and a compromise on lifting sanctions with the participation of global Jewish capital. In such a case Israel will be able to win the battle with Türkiye without even starting a war, instead reformatting the regional balance of power. However, time will tell how the three Middle Eastern capitals (i.e. Tel Aviv, Tehran, Ankara) will act.
Alexander SVARANTS – Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor
